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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents the Scottish Enlightenment as a literary practice in which Scottish 
thinkers deploy diverse forms of writing---for example, philosophical treatise, essay, 
autobiography, letter, journal, and history---to shape their ideas and interact with readers. 
After the unsuccessful publication of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), David Hume 
turns to write essays on moral philosophy, politics and commerce, and criticism. I argue that 
other representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, 
and William Robertson also display a comparable attention to the choice and use of literary 
forms. I read the works of the Scottish Enlightenment as texts of eighteenth-century literature 
rather than a context for that literature. Since I argue that literary culture is an essential 
component of the Scottish Enlightenment, I include James Boswell and Tobias Smollett as its 
members. 
In diverse literary forms, Scottish writers refer to geographical difference, and imagine 
the globe as heterogenous and interconnected. These writers do not treat geography as a 
distinctive field of inquiry. Instead, geographical reference is a feature of diverse scholarly 
genres. I suggest that literary experiments in the Scottish Enlightenment can be read as 
responding to the circulation of information, people, and things beyond Europe. Scottish 
writers are interested in the diversity of human beings, and pay attention to the process 
through which different groups of people in distant regions encounter each other and 
exchange their sentiments as well as products. The geographical scope of writing in the 
Scottish Enlightenment encompasses the whole surface of the earth. And Scottish writers 
explore the emergence and consequences of global interconnection. The construction of this 
global vision is evident across genres and it is a constitutive element of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. 
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Introduction 
 
The Man of Letters, Literary Form, and Geography 
 
1. Hume’s “Literary Pursuits”: A Model for Understanding the Scottish Enlightenment 
In “My Own Life,” David Hume (1711-1776) recollects that “almost all [his] life has been 
spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (xxxi). This autobiography was written just four 
months before his death in 1776 and posthumously published in 1777. At that time, he was 
known as an eminent philosopher, essayist, and historian in Britain. In the autobiography, he 
presents himself as a “man of letters” who has been “seized […] with a passion for literature” 
since his childhood (xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvi). This love of “literature” is indeed “the ruling 
passion of [his] life” (xxxii-xxxiii). His phrase “literary pursuits” covers diverse kinds of 
intellectual activities including epistemological, moral, aesthetic, and political inquiries. As 
James A. Harris points out, eighteenth-century writers and readers did not see “literature” as a 
specific field of writing associated with the product of imagination (Hume 15). Philosophical 
and historical writings were part of this domain in the eighteenth century. Hume was a writer 
who wrote on diverse subjects in various literary forms (by “forms” I mean to refer to the 
vehicles of inquiry which he chose). In addition to the essay, he made use of history, 
dialogue, and autobiography. His writing was also engaged with diverse genres of writing 
such as moral philosophy, politics and commerce, religion, and criticism (by “genre” I mean 
to refer to eighteenth-century classifications of knowledge). 
     As a man of letters, Hume was keen to attract a wide readership and continuously 
concerned about his reception in the publishing market. “My Own Life” dramatizes the 
disappointing response to A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740) as his first “literary 
attempt,” which “fell dead-born from the press” (xxxiv). He felt that Treatise had been 
ignored, or at least misunderstood, by readers. The autobiography presents this unfortunate 
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reception of the Treatise as the primary cause of his turn to essay-writing. He thought that the 
failure of his first publication “had proceeded more from the manner than the matter” (xxxv). 
The first part of Treatise was thus reshaped into Philosophical Essays concerning Human 
Understanding (1748). Prior to this recasting, the favorable reception of Essays, Moral and 
Political (1741-1742) convinced him that essays were a proper form for his literary pursuits, 
which would enable him to write on diverse subjects in an appropriately discursive manner. 
In the first edition of Essays, Moral and Political, for instance, the scope of Hume’s 
discussion covered aesthetics, politics, religion, and ethics. The essays included “Of the 
Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” “Of the First Principles of Government,” “Of Superstition 
and Enthusiasm,” and “Of Moral Prejudices.” After his success as an essayist, Hume 
continued to experiment with the use of different forms of writing. He was appointed as a 
librarian by the Faculty of Advocates in 1752, and started writing The History of England 
(1754-1762). Before his death in 1776, he also prepared the posthumous Dialogues 
concerning Natural Religion (1779) in addition to composing his autobiography. In total, his 
writing engaged with five literary forms: treatise, essays, history, dialogue, and 
autobiography. Each of these has its distinctive structure of narrative. 
     I call Hume’s intellectual pursuits described above “literary practice.” In other words, 
this means the act of communication by the use of diverse literary forms. This process 
includes shaping ideas, crafting narrative, and diffusing opinions. I choose the term “practice” 
to emphasize that Hume’s writing is not the product of speculation in solitude but the 
outcome of active participation in various kinds of social exchange. To shape ideas, he 
converses, exchanges letters, and reads books. His “practice” also involves meeting 
publishers, interacting with readers, and paying close attention to reviews of his books. The 
term therefore highlights the way in which Hume’s act of thinking and writing is embedded 
in a wider process of communication in society. His practice is “literary” in the sense that his 
writing opposes being confined within one specific category of knowledge, and his “practice” 
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is thus embodied in his wide-ranging activity as a man of letters. 
     My conceptualization of “literary practice” as an analytical term is indebted to three 
research strands in eighteenth century studies. Firstly, biographical approaches in Hume 
Studies have highlighted the significant role of the man of letters in the production and 
diffusion of philosophical ideas in eighteenth-century Britain.1 Jerome Christensen’s 
Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career (1987) directed my 
attention to “practice” as a crucial term to understand Hume’s intellectual pursuits. 
Christensen argues that Hume’s social identity as a man of letters embodies his philosophical 
vision of society itself, and thus his pursuit of developing a literary career is “a symbolic 
practice” to explore and represent the principles of the “commercial society” where he lives 
and writes (4). I think that the role of man of letters as Hume’s profession is crucial in 
examining his relation to other Scottish thinkers including Adam Smith (1723-1790). 
     Secondly, print culture approaches to Hume and his fellow Scottish thinkers have 
stimulated my interest in the way in which the act of writing was embedded in broader 
processes of communication in eighteenth-century Britain. In The Enlightenment and the 
Book (2010), Richard B. Sher reveals Hume’s active involvement in “every aspect of the 
publication” including “the format, timing, paper, quantity, printing, publishing, and 
marketing, as well as textual content, of his books” (45). This study presents Hume as a 
representative eighteenth-century author paying keen attention to the material conditions of 
circulating his ideas in the publishing market. Jon Mee’s Conversable Worlds: Literature, 
Contention, and Community 1762 to 1830 (2011) emphasizes the significant role of Hume as 
an essayist in the formation of eighteenth-century ideas and practices of conversation (57-67). 
In addition, David Allan’s Making British Culture: English Readers and the Scottish 
Enlightenment, 1740-1830 (2008) highlights the extensive scope of communication mediated 
                                                   
1 See E. C. Mossner’s The Life of David Hume (2nd ed. 1980) and James A. Harris’s Hume: An 
Intellectual Biography (2015). 
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by the circulation of print. 
Thirdly, sociology of knowledge approaches to eighteenth-century texts have enabled 
me to grasp the idea of “literature” in this period as an extensive field of human activities 
beyond generic boundaries. In The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain 
1700-1830 (1999), Clifford Siskin explains Hume’s turn to essay-writing in terms of social 
change in the division of labor (2, 49-51). This study has lead me to explore Hume’s use of 
diverse literary forms in relation to the professionalization of knowledge. Mary Poovey’s 
Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (2008) is another example of sociology of knowledge approaches. Her examination of 
the heterogeneity of economic writing before the nineteenth century reveals the process 
through which the idea of literature changed into a distinctive branch of writing associated 
with imagination.  
     I see Hume’s literary pursuits as an exemplary model for describing the Scottish 
Enlightenment itself. I suggest that his intellectual endeavor is typical of the production and 
circulation of diverse kinds of writing in Scotland between the 1740s and the 1770s. Hume 
and his fellow Scottish thinkers shared their active participation in communication mediated 
by print. Adam Smith (1723-1790), for instance, contributed articles to The Edinburgh 
Review (No.1 1755, No.2 1756), while lecturing on moral philosophy at Glasgow University 
in the 1750s. Even though he developed his career as a professor in the university, he was 
keen to circulate his ideas among a wide audience. The first outcome of this ambition was the 
publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. Nicholas Phillipson suggests that its 
successful sales in Edinburgh and London enabled Smith to establish himself as “a man of 
letters” (160). As The Theory of Moral Sentiments was based on his lectures at Glasgow, it 
was an outcome of communication as well as a catalyst for polite conversation. 
     William Robertson (1721-1793) responded to Hume’s historical writing. With the 
successful publication of The History of Scotland (1759) and The History of the Reign of the 
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Emperor Charles V (1769), he transformed himself into an eminent man of letters 
comparable to Hume (Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book 214, 259-60). Along with 
Smith, he was actively involved with the launch of The Edinburgh Review. He thought that 
the enhancement of writing and reading would contribute to establishing polite society in 
Scotland. He differed from Hume and Smith in his affiliation to the religious world. As a 
leader of the moderate party in the Church of Scotland, his intellectual pursuits sought to 
locate religion in modern commercial society. He saw print culture as an emerging space for 
elaborating and sharing theological opinions. In Church and University in the Scottish 
Enlightenment (1985), Richard B. Sher points out that members of the moderate party 
actively participated in The Edinburgh Review to advocate their religious views (68-70). As 
Jeffrey R. Smitten notes in The Life of William Robertson: Minister, Historian, and Principal 
(2018), Robertson’s intellectual exchange was not limited within the circle of fellow-
believers (103). As a member of the Select Society, for instance, he enjoyed discussion with 
Hume and Smith. Pairing Robertson and Hume, therefore, enables us to explore a wide 
network of intellectual exchange in which Scottish thinkers expressed and shared their 
different attitudes towards philosophy, politics, and religion. 
     Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) established his literary fame by the favorable reception of 
An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) in Edinburgh and London. Thanks to German 
and French translations of the Essay, he was known as an eminent man of letters throughout 
Europe. Fania Oz-Salzberger points out that major figures of the European Enlightenment 
including Voltaire and Herder admired Ferguson’s work (Introduction xvi-xvii). He was a 
friend of Hume, and they shared a wide variety of intellectual interests in the matters of civil 
society across epistemology, moral philosophy, politics, and history. Ferguson’s essay-writing 
explored topics also discussed in Hume’s essays including human nature, national characters, 
and the progress of the arts and sciences. In Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical 
Writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (2000), Mark Salber Phillips suggests that Ferguson’s Essay 
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“[brought] together a philosophical portrait of human nature, an anthropology of ‘rude 
nations,’ and a moralist’s preoccupation with the weaknesses of contemporary society” (179). 
This heterogeneity of the Essay resisted the modern division of knowledge, while Ferguson 
synthesized different elements under the name of the study of civil society. Ferguson wrote it 
as a coherent narrative of the rise and decline of civil society, while Hume just mentioned a 
loose connection between his own essays. The comparative study of Hume and Ferguson will 
show their different understanding of the practice of essay-writing. 
 
2. Literary Practice, Geography, and Scottish Networks 
In The Cambridge Companion to The Scottish Enlightenment (2003), Alexander Broadie 
describes the Scottish Enlightenment as “a remarkable intellectual flourish that lasted for 
much of the eighteenth century” (Introduction 1). Since William Robert Scott coined the term 
in 1900, there has been a continuous disagreement among scholars about the understanding of 
the Scottish Enlightenment (Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment 1). The points of their 
disagreement include the matters of identifying its period, space, members, and subjects. 
Still, the opening of Broadie’s The Scottish Enlightenment (2001) outlines the broad 
consensus among scholars about the definition of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
 
During a period of a few decades on either side of 1760, Scotland was home to a 
creative surge whose mark on western culture is still clearly discernible. That 
creative surge is now known as the Scottish Enlightenment. It was a moment when 
Scots produced works of genius in chemistry, geology, engineering, economics, 
sociology, philosophy, poetry, painting. The list is long. (1) 
 
Broadie sees the Scottish Enlightenment as a movement in which Scots were actively 
involved in the production of diverse kinds of knowledge in the mid eighteenth century. My 
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discussion uses this framing as a working definition. My contention, understanding the 
Scottish Enlightenment as literary practice, contributes to eighteenth century studies by 
exploring the significant role of writing in the production of knowledge during the period. 
This interpretation suggests that the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment were 
distinctive writers whose skillful prose both entertained and edified readers. 
The Scottish Enlightenment and Literary Culture (2016) edited by Ralph McLean, 
Ronnie Young, and Kenneth Simpson shows the recent scholarly interest in locating the 
movement in the history of writing. The focus of the book is the relation between Scottish 
philosophy and “imaginative literature” in the mid eighteenth century (Introduction 1). On 
the one hand, their study succeeds in highlighting the presence of poets and novelists in the 
Scottish Enlightenment. On the other hand, their discussion tends to see the works of Hume 
and Smith as a context for understanding eighteenth-century literature, as these thinkers did 
not write imaginative literature but theorized imagination (2-3). I rather read the works of 
Scottish thinkers as a constituent of eighteenth-century literature. Understanding Scottish 
thinkers in this way will contribute to filling the gap between scholarly interest in reading 
their writings and identifying the social and cultural circumstances of their works. The 
philosophical examination of their ideas, the structural analysis of their narratives, and the 
historical survey of their contexts, of course, complement each other. 
My study of the use of diverse literary forms in the Scottish Enlightenment involves the 
close reading of representative texts written by Hume, Smith and other Scottish thinkers. I 
examine the way in which each literary form shapes the structure of expressing ideas. The 
study of literary forms also helps us to recover some contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment 
by directing our attention to the process of the diffusion of ideas. In The Enlightenment and 
the Book, Richard B. Sher presents a detailed analysis of the production and circulation of 
books in the Scottish Enlightenment. I then aim to show how the understanding of these 
material circumstances can help us to interpret its representative works. My approach, 
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therefore, overlaps with Mark Salber Phillips’s attempt to “join the contextualizing methods 
of intellectual history to the formalist concerns of literary analysis” in Society and Sentiment 
(xi). His inquiry begins with the study of Hume as “the single figure who most centrally 
marks out the ambitions and vocabularies of the historiography of Britain” (xv). I am 
sympathetic to his exploration of “the ways in which historians, biographers, antiquarians, 
memorialists, literary historians, and others sought to represent the social world of everyday 
life as well as the inward world of the sentiments” (xii). I differ from Phillips in locating 
literature, rather than history, as my primary field of inquiry. I also confine the scope of my 
argument within the Scottish Enlightenment, while he broadens it into the British 
Enlightenment. 
In Geographies of the Book (2010), Miles Ogborn and Charles W. J. Withers 
emphasizes “how deeply geography is involved in the production, distribution and 
consumption of books” (Introduction 5). Scottish thinkers sometimes went to London to meet 
English publishers. For instance, Andrew Millar, a publisher of Scottish books in eighteenth-
century London, launched Hume’s essays (Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book 280, 285). 
In addition to their journey, their books circulated among English readers, or even European 
readers. David Allan’s Making British Culture reveals that the space of the Scottish 
Enlightenment was not limited within Scotland. (4-9). The practice of British and European 
readers also defined it. 
     This reconceptualization of the space of the Scottish Enlightenment enables me to 
discuss Tobias Smollett (1721-1771) and James Boswell (1740-1795) along with Hume, 
Smith, and other Scottish thinkers. As the absence of substantial discussion on Boswell and 
Smollett in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment shows, their intellectual 
pursuits have been relatively marginalized. This is partially because they were London-based 
writers. I should also note that there are some scholarly attempts to use the Scottish 
Enlightenment as a context to discuss Boswell and Smollett, examples of which are Gordon 
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Turnbull’s “Boswell in Glasgow: Adam Smith, Moral Sentiments and the Sympathy of 
Biography” (1995), Anthony LaVopa’s “The Not-So-Prodigal Son: James Boswell and the 
Scottish Enlightenment” (2011), and Richard J. Jones’s Tobias Smollett in the Enlightenment: 
Travels through France, Italy, and Scotland (2011). My own discussion aims to locate 
Smollett and Boswell in the Scottish Enlightenment instead of discussing Smollett/Boswell 
and the Scottish Enlightenment. 
The contrast between Smollett and Smith conceptualizes two different responses to the 
Humean model of literary pursuits. As an eminent man of letters in the mid eighteenth 
century, Smollett wrote as a novelist, editor, reviewer, translator, historian, and traveler. After 
moving from Glasgow to London in 1739, he shaped his multi-layered identity as a Scot, 
Briton, and European. Along with Hume after the publication of the Treatise, Smollett was 
actively involved with the use of diverse literary forms. He established himself as a 
professional writer in the publishing market, while Smith chiefly lived as a professor in the 
university. Smith critically developed Hume’s ideas in moral philosophy, politics, and 
criticism, and aspired to write systematically. He continued to develop Hume’s original 
ambition of writing philosophical treatises, a literary form embodying the system of 
knowledge.  
     Boswell lived as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. He was born in Edinburgh and 
studied at Edinburgh University between 1753 and 1759. In addition to cultivating a 
friendship with other students, he enjoyed going to the Edinburgh theatre in the Canongate 
and sharing the company of actors. It was the time of the Douglas controversy in which 
Scottish thinkers including Ferguson and Robertson aimed to vindicate drama as an 
embodiment of polite culture. In 1759, Boswell was sent to Glasgow University by his father 
to concentrate on legal studies, and encountered Smith as an impressive teacher. In 1762, just 
before moving to London, he started keeping a journal in an attempt to transform himself 
from a provincial Scot into a polite Briton. He then traveled around the Netherlands, 
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Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Based on this experience, he was proud of 
describing himself as “a citizen of the world” (Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides 10). The 
geographical mobility and the perception of diverse places characterized his practice as a 
diarist. I think that Boswell’s journal-writing is comparable with Hume’s essay-writing in 
terms of their ways to express geographical experience. 
     By including Smollett and Boswell as members of the Scottish Enlightenment, I can 
clarify its internal diversity, which included both professional writers and academic 
professors. Some of its members lived in Scotland, others outside. Professors including Smith 
and Ferguson were involved with the publishing world. London-based Scots including 
Boswell actually moved back and forth between London and Edinburgh. I intend to argue that 
the unity of the Scottish Enlightenment is based upon this extensive network of Scottish 
human relations. In London, Smollett enjoyed conversation with Scottish physicians and men 
of letters, such as William Hunter, at the British Coffee House. Boswell walked around 
London with Scottish friends and sent his journals to another friend in Scotland. Members of 
the Scottish Enlightenment “knew each other, interacted with each other, ate, drank, [and] 
argued with each with other” (Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment xi). 
     The circulation of information, people and things went beyond Europe in the Scottish 
networks. As sailors, clerks, international traders, and soldiers, Scots in the eighteenth 
century went to non-European worlds in pursuit of their ambition for financial success. In 
The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History (2011), Emma Rothschild presents 
the family history of the Johnstones whose sons and daughters “grew up in Scotland in the 
1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination or in reality, to the extremities of the 
British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” (1). By exploring this family’s friendship with 
Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, Rothschild reveals “a connection […] between the 
enlightenment and the empire” (211). Even though most representatives of the Scottish 
Enlightenment did not travel beyond Europe, conversation and reading mediated their 
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secondhand encounter with the rest of the globe. The geographical imagination constitutes 
narratives across a wide range of genres in the Scottish Enlightenment. In “Of the Rise and 
Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742), for instance, Hume mentions that “CHINA is one 
vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same 
manners” (122). In “Of National Characters” (1748), he notes that “[t]he FRENCH, 
GREEKS, EGYPTIANS, and PERSIANS are remarkable for gaiety” (208). His geographical 
interest is not confined to a particular region but covers diverse parts of the globe.  
     In “Toward a Historical Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” (2000), Charles W. 
J. Withers argues that geography constituted the primary system of knowledge in the Scottish 
Enlightenment. In universities and other public spaces, eighteenth-century Scots studied 
geography as “useful knowledge and polite learning” (88). On the one hand, I follow his 
contention that the Scottish Enlightenment is “a geographical matter” (63). On the other 
hand, I do not entirely follow Withers’s interpretation that geography was a distinctive field 
of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment (64). In the exploration of major texts in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, we encounter geographical reference in diverse forms including 
Hume’s essays, Smollett’s novels, Boswell’s journals, and even Robertson’s histories. 
Geographical inquiries and description were not confined to any specific form and genre of 
writing. 
 
3. The Summary of Argument 
In this thesis, I will present the use of diverse literary forms as an essential feature of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. My argument is that the Scottish Enlightenment has to be 
approached at the level of ideas, but that we also need to think about the importance of 
different forms of writing in the diffusion of ideas. Scottish thinkers reflect on how to discuss 
as well as what to discuss. I deploy the phrase “literary practice” to draw attention to this self-
critical awareness of and engagement with writing in the Scottish Enlightenment. To analyze 
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the use of diverse literary forms in the Scottish Enlightenment, I particularly focus on the way 
in which geographical reference shapes diverse kinds of narrative. Instead of becoming a 
distinct discipline, geography is incorporated into diverse genres of writing in the Scottish 
Enlightenment such as moral philosophy, political economy, and history. Hume refers to the 
condition of non-European people as a case study to establish the general principles of human 
nature, while he does not present geography as a branch of the science of man. His use of 
geographical reference is particularly significant in “Of National Characters” (1748). Adam 
Smith also refers to the diverse condition of societies across the globe as a means of 
developing his theory of commerce in The Wealth of Nations. Geographical reference appears 
in diverse subjects in various forms of writing such as philosophical treatises, essays, 
journals, and novels. 
My discussion will show that the presence of geographical reference in diverse forms 
across different genres of writing brings into focus two themes: diversity and connection. In 
their pursuit of the uniform principles of human nature, Scottish writers developed their 
understanding of diversity. In the mid eighteenth century, Britons were exposed to 
information about distant lands in the New World, Oceania, Asia, and Africa. In their 
encounter with such a remarkable diversity of social and cultural practices, Scottish writers 
aspired to grasp not only culturally particular detail but also the universal foundations 
underpinning it. In moral philosophy, this theme emerges as a question of moral judgment 
across social conventions, a case in which the European observer forms a moral judgment on 
the conduct of non-European people. In political economy, the theme arises as an inquiry into 
the different rate of accumulation of wealth in different regions of the earth.  
     In their writing, some of the Scottish men of letters are aware that the world is not only 
diverse but also interconnected. Geographical reference is a constitutive feature of discourse 
on commerce, as international trade is seen as a major driving force of this interconnection in 
the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume’s essays in Political Discourses (1752), such as “Of 
17 
 
 
Commerce,” inquire into the nature and consequences of the emergence of this 
interconnected world. The battlefields of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and 
the Seven Years War (1756-63) stretch out beyond Europe. In a period of imperial expansion, 
writing on this idea of “connection” also potentially becomes a critique of the British empire. 
The seventh chapter of book four of The Wealth of Nations is entitled “Of Colonies.” The 
theme of interconnection is explored in essays and treatises. The connection between distant 
regions is imaginary as much as physical in the sense that individual subjects in the 
metropole imagine their connection with distant regions based on their exposure to the 
movement of people, commodities, and information. Since connection cannot be physically 
grasped, it needs to be imagined. For this reason, the idea of connection is also important in 
forms of imaginative literature such as the novel.  
     This thesis examines six Scottish writers: David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, 
William Robertson, Tobias Smollett, and James Boswell. In my inquiry, Hume’s intellectual 
pursuits as a man of letters help to give rise to literary experiments in mid eighteenth-century 
Scotland. Following Hume, Ferguson develops essay-writing as a means of articulating the 
principles of human nature. In An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), he argues that 
the study of “rude nations” in the non-European world is the only way to establish the 
principles of human nature solely based on “observation.” This is a pivotal statement in 
which the use of geographical reference is theoretically situated as part of the process of 
theorizing human nature. This critical awareness about the function of geographical reference 
in writing is Ferguson’s contribution to the Scottish Enlightenment as literary practice. 
     In the history of philosophy, Smith is often seen as a successor to Hume, developing a 
moral theory of sympathy. In terms of the practice of writing, however, he differs from Hume 
to a certain extent. Contrary to Hume’s turn to essay-writing, Smith writes his two major 
works almost as philosophical treatises. The aspiration to produce a systematic account seems 
to determine the forms of writing he chose. Smith’s writing is also characterized by the way 
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in which it deploys geographical reference to survey the world from an Olympian 
perspective. In his view, the contemporary world is not only diverse but also interconnected. 
Coming to terms with global interconnection is a performative act of imagining this immense 
network of interaction. It is also a matter of inventing a viewpoint from which an individual 
subject in the metropole can synthesize his/her fragmentary experience of encountering 
faraway spaces. Global interconnection is not only the material condition of the world based 
on international trade and imperial conquest, but also the consciousness of metropolitans that 
their urban space is both physically and imaginatively connected with the rest of the earth 
through the wider circulation of people, things, and information. Diverse forms of writing 
articulate this global consciousness and encounter in a different manner. Boswell’s journal-
writing expresses his individual fascination with Captain Cook’s voyages in the 1770s. 
Instead of imagining a detached viewpoint like Smith’s philosophical treatise, the journal 
form represents Boswell’s individual experience of secondhand global encounter. 
 
4. “The Scottish Enlightenment”: The History of its Scholarship 
There is a consensus among scholars that the Scottish Enlightenment first became a 
distinctive subject of scholarly inquiry in the 1960s.2 Hugh Trevor-Roper’s “The Scottish 
Enlightenment” (1967) is often credited as foundational. It was a paper presented as a lecture 
to the Second International Congress on the Enlightenment in 1967, and was published in 
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century in the same year. Trevor-Roper describes the 
Scottish Enlightenment as the “efflorescence of intellectual vitality which suddenly became 
obvious after the defeat of the last Jacobite rebellion in 1745, but whose causes must lie 
deeper in the past” (18). He understands it as a “sudden Scottish revival [] after its dark age in 
the seventeenth century” (17). The principal task of his paper is, therefore, to identify the 
                                                   
2 See John Robertson, “The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment” 37, and Silvia Sebastiani, 
The Scottish Enlightenment 3. 
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causes of this significant upheaval in eighteenth-century Scotland. 
     Trevor-Roper suggests that seventeenth-century Scotland “suffered from a double 
isolation. Cut off from France by religion, from England by politics, refreshed mainly by the 
stale waters of Calvinist bigotry fed to it through the narrow conduits of Utrecht and Sedan 
and Geneva, it was also further insulated behind the barricades of a defensive nationalism” 
(23). The rise of the Scottish Enlightenment is, then, construed by Trevor-Roper as a 
consequence of “the breaking down of these barriers, the reopening of old contacts with 
Europe, [and] the discovery of fresh streams of thought” (23). Eighteenth-century Scotland is 
characterized by the confrontation between the old and new. Trevor-Roper contends that this 
presence of two different worlds in the same society led Scottish thinkers to conceptualize 
“human progress,” and this idea of progress and its analysis are “the peculiar contribution of 
the Scottish Enlightenment” (33). The last paragraph of his paper concludes: 
 
The idea of progress does not occur to a uniformly primitive society which seeks 
only to conserve ancient traditions. It could never have occurred to Covenanting 
Scotland. The problem of progress does not impose itself on a mature society, 
which too easily assumes its own virtue. How little direct impact it made on whig 
England! It is when a society finds itself faced, whether from outside or within 
itself, at the same time, by two distinct and strongly contrasting worlds, a world of 
antique custom inherited from the past and world of rapid movement inspired by 
new ideas from abroad, that thinking men are force to speculate on the social 
ambience of man and the mechanism of its change. (“The Scottish Enlightenment” 
33) 
 
From our present perspective, a half century after this paper was written, Trevor-Roper’s 
analytical language may sound naïve and some of his assumptions can easily be criticized. 
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For instance, his description of seventeenth-century Scotland as experiencing a “dark age” 
can be questioned. The unreflecting use of the word “progress” and the idea of backwardness 
in his study can be also interrogated by postcolonial criticism. The schematic contrast 
between England and Scotland might be complicated by emphasizing the interaction between 
them at that time, or the presence of Scots in London. Later scholarship contextualizes the 
Scottish Enlightenment much more fully than Trevor-Roper. Still the framework of his 
discussion remains informative, and my own approach aims to develop his conceptualization 
of the Scottish Enlightenment as an outcome of the experience of encounter between two 
different worlds. 
Along with Trevor-Roper, Duncan Forbes also contributes to the foundation of Scottish 
Enlightenment Studies by recognizing “The Progress of Society” as “the central and 
characteristic idea of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Hume’s Philosophical Politics xi). As one 
of the pioneering figures of the Cambridge School of the History of Political Thought before 
John Dunn and Quentin Skinner, Forbes particularly shows his keen interest in reading 
Hume’s writing on politics in its historical contexts. This project is crystallized in Hume’s 
Philosophical Politics (1975) whose introductory preface clearly explains the process of the 
development of his approach to the Scottish Enlightenment. 
 
Some years ago I wrote a general study of the eighteenth-century Scottish 
thinkers, which began with Hume, the idea being to bring out the differences 
between Hume and the others, and between the others themselves, and this was 
done, and the whole thing given some sort of thematic unity, by showing how the 
idea of social progress meant different things in all of them, when it was seen in 
the light of their respective systems, the difference being at times a matter of 
subtle nuance. I called this “The Progress of Society” . . . . (xi) 
 
21 
 
 
Forbes’s inquiry begins with his specific interest in the unique features of Hume’s thought. 
Despite his original focus on the difference between Hume and other contemporary Scottish 
thinkers, his study of their ideas of social progress comes to emphasize their similarities. 
“The Progress of Society” works as a conceptual framework to discuss these eighteenth-
century Scottish thinkers. In this process, Hume comes to be counted as a representative of an 
intellectual movement rather than as an exceptional figure among Scottish thinkers. Hume’s 
representative status is emphasized. 
More recent scholars emphasize Forbes’s contribution to the institutionalization of the 
study of the Scottish Enlightenment.3 Prior to the publication of Hume’s Philosophical 
Politics, his intellectual pursuit of the ideas of social progress in eighteenth-century Scotland 
“formed part of a Special Subject at Cambridge on the Scottish Enlightenment” in the 1960s 
“though in fact [he] was not allowed to call it that, because in those days the Scottish 
Enlightenment was still a somewhat backwoods kind of affair: it had to be ‘Hume, Smith and 
the Scottish Enlightenment’” (Forbes xi). This suggests that studies of Hume and Smith as 
eminent thinkers of the age provided the basis for Scottish Enlightenment Studies in its early 
stage of institutionalization. The title of the special subject “Hume, Smith and the Scottish 
Enlightenment” may give an impression that Hume and Smith are outside of the circle of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, even as it announces the relationship between them and the 
intellectual movement. As the quoted passages show, Forbes himself was inclined to locate 
Hume and Smith within the Scottish Enlightenment as its major representatives. This basic 
assumption has been questioned by some later scholars such as Richard B. Sher. 
     After the Second World War, philosophers often dismissed the idea of the 
Enlightenment and its social practice, assuming that it was a “project” to construct and 
diffuse an ideology of triumphant European modernity over the rest of the world, and one of 
                                                   
3 See John Robertson, “The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment” 37. 
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the causes of the havoc of the twentieth century.4 Karen O’Brien’s Narratives of 
Enlightenment (1997) challenged this argument, and presented the Enlightenment as 
“narration” rather than “project.” She contends that the Enlightenment was “the elaboration 
of a common descriptive model for the history of Europe through separately periodised 
ancient, medieval, early modern, and enlightened modern stages” (11). The scope of her 
discussion went beyond the Scottish Enlightenment by examining Voltaire, Gibbon, and 
David Ramsay as well as Hume and Robertson. Her focus was the way in which these 
eighteenth-century historians attempted to “modify or transform their readers’ sense of 
national self-awareness through the writing of narrative history” (1). O’Brien’s idea of 
“Narratives of Enlightenment” enables us to see the Scottish Enlightenment as the pursuit of 
new ways of describing emergent realities in the eighteenth century. The key point which I 
wish to make is that the Scottish Enlightenment production of new categories of social 
analysis was inseparable from forms of literary innovation. This is why I refer to “The 
Scottish Enlightenment as Literary Practice.” To understand the Scottish Enlightenment, it is 
necessary to consider that how the Scottish literati wrote matters as well as what they wrote.  
     I also want to emphasize that the pursuit of new models of description went hand in 
hand with the expansion of the geographical scope of Scottish Enlightenment writing. 
O’Brien touches on this point regarding the introduction of “cosmopolitan” perspectives into 
historical writing, when she examines the course of Robertson’s career as a historian. 
 
Robertson’s writing career took him from the locally specific History of Scotland 
(1759) to broader histories of Europe (The History of the Emperor Charles V, 
1769) and its colonies (The History of America, 1777). He was the most insistently 
cosmopolitan of all eighteenth-century historians, in part because he felt that 
                                                   
4 See Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment 1.  
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persistent tensions between Scottish and English cultural and political identities 
could only be resolved through a reappraisal of their common European frame of 
meaning. (Narratives of Enlightenment 3) 
 
O’Brien presents the expansion of geographical perspective as a feature of Robertson’s 
writing. Developing this claim, I will contend that such an expansion characterizes the 
writings of the Scottish Enlightenment more broadly. Other Scottish literati such as Hume, 
Smith, and Ferguson were also involved with expanding and transforming their geographical 
perspectives in the course of pursuing new models of description. Their background as Scots 
helps to bring this expanded geographical perspective into their writings. Whereas O’Brien’s 
reading primary focuses on the move from a national to a European framework, my own 
approach to the Scottish Enlightenment rather aims to explore how the expansion of its 
geographical frame of reference goes beyond Europe. I intend to suggest that its attempt to 
describe emerging realities is bound up with an enhancement of the understanding of 
relations between Europe and the rest of the world. 
     J. G. A. Pocock’s Narratives of Civil Government (1999) is more explicit about the 
expansion of the geographical scope of eighteenth-century historiography. He describes “the 
Enlightened narrative” as a preceding “norm” of writing with which Edward Gibbon needed 
to negotiate (1). This narrative “recount[s] the emergence from the ‘Christian millennium’ of 
the political, social and cultural orders in which the Enlightened historians believed 
themselves to be living and to which they applied the term ‘Europe’” (2). In this context, 
Scottish literati, such as Hume, Robertson, Smith, and Ferguson, not only consolidated the 
idea of Europe but also problematized it (2). As part of this critical reflection on the idea of 
Europe, their writings became partially conscious of “contacts between ‘Europe’ and worlds 
beyond it” (3). Pocock points out two ways in which attention to contact with the extra-
European world called into question the definition of Europe itself. 
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[Firstly,] The Russian state was believed to have been Europeanised, and to have 
set out on the conquest of Central Asia as far as the borders of China, leading to 
the final subjugation of the steppe nomad peoples who had so often invaded 
Roman and post-Roman Europe, enlarging the meaning of the term ‘barbarian’ 
beyond its Gothic and Germanic associations. Secondly, the peoples of the Atlantic 
coastlands---‘Europe’ in its narrowly Latin sense---had embarked on a conquest of 
the global ocean, leading to commercial empires in Asia, the colonisation of the 
Americas and the massive forced diaspora of enslaved Africans. (3) 
 
Pocock keenly makes it clear that the expansion of geographical horizons entailed the 
transformation of geographical understanding itself. For these enlightened historians, writing 
the contemporary world transformed the way in which people viewed their own space of 
living. Their daily world was subsumed into a larger picture. Rather than developing this 
point, Pocock’s concern is establishing a context for discussing Gibbon’s Decline and Fall. 
In the following chapters, I will examine the issue which Pocock broaches. 
 
5. The Outline of Chapters 
The first two chapters examine Hume’s intellectual pursuits as an exemplary model of 
literary experimentation in the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 1 discusses literal and 
metaphorical mobility in Hume’s life and thought by reading his autobiography, letters, and 
philosophical treatise. In his life as a man of letters, he moves back and forth between 
Edinburgh and London, Britain and other European countries. This movement shapes his 
multilayered identity as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. I suggest that the experience of 
being away from Scotland and thus being exposed to difference is an essential component of 
the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 2 focuses on the global scope of Hume and Ferguson’s 
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essay-writing. The essay was a common literary form for Scottish thinkers to diffuse their 
ideas. The link between the essay and the geographical imagination can be traced back to 
Addison’s Spectator No. 69 in which Mr. Spectator imagines London as the metropolitan hub 
of global encounters. Scottish writers admire Addison and endorse the role of the essay as an 
effective form for apprehending global interconnection. 
     The subsequent two chapters examine the use of fiction in the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Chapter 3 discusses Smith’s system-building and construction of a comprehensive view of 
the interconnected world. His two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the 
Wealth of Nations, are not essays, but more akin to philosophical treatises. I interpret this 
feature of his writing as his aspiration to system-building, which Hume the essayist had 
abandoned. In a global context, his system-building is an attempt to imagine a detached 
perspective from which he can grasp the expanding world of international trade as a whole. 
His moral philosophy emphasizes the function of imagination in the construction of this 
spectatorship. Chapter 4 presents Smollett’s epistolary novel, The Expedition of Humphry 
Clinker as a work of the Scottish Enlightenment. I emphasize Smollett’s experience of 
Glasgow and encounter with London as a Scot. He shares a conceptual vocabulary with 
Smith, and represents conflicted views of global interconnection through the form of his 
epistolary novel. 
     The last two chapters examine the way in which Scottish writers respond to the global 
circulation of information, people, and products. Chapter 5 locates Boswell in the Scottish 
Enlightenment. As a diarist, he observes and participates in conversation in the metropolis 
where people talk about imperial conquest and conflict. His London Journal shows the 
emerging awareness among Britons of a connection between their daily lives in London and 
distant regions of the globe. In addition, Boswell converses with Scottish thinkers and 
observes the social landscape of the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 6 traces the process by 
which Robertson expands the geographical scope of his historical writing. After embarking 
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on the history of sixteenth-century Europe, he comes to pay acute attention to encounters 
between Europe and the rest of the globe. His History of America presents the history of 
human beings in terms of their movement and settlement across the globe. He develops this 
global vision by responding to print culture and conversational circles in Edinburgh. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Movement Back and Forth: 
David Hume’s Life as a Man of Letters 
 
1. Introduction 
 
My suggestion is that we take seriously Hume’s description of himself as having 
intended from the beginning to live the life of a man of letters. He is best seen […] 
as a man of letters, a philosophical man of letters, who wrote on human nature, on 
politics, on religion, and on the history of England from 55 BC to 1688. (Harris, 
Hume 2) 
 
James A. Harris’s Hume: An Intellectual Biography (2015) opens a new horizon of Hume 
studies. It is written as “the first intellectual biography of Hume […] an attempt to give a 
complete picture of Hume’s ideas as they are expressed in the full range of his writings on 
philosophical, political, historical, economic, literary, and religious subjects” (Harris vii). 
Harris consciously pays much effort to distinguish his intellectual biography from E. C. 
Mossner’s The Life of David Hume, which has been the primary biography for Hume scholars 
since its first publication in 1954 (subsequently the second edition was published in 1980). In 
the preface of the first edition, Mossner summarizes “the basic plan of [the] book” as follows: 
“the man predominates, but the ideas provide the rationale of his actions” (xi).  
 
[T]he biographer must present enough of the thinking of his subject to be able to 
interpret his actions without, at the same time, going so far as to overburden the 
narrative with systematic exposition, making it difficult of comprehension for a 
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reader less interested in the ideas than in the man. (Mossner xi) 
 
Mossner’s primary aim as a biographer is to present the life of David Hume as a “man,” not 
to present a systematic account of the intellectual development of his “ideas.” This is why 
Harris refers to his own work as “the first intellectual biography of Hume.” His intellectual 
biography “is written for the reader less interested in the man than in the ideas” (Harris ix). At 
present, there are two opposite kinds of biography in Hume scholarship. I intend to point out 
that Hume scholars do not necessarily have to accept the dichotomy, choosing the man or 
ideas. Thanks to Mossner and Harris’s achievement, it is not difficult to examine the interplay 
between Hume’s life as a man and the development of his ideas. This dynamic interaction is 
the focus of my inquiry. 
     In this chapter, I aim to contend that movement back and forth characterizes Hume’s 
life and work. As a man, he moves back and forth between Ninewells and Edinburgh, 
Scotland and London, Britain and other European countries particularly France. Movement 
back and forth also appears as a crucial trope in his writing. In the conclusion of the first 
book of the Treatise, movement between sociable conversation and solitary contemplation 
works as a driving force to continue philosophical inquiry after a skeptical crisis. This 
movement characterizes Hume’s essay-writing as well. The essayist moves between the 
worlds of “learning” and “conversation.” My focus on movement back and forth will show 
the way in which Hume’s ideas and his life as a man interact with each other. 
     Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (1984) by Donald W. Livingston and A Progress 
of Sentiments (1991) by Annette C. Baier provide a point of departure for me to thematize 
“movement.” Both Livingston and Baier examine the transformation of the idea and practice 
of philosophy in Hume’s writing. Baier aims “to present Hume’s work as exhibiting a 
progress of thought and sentiments” (viii). For her, A Treatise of Human Nature is “a 
dramatic work” in which there is a “dialectical” development in Hume’s understanding of 
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philosophy (Baier 27). Livingston points this out as well: 
 
The relation between philosophy and common life, for Hume, is a dialectical one: 
the philosopher exists both within and without the world of common life. He exists 
within insofar as he presupposes the order as a whole. He exists without insofar as 
his thought is aimed at understanding ultimate reality. […] 
   True philosophy has a positive task and a negative, therapeutic task. The 
positive task is to explore the structure of common life through empirical and a-
priori analysis and to speculate about the real within the confines of common life. 
The negative task is that of purging common life of the alienating effects of false 
philosophy. (3). 
 
Livingston traces the process through which the outline of “true philosophy” emerges from 
the critique of “false philosophy.” And he shows that the transformation of the idea of 
philosophy is a product of a changing relation between the philosopher and common life. 
Both Livingston and Baier concentrate on the interpretation of Hume’s philosophical writing. 
I will deploy their perspective to examine his life. Livingston’s focus on the relation between 
philosophy and common life is particularly useful to analyze Hume’s experience of mental 
breakdown. 
     I choose three events in Hume’s life, which Harris tends to underestimate by treating 
them as anecdotes: (a) his experience of mental breakdown in the early 1730s, (b) his 
resolution to become an international trader and the resulting failure of this in Bristol in 1734, 
and (c) his stay in Paris between 1763 and 1766 as a secretary to Lord Hertford after 
establishing his international fame as a man of letters. I will argue that the experience of 
mental breakdown leads him to recognize stasis as harmful not only to his life as a man but 
also for his philosophical pursuits. A new understanding of health reshapes his idea of 
30 
 
 
philosophy as well as the course of his life. He seems to understand that movement keeps 
both his life and philosophical pursuit healthy. His aspiration to become an international 
trader after his illness is crucial to understand the construction of his persona in writing, both 
the Treatise and his later works. In Harris’s narrative of the development of Hume’s ideas, 
those two events are treated as marginal because Harris’s main focus is what Hume read and 
responded to before writing the Treatise. I want to emphasize, however, that those events are 
important to understand the larger process through which Hume reshapes the idea of 
philosophy itself in the early stage of his life. Therefore, my discussion of the two events 
contributes to understanding his ideas as well as the man himself. As for Hume in Paris 
between 1763 and 1766, Harris presents it as an event after “the end of Hume’s career as an 
author”: 
 
[Hume] wrote only a handful of short and minor pieces during the remaining 
thirteen years of his life. He was in Paris for more than two years, and became 
friends with many of the great men and women of the French Enlightenment, but 
nothing there inspired him to write anything new. (409) 
 
As is shown in this passage, Harris focuses on Hume’s encounter with French philosophes. 
My discussion, however, deals with Hume’s epistolary exchange with Adam Smith and other 
friends in Scotland about where to settle down. Hume did not write any major work in the 
mid-1760s, but wrote several important letters, which expressed the tension between his 
identities as a Scot and a cosmopolitan man of letters. In my interpretation, Hume’s life in 
Paris is an important period during which he planned to cease moving back and forth.  
     My contribution to Hume scholarship is to emphasize the importance of the three 
events in his life as a means to understand his idea and practice of philosophy. His life as a 
man is crucial to grasp the intellectual development of his ideas, particularly the process 
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through which his distinctive idea of philosophy is shaped. My argument will help Hume 
scholars to sidestep the question of whether to focus on the man or ideas. My examination of 
the interplay between his life as a man and the development of his ideas will show that 
movement back and forth characterizes both of them. Hume as a man moves, and his prose 
also embodies this movement. This point also has larger implications for our understanding 
of literature and culture in eighteenth-century Britain. Hume’s geographical movement is a 
notable example to grasp the way in which a man of letters in the eighteenth century thinks 
and writes while crossing regional and national borders. His experience of living in Paris in 
the 1760s helps us to think about the cosmopolitan ideal in the republic of letters, a 
community of men/women of letters beyond national boundaries.  
 
2. Philosophical Pursuit and Mental Breakdown 
In 1711, as the second son of Joseph Home, a lawyer who owned the estate of Ninewells in 
Berwickshire, David Hume was born in Edinburgh. Hume spent his childhood at Ninewells 
near the Anglo-Scottish border and went to Edinburgh University in 1721. After pursuing 
philosophy and general learning, he left the University in 1725 or 1726. Even though his 
family expected him to proceed to the legal profession, he continued to devote himself to 
philosophical speculation and reading classics based on his ardent passion for literature. 
Following his mental breakdown in 1729, however, he changed the direction of his life to 
becoming an international trader. In 1734, he went to Bristol as an apprentice to a sugar 
merchant, but this ended up with a quarrel with his master within a few months. He then 
returned to philosophy and stayed in France between 1734 and 1737 during which the 
substantial part of the Treatise was written. 
     The above is a concise summary of a common narrative of Hume’s early life presented 
by his biographers including Harris and Mossner. As the outset of framing his biographical 
narrative, Harris emphasizes “[t]he paucity of evidence” during the period between Hume’s 
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student days in Edinburgh and stay in France (36). In the absence of any new evidence, Hume 
scholars follow the conventional narrative. In The Life of David Hume, Mossner spends 
almost one hundred pages explaining the minute details of Hume’s early life such as the 
preceding family history of the Humes (Homes) of Ninewells, the social landscape of 
Edinburgh and Bristol, and his friendship and personal encounters. Mossner’s interest in 
Hume as a man dominates his extensive account of that period. Harris, by contrast, spends 
less than fifty pages examining Hume’s early life in his intellectual biography. He pays 
greater attention to Hume’s ideas than to his life, and concentrates on what Hume read and 
wrote in this period. Hume’s response to Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks is a key moment in 
Harris’s account of his development as a thinker. 
 
The first really significant event in Hume’s intellectual life may have been an 
encounter with Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. 
Hume bought, or was given, a copy in 1726, and his earliest letters give the 
impression that he spent the next two or three years working very hard to follow 
Shaftesbury’s instructions as to how taste, and character, should be formed. Hume 
seems to have done his best to turn himself into a kind of Stoic, albeit one of a 
modern and polite sort. The experiment was not a success. It helped to bring on a 
physical and mental breakdown in the autumn of 1729, and by the time Hume was 
on the way to recovery, he had a completely new sense of his intellectual vocation. 
He no longer shared Shaftesbury’s admiration for the moral philosophy of the 
ancients, and believed that there was a need for a completely fresh start in the 
study of human nature. (Harris 25-26) 
 
Harris shows that there was a transformation of Hume’s idea of philosophy itself in the late 
1720s. At first, he aspired to live and think as a Stoic in the modern world with his 
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philosophy concerned to present how human beings should behave. The failure of this 
intellectual attempt led him to pursue philosophy as an anatomist of human nature. His new 
idea was that philosophy was an analysis of “human nature as it revealed itself to 
experience,” an empirical inquiry into “what human beings were actually like” as opposed to 
“what moralists and religious apologists wanted them to be like” (Harris 36). Harris presents 
this turn as a process in which Hume established a critical distance from Shaftesbury’s moral 
philosophy. I want to emphasize that the shift is also determined by Hume’s experience of 
illness. Therefore, it represents a notable interplay between the course of his life as a man and 
the development of his ideas. 
     My contention is that Hume shaped his own idea of philosophy through his experience 
of mental breakdown: he found that trying to be a modern Stoic was bad for his health. Hume 
subsequently realized that the lack of the movement between sociable and speculative lives 
led philosophical inquiry in the wrong direction. As a result of this illness, movement 
emerged as a crucial theme in his thinking and writing as well as his life itself. To explore 
further this pivotal moment in his intellectual life, I will closely examine his letter to a 
physician in London written in 1734 before starting his apprenticeship in Bristol. In this 
letter, he gave an account of his illness and passion for philosophy and sought professional 
advice from the physician. As Harris points out, “there is no evidence that [the letter] was 
actually sent”: it “exists only in draft form” (37). In addition, Hume scholars disagree about 
the identity of the physician. J. Y. T. Greig, the editor of The Letters of David Hume, 
conjectures that it is Dr. George Cheyne, while Mossner contends that Dr. John Arbuthnot is 
“the only candidate perfectly fulfilling all the qualifications laid down and implied in the 
letter” (84). Hume addresses the physician: “I am your Countryman, a Scotchman” (Letters 
1:12). And the physician is “a man of Letters, of Wit” (1:12). Even though there is 
uncertainty about some background of the letter, it nonetheless helps us to understand 
Hume’s transforming idea of philosophy. 
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     In the letter, Hume presents himself as a man who has kept “a strong Inclination to 
Books & Letters” since “earliest Infancy” (1:13). He intends to describe the brief history of 
his life so far while leaving the letter anonymous. He announces: “I […] shall give you a kind 
of History of my Life, after which you will easily learn, why I keep my Name a Secret” 
(1:13). The letter expresses that he was dissatisfied with the present condition of knowledge 
and learning after attending Edinburgh University: “[e]veryone, who is acquainted either with 
the Philosophers or Critics, knows that there is nothing yet establish[ed] in either of these two 
Sciences, & that they contain little more than endless Disputes” (1:13). Before his mental 
breakdown in 1729, he had a certain intellectual ambition to reform this chaotic disorder in 
the sphere of learning. He aspired to “seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be 
establish[ed]” (1:13). 
     Hume’s health began to decline during the midst of that intellectual pursuit. 
 
After much Study, & Reflection […] when I was about 18 Years of Age, there 
seem’d to be open’d up to me a new Scene of Thought […]. I cou’d think of no 
other way of pushing my Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & 
Philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this Course of Life for some Months; till at 
last, about the beginning of Sep[tember] 1729, all my Ardor seem’d in a moment 
to be extinguish[ed], & I cou’d no longer raise my Mind to that pitch, which 
formerly gave me such excessive Pleasure. (1:13) 
 
Hume’s language here solicits close reading. He felt “infinitely happy” in the philosophical 
pursuit. And such an intense immersion in reading and thinking without any restriction gave 
him “excessive Pleasure.” These phrases seem to present his intellectual involvement as 
shading in to overindulgence in some degree. Hume’s emphasis on excess in this passage 
suggests that he understands his mental breakdown not as an unfortunate interruption of his 
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philosophical inquiry but as a consequence of it. 
     In the letter, Hume suspects that his “having read many Books of Morality, such as 
Cicero, Seneca & Plutarch” might have been the cause the breakdown (1:14). He was “smit 
with their beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy,” but they drained his “Spirits” 
(1:14). Hume then distinguishes between the active and speculative lives. 
 
These [books of morality] no doubt are exceeding useful, when join’ed with an 
active Life; because the Occasion being presented along with the Reflection, 
works it into the Soul, & makes it take a deep Impression, but in Solitude they 
serve to little other Purpose, than to waste the Spirits, the Force of the Mind 
meeting with no Resistance, but wasting itself in the Air, like our Arm when it 
misses its Aim. This however I did not learn but by Experience, & till I had 
already ruin’d my Health, tho’ I was not sensible of it. (1:14) 
 
In this passage, Hume identifies the period of his intensive study as the time when his health 
began to decline. There were no obstacles to his studies at this time but the absence of any 
form of “resistance” was itself problematic. He realizes that philosophical speculation which 
is unconnected to active life is not only barren but also dangerous. As Jerome Christensen 
argues in his reading of this letter, Hume’s account of his failure to follow the ancient 
philosophers allows him to ground “a philosophy which can rest neither on hypothesis nor 
authority”: it is experience that “makes it possible for Hume to write any philosophy at all” 
(Practicing Enlightenment 59). Writing the experience of his disease represents a significant 
moment in which Hume transforms himself from an admirer of ancient philosophy into an 
anatomist of human nature whose philosophy is solely based on experience. Christensen 
argues that “Hume […] devises a remedy for his illness that is simultaneously a technique for 
writing” (17). Following Christensen’s reading, I want to emphasize that Hume’s experience 
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of his breakdown introduces two crucial insights into his life and thought: (a) the distinction 
between the active and speculative lives, (b) the agency of writing. Writing about himself 
provides a way of doing philosophy and developing his ideas. In other words, writing the 
diseased self is the origin of his philosophy. 
     Christensen argues that “[t]he metaphorization of symptom,” the process in which 
Hume abstracts his diseased “body […] into discourse,” is the core of the letter (18, 63). But I 
want to point out that his reading overlooks the way in which movement is introduced as a 
crucial theme in the letter, and then his life and thought. In the course of analyzing the nature 
of the breakdown, Hume realizes “that as there are two things very bad for this Distemper, 
Study & Idleness, So there are two things very good, Business & Diversion” (HL 1:17). 
Therefore, he has “resolved to seek out a more active Life” (1:17). I want to emphasize that 
his resolution is not a statement about the renunciation of the speculative life. In the letter, 
Hume clearly articulates the point: “I cou’d not quit my Pretensions in Learning, but with my 
last Breath, to lay them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them” 
(1:17). Hume plans to move back and forth between two worlds, the active and the 
speculative. And he expects that this movement will enable him to resume philosophy in a 
proper manner. 
The movement back and forth between two worlds, the speculative life in solitude and 
the sociable life in company, also underlies his narrative at the end of the first book of 
Treatise where he articulates the consequences of his inquiry into skepticism. He presents his 
current situation as “a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap’d 
shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky 
weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the 
globe under these disadvantageous circumstances” (1.4.7.1 SB263-64: 172). Hume’s 
philosophical investigation begins with his ambition to establish the science of man, and 
proceeds to examining the nature of human faculties so as to provide a foundation for 
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knowledge. His study, however, reveals the uncertainty of our sensory experience, and 
therefore, of our knowledge. This outcome potentially undermines the possibility of the 
science of man itself. His preliminary inquiry ironically subverts the prospect of his whole 
project. This state of affairs “strikes [him] with melancholy” (1.4.7.1 SB 264: 172).  
 
I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am 
plac’d in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not 
being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d all human commerce, 
and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate. (1.4.7.2 SB 264: 172) 
 
His situation here is somewhat similar to when he suffered from mental breakdown. This is a 
point where there is an interplay between his life and thought. Philosophical contemplation 
has made him melancholic, and removed him from sociable interaction in conversational 
space. This is another version of the contrast between the speculative and active lives. His 
philosophical argument at the end of the first book presents the necessity of movement 
between these two worlds. Even though “reason is incapable of dispelling” this gloom in 
solitude, “nature herself” becomes a driving force to lead him back to conversation in 
company in the midst of which he no longer cares about the issue of the uncertain condition 
of knowledge (1.4.7.9 SB 269: 175). 
 
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; 
and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in 
my heart to enter into them any further. (1.4.7.9 SB 269: 175)  
 
It is not external but internal forces that provide the means to cure this philosophical 
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melancholy. This move is analogous to his resolution to quit philosophy and become a 
merchant. Treatise also presents the subsequent process after the engagement with the 
sociable life, his return to the speculative life. The movement between two worlds is not 
necessarily one-way. 
 
. . . I am tir’d with amusement and company, and have indulg’d a reverie in my 
chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel my mind all collected within 
itself, and am naturally inclin’d to carry my view into all those subjects, about 
which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and 
conversation. . . . I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction 
of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These 
sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition . . . and this is the origin 
of my philosophy. (1.4.7.12 SB 270-71: 176) 
 
As a philosopher, he carefully manages both his distance from and connection to the sphere 
of common life where other people enjoy sociable interaction. He tries to keep a distance 
because he is aware that conversation can turn into empty chatter. The sociable life itself does 
not provide him a place of thinking. The sense of boredom from being with other people 
leads him to return to solitude. At the same time, this passage does not entirely deny the value 
of conversation itself. Thanks to his former conversation, he now has subjects for critical 
reflection in his solitary life. Being involved with common life is, thus, an essential part of 
the development of his philosophical thinking. The movement between two worlds can be a 
driving force of this narrative. The philosopher is somewhat distant from common life, but 
still keeps his connection with it, as his inquiry aims to contribute to improving the condition 
of “mankind.” 
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3. Becoming an International Trader in Bristol 
 
In 1734, I went to Bristol, with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but 
in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, 
with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat; and I there laid that 
plan of life, which I have steadily and successfully pursued. [. . .] 
   During my retreat in France, first at Reims, but chiefly at La Fleche, in Anjou, 
I composed my Treatise of Human Nature. After passing three years very 
agreeably in that country, I came over to London in 1737. (David Hume, “My 
Own Life” xxxiii-xxxiv) 
 
In the early 1730s, Hume chose to become a merchant and went to Bristol for his 
apprenticeship. From this resolution onward, his life was characterized by several kinds of 
movement. Firstly, he moved between the speculative and active lives. Like the sceptic back 
in the sociable world after a period of solitary inquiry in the Treatise, Hume enjoyed the 
conversational world of Bristol with his friends. And he resumed his philosophical pursuit 
again after abandoning his plan to become a merchant. Secondly, he moved geographically 
between Scotland and England, and between Britain and France. His life was determined by 
the experience of crossing regional and national borders, and of becoming a stranger, whether 
as a Scot in England or a Briton in France. Such geographical movements posed 
philosophical questions about the existence or otherwise of “national character,” and the 
possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, he moved between diverse professions. After his 
failure to become a merchant, he aspired to live as a philosopher. As a result of the 
unsuccessful publication of the Treatise, however, he moved toward becoming an essayist 
following the Addisonian ideal of politeness in literary culture. He temporarily worked as a 
tutor and a secretary to a military embassy as well. Fourthly, there was a movement in his 
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writing as he began to compose essays rather than self-consciously “philosophical” works. In 
the Treatise, he wrote as an “anatomist,” who observed and described human nature without 
any colorful exaggeration. In his subsequent works, however, he tried to entertain and affect 
readers. 
     In this section, I will closely examine the philosophical and literary implications of 
Hume’s failure to become a merchant in Bristol. He fails to participate in commerce but starts 
instead to write about commerce afterwards. In addition, his essay-writing performs the social 
commerce of sympathy. Even after his life in Bristol, his persona as a merchant helps us to 
understand his idea and practice of writing. In other words, commerce matters in his life and 
thought in two respects. Firstly, the nature and consequences of commerce become an object 
of his philosophical inquiry. Secondly, as an essayist, he presents writing as a kind of 
commerce, the exchange of information, opinions, and sentiments between the writer and 
reader. Movement characterizes his writing, as he intends to move readers psychologically. 
And his experience of geographical movement is incorporated into writing as well. 
My focus on the trajectory of Hume’s career is indebted to Jerome Christensen’s 
Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career (1987), which 
contends that his “career” fully embodies “an epistemology based on a deontologized system 
of representation, an ethics reducible to sympathetic exchange, and a social anthropology 
anchored in convention” (3). The pursuit of his literary career means a continuous attempt to 
shape his social identity by the performative agency of writing. In Christensen’s original 
study, Hume’s self-fashioning as a man of letters is construed as a microcosm of his theory of 
human nature itself. My discussion shares Christensen’s premise that Hume’s life itself 
articulates his thought. 
 
At different times Hume was a student of the law, a clerk to a Bristol merchant, a 
writer of philosophical treatises, a tutor, a military adjutant, a librarian, a composer 
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of belles lettres, a historian, an embassy secretary, and a Parisian saloniere. He 
intermittently resided at his family estate of Ninewells, in Edinburgh, in Reims, in 
London, and in Paris. That the personal identity which underwent those changes 
was anything but fictitious we can safely doubt [. . .]. We can safely doubt because 
of our assurance that Hume’s social identity was continuous [. . .]. 
   For Hume “man of letters” offered a social identity of great resilience and 
power because it was at every point congruent with the marvelously adaptive idea 
of society that Hume composed in his works. (3) 
 
The starting point of my inquiry is the same as that of Christensen’s; that Hume was involved 
with different kinds of profession in the course of his life, and that this also entailed his 
geographical movement from place to place. But the direction of my argument is different 
from that of Christensen’s. His focus is on the way in which the performative agency of 
writing consolidates the different dimensions of his social persona. I am more interested in 
the nature of his movement between different professions/places itself than the imaginative 
force which ensures the consistency of his sense of self. In other words, Christensen examines 
the union of Hume’s fragmented selves in his life and writing, and I explore the 
transformation of his identity that was facilitated by his mobility. 
     In 1734, Hume left Ninewells and probably took a sea voyage from Berwick to London 
(Mossner 81). Harris presumes that Hume then moved from London to Bristol by stagecoach 
(76). His move from Ninewells to Bristol via London was his first experience of exposure to 
English society and its polite manners. His working experience under an English merchant 
would lead him to become aware of his socio-cultural background as a Scot. It was also a 
moment of his involvement in Britain’s commercial empire. As E. C. Mossner points out in 
The Life of David Hume, Bristol in this period served as “the chief port for the West India 
trade”; Hume’s employer, Michael Miller, was “[a] sugar-merchant importing from the West 
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Indies” and “also involved in the slave-trade in accordance with the customary practice of the 
lucrative triangular voyage” (88). This biographical detail helps us to read his discussion of 
commerce. We can trace very limited details of his life in Bristol as a merchant. Mossner’s 
biography mentions two notable events. Due to “the futility of getting Englishmen to 
pronounce Home as Hume,” he “change[d] the spelling of his surname to conform to the 
pronunciation” (90). In addition, he had a “quarrel with his master at the counting-house” 
because of his “corrections of grammar and style in Miller’s letters” (90). Both points 
confirmed the beginning of his consciousness of being a marginal Scot in English society. 
Mossner summarizes Hume’s experience of being in Bristol as one of disappointment: 
 
So, Hume, despite his romantic anticipation in the letter to Dr Arbuthnot of the life 
of a supercargo---“to toss about the World, from the one Pole to the other”---
became just another clerk in a counting-house in the homeland. Whether this was 
by his own choice or not cannot be ascertained; but, in later years at least, he 
acknowledged himself such a poor sailor as to be unable to cross even the Firth of 
Forth without getting seasick. Perhaps the coastal voyage to London had already 
given him some inkling of that weakness. (88) 
 
Hume originally imagined his future active life in which he would go back and forth between 
different places. In his apprenticeship as a merchant, however, he himself did not move 
actively. His work as a clerk was rather to manage the circulation of things and the movement 
of other individuals. In this respect, his own exposure to the imperial/global network was 
imaginary rather than actual. And this implies that movement in his life and philosophy has a 
symbolic aspect as well as a spatial one. 
     Hume never returned to work as a merchant after leaving Bristol. In the course of 
pursuing his literary career after his apprenticeship, he sometimes suspended philosophical 
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speculation in solitude and participated in some active scenes of common life. In such a 
situation, he chose professions other than a merchant, such as a tutor and a secretary to an 
embassy. In this respect, Hume moved away from the world of merchants. At the same time, 
however, he to some extent retained the persona of a merchant even when he began to 
commit himself to literary pursuits. The work of the merchant functions as a crucial metaphor 
to conceptualize the nature of his writing. 
In “Of Essay-Writing” (1742), he presents the initial task of the essayist as 
“promot[ing] a good Correspondence” between “the learned and conversible Worlds” (535). 
The distinction between the speculative and active lives in the letter to the physician re-
appears here as the distinction between learning and conversation. On the one hand, the 
learned world comprises people who are devoted to speculative labor in “Solitude” detached 
from common life (533). On the other hand, the conversible world comprises people who are 
in the common world and involved with intellectual labor based on “a sociable Disposition” 
(533). Therefore, “the Company and Conversation of our Fellow-Creatures” is the foundation 
of their activities (534). Hume points out that “[t]he Separation of the Learned from the 
conversible World seems to have been the great Defect of the last Age” (534). The lack of the 
interaction with the learned possibly turns conversation into a mere indulgence: people just 
enjoy “gossip[]ing Stories and idle Remarks” (534). In addition, Hume also emphasizes that 
“Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded 
from the World and good Company”: “Philosophy […] became as chimerical in her 
Conclusions as she was unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of Delivery” (534-35). Its lack 
of connection to the sphere of conversation means that philosophical speculation in solitude 
develops ideas not rooted in experience, therefore they become “chimerical.” Essay-writing is 
then an effective means to resume the communication between these two worlds. The central 
theme in “Of Essay-Writing” follows and rehearses the theme in his preceding writing. 
Hume as an essayist describes himself as “a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the 
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Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation” (535). He moves from the speculative 
world into the sociable world. In addition to his own movement, he also facilitates the 
interaction between these two dominions by writing essays.  
 
I shall give Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall 
endeavour to import into Company whatever Commodifies I find in my native 
Country proper for their Use and Entertainment. The Balance of Trade we need 
not be jealous of, nor will there be any Difficulty to preserve it on both Sides. The 
Materials of this Commerce must chiefly be furnish’d by Conversation and 
common Life: The manufacturing of them alone belongs to Learning. (“Of Essay-
Writing” 535) 
 
The interaction between the two worlds is imagined as international trade in this passage. 
Hume works as a merchant to “import” the product of philosophical speculation from the 
world of learning into the world of conversation, with a vision that the outcomes of learning 
will afford company appropriate topics for conversation; and therefore, this international 
trade is expected to advance the practice of conversation. As an international trader, Hume 
resides in the world of conversation, and collects materials of philosophical speculation there 
for exportation to the world of learning. The production of knowledge is described as a 
process necessarily entailing exchange. There is a division even in intellectual labor. This 
vision also articulates Hume’s empiricism. Philosophical speculation needs to be based on the 
experience and observation of common life. 
Hume emphasizes the reciprocity in intellectual exchange between the two worlds by 
saying that “[t]he Balance of Trade we need not be jealous of.” At this moment, international 
trade is deployed as a crucial metaphor to characterize his idea and practice of writing as an 
essayist. In his later work international trade becomes a subject of his inquiry. After the 
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publication of the two volumes of Essays, Moral and Political (1741-1742), in which “Of 
Essay-Writing” was collected, he published a new collection of essays on commerce titled 
Political Discourses in 1752. One of its essays was “Of the Balance of Trade.” As Eugene F. 
Miller points out, Political Discourses was “so successful that a second edition was published 
before the year was out, and a third in 1754” (Foreword xiii). In “My Own Life” written in 
1776, Hume recollects: 
 
In 1751, I removed from the country to the town, the true scene for a man of 
letters. In 1752, were published at Edinburgh, where I then lived, my Political 
Discourses, the only work of mine that was successful on the first publication. It 
was well received abroad and at home. (xxxvi) 
 
Hume does not explain why Political Discourses was so successful in its reception. But it 
deployed a strategy of writing which enabled his essays to be accessible to readers unfamiliar 
with the discussion of commerce. Harris points out that “Hume wrote as a person of liberal 
and learned education seeking liberal and learned readers” (Hume 283). The subject of 
Political Discourses is the nature and consequences of international trade, but Hume’s 
writing deploys a style influenced by his passionate study of literature. “There were no tables 
of figures in the Political Discourses, and nothing in the way of detailed examination of the 
state of trade, […] or even of the current amount and cost of the national debt” (Harris 283). 
Hume’s writing combines a range of genres not usually associated with the study of 
international trade.  
     Harris also points out another unique feature of Political Discourses in terms of the 
relationship between the writer and his readers which Hume intends to establish. 
 
Hume had no particular doctrine or theory of trade to argue for. He wrote first and 
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foremost with the intention of stimulating surprise, puzzlement, and reflection in 
his reader. Part of the point of calling the book a set of discourses was, perhaps, to 
highlight the fact that topics are treated there, as in a talk given to a club or society, 
in a manner intended to provoke further discussion. (Hume 282) 
 
Instead of developing and presenting his own principles of international trade, Hume invites 
readers to think and talk about his topics. His writing aims as much to inspire as to persuade 
them. While Hume here approaches the subject of international trade in a manner very 
different from a contemporary such as Adam Smith, his practice in Political Discourses is 
consistent with the idea of essay-writing which he expressed in Essays, Moral and Political. 
In Political Discourses, his intellectual labor is devoted to importing interesting topics from 
the study of commerce for the benefit of non-specialists. His persona continues to be that of a 
merchant, and he expects that his essays on international trade will promote sociable 
exchange in the world of conversation. 
     In “Of the Balance of Trade,” Hume intends to interrogate a prevailing view about the 
negative consequences facing any nation which imports more than it exports. “[E]ven in 
nations well acquainted with commerce,” Hume finds that there is “a strong jealousy with 
regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and silver may be leaving them” 
(309). He comments that “all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on 
very uncertain facts and suppositions” (310). In the construction of his counterargument, the 
flow of money is compared to that of water. “All water, whatever it communicates, remains 
always at a level” (312).  
 
Can one imagine, that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even by any art or 
industry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought 
from the INDIES. […] What other reason, indeed, is there, why all nations, at 
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present, gain in their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL; but because it is 
impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level? (“Of 
the Balance of Trade” 312) 
 
Hume imagines the movement of wealth in a wider geographical scope including imperial 
connections between Europe and the rest of the world. As a result of his failure to become an 
international trader, he does not participate in facilitating such movement. But the world of 
international trade still provides the basis for his philosophical thinking. This act of imagining 
the world of international trade is underlain by his experience of being exposed to the social 
dynamics of Bristol. As an apprentice to a sugar merchant involved with the West India trade, 
he would have recognized the imprint of the movement of wealth on everyday life in Bristol.  
     Hume’s study of commerce expands the sphere of common life, which provides raw 
materials for his essay-writing. His essay on international commerce shows that the scope of 
common life even covers non-European regions. In “Of the Balance of Trade,” he also 
mentions the distance between Europe and China. 
 
[T]he immense distance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA 
companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in EUROPE the gold and 
silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that 
kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes 
abovementioned is still evident. The skill and ingenuity of EUROPE in general 
surpasses perhaps that of CHINA, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; 
yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage. And were it not 
for the continual recruits, which we receive from AMERICA, money would soon 
sink in EUROPE, and rise in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places. 
(313) 
48 
 
 
 
In his analysis of the connection between Europe and China, Hume also discusses the way in 
which European colonies in the New World mediate the interaction between those two 
regions. In developing his account of spatial relations, Hume therefore broaches the concept 
of the “network,” as a means of understanding the integration of different regions. In such a 
manner, writing on commerce expands the geographical scope of his philosophical 
speculation.  
 
4. Movement and Settlement 
Hume moved back and forth beyond national borders. He wrote the Treatise in France after 
his failure to become a merchant in Bristol, and went back to London in 1734 to publish it. In 
1748, He attended General St. Clair’s military embassy to Vienna and Turin as a secretary. In 
“My Own Life,” he recalls this moment: “I then wore the uniform of an officer, and was 
introduced at these courts [of Vienna and Turin] as aid-de-camp to the general” (xxxv). As 
part of his experience in another profession, he encountered a polite world of conversation in 
foreign countries. In 1763, he was also invited to attend Lord Hertford’s embassy to Paris. He 
found “a real satisfaction in living at Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing, and 
polite company” (“My Own Life” xxxix). He even “thought once of settling there for life” 
(xxxix). He enjoyed such a cosmopolitan life while keeping an emotional attachment to his 
homeland, both Ninewells and Edinburgh. 
     Hume did not write any philosophical treatise or essay on cosmopolitanism. There was 
no systematic account of that subject in his writing. But some scholars argue that a 
cosmopolitan perspective is nonetheless a distinctive element of his writing. In his 
interpretation of Political Discourses, Harris contends that Hume was “willing to consider the 
politics of trade from a historical and markedly cosmopolitan perspective” (269). This made 
Hume’s work “novel” because preceding literature on commerce in English usually 
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expressed “the exclusive and obsessive concern with British interests alone” (269, 270). In 
addition, Karen O’Brien construes Hume’s History of England as an Enlightenment project to 
write “cosmopolitan history” along with Voltaire, William Robertson, and Edward Gibbon 
(Narratives of Enlightenment 2). Hume presents a national history “within a European 
historical framework [. . .] with subtly ironic detachment” (O’Brien 3). He writes as a 
cosmopolitan when he discusses commerce and history. 
     Hume’s adoption of the persona of a cosmopolitan is a product of the interplay between 
his life and writing. In this section, I focus on Hume’s experience of being in Paris as Lord 
Hertford’s secretary in the 1760s, and closely examine his epistolary exchange with friends in 
Scotland, Adam Smith in particular. It was a moment in which Hume was wondering where 
to settle. In preceding years, he moved back and forth between Ninewells and Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh and London, and London and other European cities. After accepting an invitation 
to join the Embassy to France, Hume thought that Paris could be his permanent home, though 
he eventually went back to Britain in 1766. Over the course of this period, Hume experienced 
a tension between his aspiration to move and desire to settle, and between an ideal and reality 
of cosmopolitanism. Hume studies pays relatively little attention to the period between 1762 
and 1769, mainly because its biographical details do not help scholars to re-interpret his 
major texts, which had already been published by this time. And, as Harris notes, his 
enthusiastic experience of being in the heart of the French Enlightenment did not prompt him 
“to write anything new” (33). Nonetheless, I want to point out that the study of Hume’s later 
life enables us to think about a philosophical and historical problem, regarding the possibility 
or otherwise of becoming a cosmopolitan in the republic of letters. 
     After a certain success as an essayist writing on commerce, Hume embarked on writing 
The History of England, whose final two volumes were published in 1761.1 As Harris notes, 
                                                   
1 For Hume as a historian, see Nicholas Phillipson, Hume (1989). Along with O’Brien’s Narratives of 
Enlightenment, J. G. A. Pocock’s Narratives of Civil Government (1999) develops this theme. See 
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“The History of England made Hume rich” and “left him unsure what to do next” as well 
(33). What he did soon after this was to purchase a fixed property in Edinburgh. In July 1762, 
He wrote to Gilbert Elliot of Minto:  
 
I have hitherto been a wanderer on the face of the earth, without any abiding city; 
but I have now at last purchased a house, which I am repairing, tho I cannot say 
that I have yet fixed any property in the earth, but only in the air: for it is the third 
story of James’s Court, and it cost me five hundred pounds. (HL 1:367)2 
 
Hume’s sense of humor underlies the whole tone of this letter. He jokes that his apartment is 
not fixed “in the earth” because it is not on the ground floor. His sanguine voice expresses his 
pleasure at being settled. He no longer has to move back and forth between different places 
unless he wants to move. In a playful manner, he presents his past life as “a wanderer on the 
face of the earth, without any abiding city.” The movement back and forth had been a driving 
force, enabling him to think and write after his mental breakdown. In 1762, however, he 
started to think about retirement, and about staying in one place. At least, he did not have to 
write anymore. In “My Own Life,” he recalls his desire for retirement at that time: 
 
[…] I was become not only independent, but opulent. I retired to my native 
country of Scotland, determined never more to set my foot out of it; and retaining 
the satisfaction of never having preferred a request to one great man, or even 
making advances of friendship to any of them. As I was now turned of fifty, I 
thought of passing all the rest of my life in this philosophical manner. (xxxviii) 
                                                   
also Mark Salber Phillips, On Historical Distance (2013) 61-78. 
 
2 Hume scholars often quote this letter. For instance, see Mossner 409, and Harris 408. 
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Hume tries to detach himself from the active scene of life, with which he was formerly 
involved as a man of letters. This plan of retirement is not the abandonment of his 
philosophical pursuit. He equates retirement with life lived in a “philosophical manner.” He 
now has less aspiration to write, but still favors thinking. 
     Like his plan to be an international trader in Bristol, this retirement plan was not 
realized. He was invited to attend Lord Hertford’s embassy to France. In August 1763, he told 
Adam Smith that he had accepted this invitation even though he was too old to “be entering 
on a new Scene” (HL 1:391). He “resolvd [sic] to give up [his] future Life entirely to 
Amusements” and “there could not be a better Pastime than such a Journey, especially with a 
Man of Lord Hertford’s Character” (HL 1:391-92). He returned to an active scene of life, 
although he chose to observe than participate in it. 
     A few days after his arrival in Paris, Hume wrote to Adam Ferguson that he 
encountered a favorable “reception from all ranks of people” there (HL 1:411). Mossner 
points out that Hume enjoyed a “vogue in Paris,” which “lasted throughout the entire twenty-
six months of his stay” (445). Hume was welcomed as a prominent man of letters.3 At 
Versailles, he was “presented to the Dauphin’s children” and “the eldest, a boy of ten years 
old […] told: “how many friends and admirers I had in this country, and that he reckoned 
himself in the number, from the pleasure he had received from the reading of many passages 
in my works” (HL 1:416). Mossner suggests that “[t]he several translations of his works had 
brought him many readers” in France (423). 
     Before his leaving from Britain, Hume told Adam Smith that he “had indeed struck 
Root so heartily” in his flat in Scotland and was unwilling to “transplant[]” himself (HL 
1:394). After his arrival in France, however, Hume gradually changed his mind. On 1 
                                                   
3 See Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment (1995). 
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December 1763, he wrote to William Robertson: 
 
[…] you see I am beginning to be at home. It is probable, that this place will be 
long my home. I feel little inclination to the factious barbarians of London; and 
have ever desired to remain in the place where I am planted. […] I cannot forbear 
observing, on what a different footing learning and the learned are here, from what 
they are among the factious barbarians above-mentioned. (HL 1:417) 
 
Hume revisits the question of where to settle down. He is inclined to live in Paris as a 
cosmopolitan. The international circulation of his works opens up such a possibility. Print 
culture, therefore, consolidates the foundation of this cosmopolitanism. The culture of the 
salon in Paris seems to attract Hume’s attention in his vision of desirable retirement.4 In 
London, he finds that conversational interaction turns into “factious” clashes. As Mossner 
describes, Hume grasps the “democratic” feature of salon society in Paris: “all were expected 
to learn gracefully and unobtrusively; all were accepted as artistic, intellectual, or social 
equals” (448). 
In November 1765, after spending two years in Paris, Hume wrote to Adam Smith: “I 
am much in Perplexity about fixing the Place of my future Abode for Life” 
 
Paris is the most agreeable Town in Europe, and suits me best; but it is a foreign 
Country. London is the Capital of my own Country; but it never pleasd [sic] me 
much. Letters are there held in no honour: Scotsmen are hated: Superstition and 
Ignorance gain Ground daily. Edinburgh has many Objections & many 
                                                   
4 My discussion is limited to Hume’s perception of the salon. For its actual features in eighteenth-
century France, see Antoine Lilti, The World of the Salons. As part of his study of worldliness, Lilti 
examines a quarrel between Hume and Rousseau in the 1760s (178-91). 
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Allurements. My present Mind, this Forenoon the fifth of September, is to return 
to France. (HL 1: 521) 
 
In his reply to the letter, Smith persuades Hume to change this resolution. 
 
It gives me the Greatest pleasure to find that you are so well contented with your 
present situation. I think however you are wrong in thinking of settling at Paris. A 
man is always displaced in a foreign Country, and notwithstanding the boasted 
humanity and politeness of this Nation, they appear to me to be, in general, more 
meanly interested, and that the cordiality of their friendship is much less to be 
depended on than that of our own countrymen. (To David Hume, September 1765: 
The Correspondence of Adam Smith 107-08) 
 
This advice presents Smith’s balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of living as a 
cosmopolitan away from one’s native country. Smith does not necessarily deny that sympathy 
can extend beyond national boundaries. There is a certain kind of hospitality which a stranger 
can enjoy in a foreign country. Smith is, however, skeptical about the origin of such 
cosmopolitan sentiments. His choice of the phrase “the boasted humanity” implies that he has 
a realistic understanding of the nature and intensity of affection beyond national boundaries. 
Unlike an intimate affective tie between fellow countrymen, cosmopolitan sentiments come 
from the politeness which members of civilized society are expected to show. Due to this, 
cosmopolitanism has a weaker foundation. Smith’s emphasis on the irreversibility of 
displacement opposes Hume’s claim that France can be his home. For Smith, individuals 
cannot find any home outside of their native country. He continues: 
 
The Clamour against you on account of Deism is stronger, no doubt, at London 
54 
 
 
where you are a Native and consequently may be a candidate for everything, than 
at Paris where as a forreigner [sic], you possibly can be a candidate for nothing 
[. . .]. In short I have a very great interest in your settling at London [. . .]. Let us 
make short excursions together sometimes to see our friends in France and 
sometimes to see our friends in Scotland, but let London be the place of our 
ordinary residence. (108) 
 
Smith thinks that Hume’s hospitable and enthusiastic reception in France is a consequence of 
his status as a foreigner. As people pay less attention to strangers than their own countrymen, 
Hume can avoid being blamed for his writing. It is not certain how far Smith’s advice was 
influential in Hume’s final decision, but Hume abandoned his original plan to settle in Paris 
and went back to Britain. 
     As an essayist and a historian, Hume introduces cosmopolitan perspectives into his 
writing. His writing interweaves different geographical scales, regional, national, and 
international perspectives. His life embodies this co-existence. He lives as a Scot, Briton, and 
cosmopolitan. His favorable reception in France as an eminent man of letters suggests that 
print culture establishes the republic of letters beyond national boundaries. The international 
circulation of his works provides a foundation for his cosmopolitan life. He is impressed by 
the world of the salon where people converse in a polite manner. This politeness, however, 
may also constitute an obstacle to cosmopolitan exchange. Smith points out that Hume is 
welcomed to polite society as a guest but that his actual interactions there are superficial. On 
the one hand, politeness is a basis for hospitality towards foreigners, and therefore for the 
possibility of cosmopolitan life. On the other hand, politeness acts as a constraint, to the 
extent that visitors are treated as no more than guests. In such a situation, there is no cordial 
collision of opinions between friends. Hume’s geographical movement usually entails his 
experience of such productive interaction with people from different social and cultural 
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backgrounds. And this collision becomes a point of departure for his thinking. But politeness 
undermines this creative collision.5 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hume moves back and forth between two modes of life, active and speculative. This 
movement embodies his own idea and practice of philosophy. He thinks that philosophy 
requires the stimulus of contact with everyday life. As a philosopher, he finds examples for 
contemplation in the world of sociable interaction. This link between philosophy and daily 
life is a basis for his empiricism. He is a resident of the conversable world, but keeps a certain 
distance from worldliness to develop those examples into philosophical principles. 
Movement back and forth shows the way in which he balances active participation and 
detached observation. 
     As a man of letters, Hume facilitates movement in addition to his own movement. He 
imagines essay-writing as symbolic commerce. In his youth, he aspired to be an international 
trader, who traveled across the globe and facilitated the flow of wealth from one place to 
another. Even though he fails to become a merchant, his writing still embodies that vision. In 
print culture, his persona as a writer to some extent resembles that of a merchant. His works 
are translated and circulated beyond national borders. And this international dissemination of 
his ideas provides the basis for his cosmopolitan life. His movement is geographical as well 
as symbolic. He lives as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. The movement in his life and 
writing generates a cosmopolitan perspective. 
     Hume’s experience of suffering from mental breakdown, choosing his profession, and 
thinking about where to live underlies the development of his philosophical ideas. Health, 
work, and home become essential themes of his philosophical speculation. For this reason, 
                                                   
5 See Jon Mee, Conversable Worlds 65-66. 
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Hume biographers do not have to follow the dichotomy established by Mossner and Harris 
between the man and his ideas. Understanding Hume as a man entails a critical examination 
of his ideas, particularly his idea of philosophy. And without understanding his life as a man, 
our attempt to grasp his intellectual pursuits remains partial. Hume scholars need to move 
back and forth between his life and thought to examine his writing in a comprehensive 
manner. 
57 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Essay-Writing and Geographical Reference: 
Addison, Hume, and Ferguson 
 
1. Introduction 
 
[…] Hume’s thought was informed to some degree […] by an awareness of the 
world beyond Europe. Indeed, the frequent presence of non-Western themes in 
Hume’s writings, even though they are rarely a central concern, is significant in 
itself, since it is suggestive of the pervasive impact of the European confrontation 
with foreign societies in the consciousness of eighteenth-century thinkers. 
(Frederick G. Whelan, Enlightenment Political Thought and Non-Western 
Societies 7) 
 
David Hume does not conceptualize geography as a distinctive field of inquiry in his study of 
human nature. He does not write any treatise or essay on geography as such. But he 
sporadically refers to the diversity of peoples and societies on the earth. In “Of the Rise and 
Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” for instance, Hume mentions that “CHINA is one vast 
empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same 
manners” (122).1 In “Of Polygamy and Divorces,” he describes a custom in “TONQUIN,” 
the northern region of Vietnam: “it is usual for the sailors, when the ships come into harbour, 
to marry for the season” (182).2 In the same essay, he also refers to the domestic conditions 
                                                   
1 This essay first appeared in the second volume of Essays, Moral and Political (1742). 
 
2 This essay first appeared in the second volume of Essays, Moral and Political (1742). 
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of “TURKS” and “PERSIANS” (184). His attention is not directed to any particular region of 
the earth. Instead, his imagination “run[s] over the globe” to present case studies to help him 
explore the principles of human nature (“Of National Characters” 204). As is shown in the 
various titles of the essays cited above, Hume’s writing interweaves geographical reference 
with various subjects including moral philosophy, aesthetics, politics, and commerce. 
     Hume’s imaginary survey of the globe is also characterized by an awareness of the 
interaction between Europe and other regions of the earth. This consciousness is particularly 
explicit in his writing on politics and commerce. In “Of the Balance of Trade,” he discusses 
the flow of “gold and silver” from the New World into Europe (312).3 He is interested in the 
connections between different regions of the globe as well as the diversity of peoples and 
societies on the earth. Therefore, I contend that Hume is a pioneering analyst of global 
interconnection. As David Armitage points out in Foundations of Modern International 
Thought (2013), “global possibilities for thought opened up for the generations of thinkers 
writing after the mid eighteenth century” such as Adam Smith (24). 
     Hume’s encounter with the non-Western world is secondhand. As I have shown in the 
first chapter, the actual movement in his life is limited to Europe. Even though he writes 
about the New World, the Middle East, and Asia, he does not travel there. His geographical 
imagination is mediated by print culture and sociable conversation.4 He knows people with 
experience of the extra-European world via their roles as merchants, clerks, travelers, or 
military officers. As Linda Colley suggests in Britons (1992), Scots worked as agents for the 
construction and expansion of the British Empire after the Union (126-30). “A British 
imperium […] enabled Scots to feel themselves peers of the English in a way still denied 
them in an island kingdom” (Colley 130). In her study of the family history of the Johnstones, 
                                                   
3 This essay first appeared in Political Discourses (1752). 
 
4 In his essays, Hume is not explicit about where his geographical knowledge comes from. For print 
culture and geography in eighteenth-century Scotland, see Charles W. J. Withers “Toward a Historical 
Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” 72-74.  
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The Inner Life of Empires (2011), Emma Rothschild reveals the connection between the 
worlds of global commerce and the Scottish Enlightenment. The sons and daughters of the 
Johnstones “grew up in Scotland in the 1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination 
or in reality, to the extremities of the British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” 
(Rothschild 1). Hume and Adam Smith were connected to this family. Rothschild points out 
that “Hume wrote twenty-one letters to the older James Johnstone over the course of a few 
months in 1745-46” (214). The non-Western world was in many ways bound up with daily 
life in eighteenth-century Scotland. 
     In “Toward a Historical Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” (2000), Charles W. 
J. Withers suggests that geography was a proper subject for polite conversation as well as 
practical knowledge taught at schools and universities in eighteenth-century Scotland (74-
76).5 There were public lectures on geography whose printed advertisements were circulated 
among coffee houses in Edinburgh (75). Learning geography was “a way of promoting polite 
sociability through description of foreign countries and use of the globes” (76). This use of 
the globe in teaching shows the way in which instruments mediate the geographical 
imagination and the global vision. 
     Withers’ historical geography of the Scottish Enlightenment is an example of the 
sociological approach to ideas. He discusses the intellectual environment of eighteenth-
century Scotland in which Hume and other Enlightenment thinkers developed their 
geographical imagination. As a result, his study is less engaged in the interpretation of the 
Scottish Enlightenment’s major texts such as A Treatise of Human Nature and The Wealth of 
Nations. Instead, he examines diverse historical documents such as the outline of university 
curriculums, maps and geography books, the description of public lectures, and the record of 
sociable meetings. In such a manner, his approach is contextual. 
                                                   
5 See also Withers “Situating Practical Reason” (2002). 
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     Silvia Sebastiani’s The Scottish Enlightenment (2013) presents a more textually 
focused approach to geographical reference, and Hume’s essay, “Of National Characters” 
(1748), becomes its key text. She argues that the essay marks the emergence of “a 
comparative method” in the Scottish Enlightenment, which presents “a sort of sociological 
explanation of the diversity between peoples” (20, 24). She understands Hume’s geographical 
reference as a part of his comparative study of diverse societies, which focuses on “the 
functional interrelation of economic, political, and social factors” (Sebastiani 20). Some 
Scottish thinkers after Hume, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, she argues, develop 
“a stage scheme for interpreting the historical evolution of legal, social, and political 
systems” (Sebastiani 45). This stadial theory presumes that “society advances through 
successive stages”: “the stages of hunting, herding, agriculture, and commerce” (Sebastiani 
6). Those Scottish thinkers who appeal to stadial theory use geographical reference to 
substantiate their claims. 
     In addition to diversity, the connection between distant regions is also a crucial matter 
of Hume’s geographical reference. Istvan Hont’s Jealousy of Trade (2005) examines Hume’s 
global vision with a close reading of his essays on commerce, most of which are collected in 
Political Discourses (1752). The phrase “jealousy of trade” comes from the title of one of 
Hume’s essays, and raises “a pathological conjunction between politics and the economy that 
turned the globe into a theatre of perpetual commercial war” (Hont 1,6). With a close 
attention to “the interdependence of politics and the economy,” Hont aims “to identify 
political insights in eighteenth-century theories of international market rivalry” (Hont 4). 
Hume’s writing on commerce plays a distinctive role here, because he develops “a 
cosmopolitan theory of commercial globalization” (Hont 66-67). With the emphasis on the 
reciprocity of international trade, his theory intends to distinguish the political logic of war 
and the economic logic of commerce: “war [is] a one-way affair, with a winner and a loser” 
but trade is based on “mutual benefit” (Hont 6). Hume contends that the jealousy of trade is 
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“groundless” (“Of the Jealousy of Trade” 327). 
     I agree with Hont that Hume has a certain vision of the global in his theory of 
international trade. Whereas Hont intends to situate this vision in the history of political and 
economic thought, I want to emphasize that Hume’s narrative of global interconnection is a 
distinctive product of eighteenth-century literature as well. Hume expresses his geographical 
imagination by writing in the essay form. This link between his global vision and the form of 
writing that he uses to express this helps us to understand some essential features of 
eighteenth-century prose. In this chapter, I examine the way in which geographical reference 
is deployed in the essay form. A wide-ranging geographical sweep is a component feature of 
some essays. I will argue that this global purview in turn determines the nature of essay-
writing. 
     This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I discuss Joseph Addison’s 
periodical essays as a model for Hume’s essay-writing. In “Of Essay-Writing,” as I have 
shown in the first chapter, Hume presents the essay as a form mediating philosophy and the 
experience of daily life. As an essayist, he collects examples from everyday life to establish 
philosophical principles. And the scope of daily life is sometimes extended into the wider 
world due to the agency of international trade. This idea and practice of essay-writing 
originate in Addison’s The Spectator. I particularly pay attention to Spectator No. 69 
(Saturday, May 19, 1711) in which Mr. Spectator articulates his cosmopolitan sentiments in 
his aesthetic exposure to the vivid scene of international trade at the Royal Exchange. 
Secondly, I will examine Hume’s use of geographical reference in his essay-writing. 
Following Sebastiani’s The Scottish Enlightenment, I present “Of National Characters” as a 
key text for situating Hume’s geographical interest in the study of human nature. Scholars 
tend to focus on its notorious footnote on the natural inferiority of black people when they 
discuss “Of National Characters.” In Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial 
Studies (2009), for instance, Suvir Kaul interprets the footnote as an embodiment of “the 
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colonialist underpinnings of Enlightenment sociology and historiography per se” (111-12). 
Sebastiani points out that the footnote was added in the later edition (1753-1754), and 
therefore its revision process shows the development of Hume’s idea of diversity (24). In my 
interpretation of his essay on national characters, however, I emphasize that the footnote does 
not necessarily summarize his whole argument. We should pay attention to other parts of the 
essay as well. As part of framing his comparative study of society, Hume mentions “[t]he 
propensity to company and society” (“Of National Characters” 202). I will contend that the 
idea of sociability is essential for thinking about the global scope of his essay-writing. 
Thirdly, I turn to discuss Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society 
(1767) as a text that reshapes the function of geographical reference in essay-writing. In his 
study of the progress of society “from rudeness to civilization,” Ferguson converts spatial 
remoteness into temporal distance. He argues that the present condition of non-western 
peoples helps us to think about the past of modern Europeans. This is a foundational moment 
of anthropological discourse because anthropologists use time and space in this manner to 
construct their object of study.6 This new understanding of the relation between space and 
time makes Ferguson’s Essay very different from Hume’s. In terms of its geographical scope, 
Ferguson’s essay-writing aims to cover the whole surface of the earth, too. In Narratives of 
Civil Government (1999), J. G. A. Pocock points out that Ferguson incorporates “a body of 
literature describing the hunting, herding, and farming peoples of Siberia and Central Asia” 
into his discussion (333). In Ferguson’s survey of the globe, then, Siberia is presented as “the 
cradle of world history” (Pocock 330). Ferguson’s geographical reference shows that Scottish 
thinkers in the mid-eighteenth century did not necessarily confine their geographical interest 
to the New World. The global scope of Hume and Ferguson’s essay-writing suggests that 
wide-ranging geographical reference is a constitutive element of narratives of the Scottish 
                                                   
6 See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other 6-7. 
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Enlightenment, even though geography is not established as a distinctive field of their inquiry 
into human nature. 
 
2. Addison’s Periodical Essays and the Geographical Scope of Daily Life 
 
Most of these ESSAYS were wrote with a View of being publish’d as WEEKLY-
PAPERS, and were intended to comprehend the Designs both of the 
SPECTATORS and CRAFTSMEN. (David Hume, Essays, Moral and Political 
iii)7 
 
In the advertisement to the first volume of Essays, Moral and Political (1741), Hume refers 
to Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s periodical essays in The Spectator (1711-14), as one 
of the two models for his writing. As Donald F. Bond points out, “[t]he periodical essay was a 
unique genre of the eighteenth century: there was nothing quite like it before” (Introduction 
xiii). As essayists, Addison and Steele aim to transform their readers, middle-class people in 
urban space, into “‘polite’ citizens in society” (Copley and Edgar ix). They associate 
politeness with particular fields of knowledge and conduct such as manners, morals, and 
aesthetics (Copley and Edgar ix). In his analysis of the literary form of periodical essays, 
Scott Black contends that “the daily press, the essay, and the city were mutually defining”: 
The Spectator was “written at the convergence of three early-modern phenomena […] a new 
use of print technology, a new literary form, and a new social space” (“Social and Literary 
Form in the Spectator” 21). In this manner, scholars of eighteenth-century literature and 
thought understand the emergence of periodical essays as a new form of writing that was 
                                                   
7 This passage is often quoted by scholars who discuss the nature of Hume’s essay-writing. See 
Harris Hume 144; Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar’s Introduction to David Hume Selected Essays 
ix. 
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bound up with social transformation. The essay form is closely tied with the “new social 
space.” 
     In the first number of The Spectator (Thursday, March 1, 1711), Addison constructs the 
persona of the writer of periodical essays as a man who “live[s] in the world, rather as a 
Spectator of Mankind, than as one of the Species” (4). Mr. Spectator detaches himself from 
“any Practical Part in Life” (4). Addison situates the essayist outside of the division of labor 
in which members of each profession work for money. The portrait of Mr. Spectator then 
helps to conceal the reality that essay-writing is professional labor in the marketplace. He 
lives in the “City” and is “frequently seen in most publick Places” (3). In his life, worldliness 
coexists with detachment. He thinks and writes in the urban space where people meet and 
converse with each other. He often visits several coffee houses in London to “overhear the 
Conversation of every Table in the Room” (4). Even though Mr. Spectator does not 
participate in such sociable exchange, he is an observer who is still a member of society: 
“where-ever I see a Cluster of People I always mix with them, tho’ I never open my Lips but 
in my own Club” (4). The scene of daily life is the source of his thinking and writing. 
     Addison conceives of his periodical essays as a by-product of the conversation of 
others. He also writes essays in order to stimulate further conversation. In Spectator No. 10 
(Monday, March 12, 1711), Mr. Spectator states that his periodical essays are for those who 
“do not know what to talk of” (46). He intends his essays to mediate between readers and the 
circle of conversation. He expects that his writing connects people and promotes the social 
exchange of opinions and sentiments in urban space. His essay-writing aims to “[bring] 
Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and 
Assemblies, at Tea-Tables, and in Coffee-Houses” (44). In such a manner, Addison 
conceptualizes periodical essays as the conversational form of writing whose foundation lies 
in everyday life. 
The geographical scope of Mr. Spectator’s world is vast. In the first number of The 
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Spectator, Addison presents the personal history of Mr. Spectator to satisfy readers’ 
“Curiosity” (1). Mr. Spectator was a great traveler. After studying at university, he “was 
resolved to travel into Foreign Countries” (2). He visited “all the Countries of Europe” but 
found nothing “new or strange to be seen” (2). “Curiosity” then made him travel further “to 
Grand Cairo, on purpose to take the Measure of a Pyramid,” as he was interested in “the 
Controversies of some great Men concerning the Antiquities of Egypt” (2-3). Finally, he 
“returned to [his] Native Country with great Satisfaction” (3). 
The distinction between the exotic and the domestic is not stable in Addison’s 
periodical essays. The exoticism of the non-European world is incorporated into the daily 
scene of urban space. In A Taste for China (2013), Eugenia Zuroski Jenkins examines the 
process by which Chinese objects such as “porcelain, furniture, and tea” were transformed 
into “an essential component of the English self” in the early eighteenth century (12). The 
non-European world may have been imaginatively distant for people living in eighteenth-
century London. But non-European travelers and things came to London, and the exotic 
became an element of daily life. As the world of everyday life is The Spectator’s main area of 
concern, non-European people and things can be seen as constitutive of Addison’s periodical 
essays. 
Spectator No. 69 (Saturday, May 19, 1711) represents London as a cosmopolis where 
people coming from different regions of the globe meet. The Royal Exchange is depicted as 
the primary location of such encounters. In this number, Mr. Spectator expresses the pleasure 
he feels at being exposed to the vivid scene of global commerce there. “There is no Place in 
the Town which I so much love to frequent as the Royal-Exchange” (292). This active scene 
of commercial exchange exemplifies how, in Mr. Spectator’s imagination, “this Metropolis” 
becomes “a Kind of Emporium for the whole Earth” (293). The use of the phrase “the whole 
Earth” suggests that his view aspires to a kind of global vision. The practice of commerce 
lays the foundation of global interconnection. 
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Factors in the Trading World […] negotiate Affairs, conclude Treaties, and 
maintain a good Correspondence between those wealthy Societies of Men that are 
divided from one another by Seas and Oceans, or live on the different Extremities 
of a Continent. I have often been pleased to hear Disputes adjusted between an 
Inhabitant of Japan and an Alderman of London, or to see a Subject of the Great 
Mogul entering into a League with one of the Czar of Muscovy. I am infinitely 
delighted in mixing with these several Ministers of Commerce, as they are 
distinguished by their different Walks and different Languages: Sometimes, I am 
justled among a Body of Armenians: Sometimes I am lost in a Crowd of Jews, and 
sometimes make one in a Groupe of Dutch-men. (293-94) 
 
People are divided by land, sea, and language. Mr. Spectator imagines that the agency of 
commerce overcomes those barriers. International trade opposes the fragmentation of the 
globe. Commercial transactions in the Royal Exchange are depicted as harmonious and 
peaceful. In this vision, commerce is the source of social energy, and it does not become a 
cause of conflict between peoples from different countries. Mr. Spectator does not think 
about the negative consequences of global commerce. 
     Mr. Spectator imagines that “the Natives of the several Parts of the Globe might have a 
kind of Dependance upon one another, and be united together by their common Interest” 
(294-95). He also points out that the ongoing process of “this mutual Intercourse and Traffick 
among Mankind” is experienced as a daily reality (294). Such interconnection is especially 
evident at the dinner table. 
 
The Food often grows in one Country, and the Sauce in another. The Fruits of 
Portugal are corrected by the Products of Barbadoes: The Infusion of a China 
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Plant sweetned with the Pith of an Indian Cane: The Philippick Islands give a 
Flavour to our European Bowls. (295) 
 
This passage describes a division of labor which takes place on a global scale. Countries such 
as China and India are far away from England. But the daily scene of the dining table in 
London is impossible without their produce. Mr. Spectator makes his readers aware that their 
everyday life is inflected by global processes of commercial exchange. He states that: 
 
The single Dress of a Woman of Quality is often the Product of an hundred 
Climates. The Muff and the Fan come together from the different Ends of the 
Earth. The Scarf is sent from the Torrid Zone, and the Tippet from beneath the 
Pole. The Brocade Petticoat rises out of the Mines of Peru, and the Diamond 
Necklace out of the Bowels of Indostan. (295)8 
 
Mr. Spectator’s interest is in how Britain’s position at the center of world trade ensures the 
prosperity of the nation and its people. He is less interested in the condition of the non-
European world itself. For instance, he does not talk about what kind of dress women in 
China or India wear. His global vision does not incorporate any ethnographic description of 
social and cultural life beyond Europe. The diversity on the globe is a marginal subject for 
him. In addition, he also disregards the way in which global commerce transforms people’s 
lives in the non-European world. Even though he emphasizes that such commerce is 
reciprocal, he is not explicit about how it benefits non-European people. 
     As Jenkins points out in A Taste for China, cosmopolitanism shapes English national 
identity in Spectator No. 69 (16-17). In this interpretation, “the display of acquired, foreign 
                                                   
8 This passage is quoted in Suvir Kaul, Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial 
Studies 90. 
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things within English spaces” is a pivot of Mr. Spectator’s narrative (Jenkins 18). In the 
opening paragraph, Mr. Spectator presents himself as “an Englishman” (292). His pleasure at 
being exposed to global commerce is linked with his patriotic pride. In the Royal Exchange, 
he imagines himself as “a Citizen of the World” (294). This cosmopolitanism does not 
undermine his English identity, but rather contributes to defining Englishness. He imagines 
that English people are agents as well as beneficiaries of global interconnection, and that the 
daily scene of London life is the world in microcosm.  
 
If we consider our own Country in its natural Prospect, without any of the Benefits 
and Advantages of Commerce, what a barren uncomfortable Spot of Earth falls to 
our Share! Natural Historians tell us, that […] our Melons, our Peaches, our Figs, 
our Apricots, and Cherries, are Strangers among us, imported in different Ages, 
and naturalized in our English Gardens […]. Our ships are laden with the Harvest 
of every Climate: Our Tables are stored with Spices, and Oils, and Wines: Our 
Rooms are filled with Pyramids of China, and adorned with the Workmanship of 
Japan: Our Morning’s-Draught comes to us from the remotest Corners of the 
Earth: We repair our Bodies by the Drugs of America, and reposes our selves 
under Indian Canopies. (295) 
 
Mr. Spectator emphasizes here that the import and domestication of foodstuffs and other 
commodities have created the nation’s prosperity. His reference to climate and soil 
anticipates the rise of the Enlightenment discourse on national character and environmental 
determinism in the mid-eighteenth century as well. Mr. Spectator emphasizes that English 
soil is not fertile, and therefore English people almost have no option but to become 
merchants. English people are defined by their technological capability of improving the land 
as well as their commercial spirit. The English garden is presented as the embodiment of this 
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capacity to transplant and domesticate exotic plants. 
     Addison’s periodical essays are characterized by their focus on daily life in which 
people actively participate in conversation. Mr. Spectator thinks and writes through observing 
the minute details of the everyday world. As he expresses an ambition to bring philosophy to 
coffee houses and beyond in Spectator No. 10, his essays reconceptualize philosophy as a 
form of conversational practice. For him, conversation is the source of philosophical 
speculation, and the function of philosophy is in turn to mediate conversation as well. 
 
3. “If We Run Over the Globe”: Hume’s Essay on National Characters 
Scots in the eighteenth century were avid readers of Addison’s periodical essays.9 Even 
before the first publication of Hume’s essays in 1741, Scottish writers inspired by Addison 
and Steele were keen to launch periodicals.10 As Harris points out, Hume was one of the 
Scottish writers who aspired to realize polite culture in Scotland (144). For them, Addison’s 
essay-writing provided a model for improving the moral and literary culture of eighteenth-
century Scotland.11 
     Following Addison, Hume also sees essays as a conversational form of writing, both 
the outcome and the medium of social exchange. As I have shown in the first chapter, “Of 
Essay-Writing” summarizes Hume’s ideal. He conceptualizes essay-writing as a 
philosophical labor to develop abstract principles based on the observation of the daily world 
where conversation takes place. Conversation, daily life, and detached observation continue 
to shape the distinctive feature of the essay form. At the same time, there are also notable 
differences between Hume and Addison. For instance, Hume emphasizes that essay-writing is 
                                                   
9 See Robert Crawford, Devolving English Literature 18-21. 
 
10 See Harris, Hume 508 n.3. He presents The Echo: or, Edinburgh Weekly Journal (1729-1732), The 
Reveur (1737-1738), and Letters of the Critical Club (1738) as chief examples of Scottish periodicals 
before Hume’s essay-writing. 
 
11 See John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse 10.  
70 
 
 
a means to earn money: writing is a profession, and therefore, essay-writing is located within 
the division of labor. This point is explicit in “My Own Life” where Hume states that his “life 
has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (xxxi: emphasis mine). 
     Hume writes essays on diverse subjects, as the title of his Essays suggests. He 
conceives of essays as a form of writing but not a genre of writing. Rather, the essay form 
crosses several genres such as moral philosophy, literary criticism, and politics. In this 
respect, Hume’s essays function as an interface between different kinds of knowledge, and 
their connection is presented in a non-systematic manner. 
     “Of National Characters” (1748) exemplifies Hume’s use of the essay form as an 
interface between different fields of knowledge. In this essay, he aims to interrogate the 
opinion that “the air and climate” determine the national character of each country (198). His 
case studies make both geographical and historical references. The comparative study of 
society in the essay shows the way in which he refers to politics. The essay also interweaves 
moral philosophy into its narrative when it discusses a sociable disposition in human beings 
to examine the process in which national characters are formed. Due to such heterogeneity, 
the essay cannot be classified as any one genre of writing. 
     The structure of the essay on national characters is also notable. Hume contrasts two 
accounts of the determinations upon national character. The clash between them is a driving 
force of his narrative. The concept of sociability works as a theoretical basis for his argument, 
which is supported by examples from history and geography. The flow of his narrative is 
sometimes not straightforward. At the end of the essay, for instance, he refers to “the passion 
for liquor” (215). In addition to persuading his readers, Hume tries to entertain them with 
anecdotal and ethnographic descriptions. Diverse customs across the globe might arouse 
readers’ curiosity. In such a manner, Hume’s essay embodies and mediates social exchange, 
staging a conversation between different fields of knowledge, between the writer and readers, 
and between readers. In Conversable Worlds (2011), Jon Mee contends that Hume “retains 
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more room for collision” in his model of conversation than Addison (65-66). As an essayist, 
Hume invites readers to disagree. This introduces a “sometimes provocative and often 
paradoxical style” into his writing (Mee 66). Hume’s essays both embody and mediate 
collision as a feature of vibrant conversation. “Of National Characters” locates essay-writing 
as collision in a global context. Hume imagines the globe as a space of collision between 
heterogeneity and homogeneity. 
Along with Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws published in 1748, Hume’s “Of 
National Characters” posed the question of the influence of climate on human nature. This 
notable debate among Enlightenment philosophers, which began in the late 1740s, was the 
consequence of their theoretical attempt to reconcile the idea of the uniformity of human 
nature with the recent discovery that various kinds of people and society subsisted in the 
different regions of the globe. Their central task was to explain how such variety had emerged 
from the supposedly uniform character of human nature. The Scottish thinkers read The Spirit 
of the Laws as a possible answer to this crux, engaging with its claim that climate was the 
essential factor determining this difference. By writing “Of National Characters,” however, 
Hume intends to deny this kind of climate theory, and identifies the origin of difference in 
“the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which 
the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like 
circumstance” (198). His essay emphasizes that social conditions are more important than the 
natural environment in determining difference between human beings. 
The climate debate seems to show how the circulation of knowledge and information 
influences the making of Scottish Enlightenment thought. In The Great Map of Mankind, P. J. 
Marshall and Glyndwr Williams point out that the age of the Enlightenment corresponds to 
the growing British perception of the world outside Europe represented by maps and travel 
accounts (1). It was the condition of non-European societies and people that led the Scottish 
philosophers to think about the origin of difference. Although Hume does not think that 
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geography is an independent branch of the study of human nature, “Of National Characters” 
includes various references to the condition of the world outside Europe. His first counter-
argument to the climate theory is based on the social uniformity of the Chinese Empire. 
Hume points out that “the CHINESE have the greatest uniformity of character imaginable: 
though the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very 
considerable variations” (204). The cases found in non-European regions are no longer a 
marginal issue but become an important object of inquiry which potentially reshapes the 
theoretical framework of the Enlightenment. 
“Of National Characters” has engaged wide scholarly interest because of its notorious 
footnote in which Hume addresses the natural inferiority of “the negroes.” When this essay 
was first published as a part of Three Essays, Moral and Political in 1748, it included no such 
statement. Hume added the footnote as part of the process of revision before the publication 
of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1753-54). In this new addition to the text, Hume 
insists that “the negroes, and in general all the other species of men” are “naturally inferior to 
the whites” (629). It is worth pointing out that Hume referred to “four or five different kinds” 
of non-whites in the 1753-54 edition of the essay (629). Hume revised this footnote in the 
1777 edition, as Eugene F. Miller indicates in variant readings of “Of National Characters” 
(629). In this later version, Hume just compares “whites” and “negroes” and no longer 
mentions other non-whites. 
In The Limits of the Human, Felicity Nussbaum considers the footnote as a notable 
example of how racial discourse was entangled with the definition of the boundary between 
humans and animals, as Hume associates the educated “negro” with a parrot which learns to 
speak a few words (136). Furthermore, she clarifies the ambiguous status of “negroes” in 
Hume’s essay-writing by pointing out the coexistence of his antislavery sentiments with the 
denial of their intellectual capability (137). In The Politics of Sensibility, Markman Ellis also 
discusses “Of National Characters” and the footnote referred to above in the context of the 
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contemporary debate about the slave trade (52-54). For Ellis, Hume’s essay shows how the 
political debate about slavery “often invoked a host of related problems, such as colonial 
administration, notions of racial and cultural difference, or climatic theories of meteorological 
or environmental determinism” (52). The process of Hume’s revision of the essay seems to 
represent a crucial transitional moment in the development of the idea of difference in which 
his essay-writing becomes gradually involved with racial discourse. In The Complexion of 
Race, Roxann Wheeler shows that this change also indicates the emergence of an intellectual 
current in which Africans are singled out as a special subject in the Enlightenment’s 
articulation of difference.  
     Those interpretations suggest that the essay and its notorious footnote illuminate 
Hume’s changing understanding of diversity. Their studies also suggest that the footnote 
embodies the way in which Hume’s writing is underlain by the wider intellectual and social 
discourses. At the same time, however, their approach potentially confines scholarly interest 
in “Of National Characters” to this footnote, as if the essay itself does not need to be 
examined. Despite the addition and revision of the footnote, Hume does not substantially 
change the main body of the essay. His main argument itself does not change between the 
1748 and later editions. 
     The whole essay is devoted to explaining the determination of “national characters,” 
the process in which people in the same society come to share a certain temper. As an 
example of national character, Hume points out that French people are known for “wit and 
gaiety” (“Of National Characters” 198). He acknowledges that “each nation has a peculiar set 
of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one 
people than among their neighbours” (197). His subject has two dimensions. Firstly, it is a 
question about the emergence of homogeneity among people in the same group. Secondly, it 
is also a question about the emergence of diversity between societies. One group of people 
becomes different from other groups of people despite the uniformity of human nature. 
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Hume’s essay shows the collision between homogeneity and heterogeneity. 
     Hume presents sociability as the founding principle of national characters. 
 
The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men 
to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and 
communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to 
company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, 
which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other’s sentiments, 
and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through 
the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one 
political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defense, 
commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they 
must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national 
character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. (202-03) 
 
 
The sociable disposition in human beings promotes the exchange of sentiments between 
people in the same society. The frequency and intensity of this exchange homogenizes those 
people’s temper. Hume’s narrative in the quoted passage moves from one genre to another: 
from moral philosophy to politics. The sociability of human beings mediates the contagion of 
sentiments within the circle of conversation and interaction. This is an expression of the 
mechanism of sympathy, the inquiry of which constitutes Hume’s moral philosophy. The 
scope of social exchange is then limited and expanded by political activities. The political 
body determines the way in which people find their company. In such a manner, sociability is 
a crucial concept across genres. In Hume’s writing, discussing sociability enhances the 
heterogeneity of his narrative. 
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Following speculative discussion about the imitative nature of the human mind, Hume 
seeks to prove his own thesis that climate is not the cause of the differences found among 
human beings: 
 
If we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover every 
where signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or 
climate. (204) 
 
In addition to cases derived from historical records, the condition of each region of the 
contemporary world is counted as further proof of his opinion. This statement, therefore, 
indicates that geographical information can be a legitimate object of his inquiry. The phrase 
“run[ning] over the globe” expresses the vast scope of his geographical reference. He even 
mentions the condition of “the nations, which live beyond the polar circles or between the 
tropics” (207). In “Of National Characters,” the inquiry into human nature is not limited to 
the study of European societies, but Hume’s attention is expanded into almost every part of 
the globe. In this respect, the quoted passage represents a new global consciousness in the 
study of human nature. Its central assumption is that the principle of uniformity of human 
nature is applied to every part of the globe, and therefore societies and peoples in non-
European regions need to be examined, or at least referred to, in order to validate the 
universality of Hume’s thesis. 
His global consciousness, however, does not necessarily entail a critical way of 
understanding and interpreting these distant societies and peoples: 
 
Shall we say, that the neighbourhood of the sun inflames the imagination of men, 
and gives it a peculiar spirit and vivacity. The FRENCH, GREEKS, EGYPTIANS, 
and PERSIANS are remarkable for gaiety. The SPANIARDS, TURKS, and 
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CHINESE are noted for gravity and a serious deportment, without any such 
difference of climate as to produce this difference of temper. (208) 
 
In this comparison of national characters, the reference to different countries lacks any 
substantiating evidence. What is more, Hume is not concerned to judge whether such a 
representation of different nations is accurate. In contrast to his careful reading of classical 
documents in the field of historiography, he seems to just accept the common image of 
various nations in contemporary geographical representation. His blind rehearsal of circulated 
information is also evident in his claims about the inferiority of particular groups of people 
outside Europe. For instance, he points out “[t]he poverty and misery of the northern 
inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern” (207). Even before the revision of 
the essay, he does not hesitate to say, “You may obtain any thing of the NEGROES by 
offering them strong drink” (214). Although the 1748 edition does not ascribe this kind of 
inferiority to their natural or racial character, his argument based on stereotypical 
representation potentially prepares the moral justification of Empire in which European 
expansion into other parts of the globe is understood as a beneficial agency to improve the 
condition of indigenous people. 
Hume does not explicitly insist that these “inferior” people should be improved by 
European influence, but the “contagion” of national characters caused by the intercourse 
between distant societies becomes the key issue of his essay. Although Hume was neither an 
active advocate of imperial expansion nor its critical opponent, the realities of empire inform 
his speculation on the diffusion of manners even in the 1748 edition of “Of National 
Characters”: 
 
The same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them over the whole 
globe, as well as the same laws and language. The SPANISH, ENGLISH, 
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FRENCH and DUTCH colonies are all distinguishable even between the tropics. 
(“Of National Characters” 205) 
 
The “fact” that the metropole and colonies share the same national character despite the 
difference in climate is considered to deny the influence of geographical variation. This 
argument presupposes the idea that the European Empires are now stretching over the globe. 
The choice of the phrase “the whole globe” expresses his global consciousness. “Of National 
Characters” imagines an ongoing process in which the European Empires stretch out over all 
other parts of the world. 
 
4. “The Whole Description of Mankind”: Ferguson’s Essay 
In An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Adam Ferguson presents a historical 
account of the social progress of human beings from a rude state into a civilized one. As a 
political thinker, he is particularly concerned about the way that civil society encounters 
corruption and decline in the course of its commercial prosperity and the progress of its polite 
culture. Silvia Sebastiani points out that the aim of his Essay is “to identify the ills of the 
modern world and try to remedy them, understanding how the decline of political systems 
could be avoided” (55). Unlike Hume, Ferguson does not explicitly explain why his history 
of civil society is written in the essay form. Even though his work is titled “An Essay,” it is 
very different from Hume’s essays. In Ferguson’s Essay, six parts constitute one essay, and 
more than two hundred pages are devoted to examining one subject, the progress and decline 
of civil society. 
     The fact that the Essay achieved a wide readership both in Britain and on the Continent 
might explain Ferguson’s decision to write it in essay form.12 He wants to address his view 
                                                   
12 See Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment 98. 
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of polite society to the general public, not a particular group of people. As the success of 
Addison’s Spectator shows, the essay is an effective form to circulate opinions across diverse 
professions and social divisions. Ferguson is a pamphleteer who knows the political agency 
of print culture. Prior to the publication of the Essay, Ferguson participated in defending John 
Home’s play Douglas (1756) by writing a pamphlet, The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously 
Considered (1757). It is perhaps ironic that Ferguson writes on the decline of civil society in 
the essay form, because both Addison and Hume deploy essays as a means to promote the 
progress of civil society. The essay form is defined as a medium to transform its readers into 
polite citizens. In this respect, depicting the corruption and termination of civil society 
potentially conflicts with the original ideal which the essay form embodies. Due to his 
diagnosis and narrative of corruption, Ferguson’s Essay notably reworks the idea and practice 
of essay-writing. 
The Essay can be seen as a critical response to Hume’s “Of National Characters” 
because Ferguson examines the influence of climate on human beings with reference to 
various regions of the globe such as Africa, China and India. The first section of the third part 
of the Essay is titled “Of the Influences of Climate and Situation.”  
 
 
The modern description of India is a repetition of the ancient, and the present state 
of China is derived from a distant antiquity, to which there is no parallel in the 
history of mankind. The succession of monarchs has been changed; but no 
revolutions have affected the state. The African and the Samoiede are not more 
uniform in their ignorance and barbarity, than the Chinese and the Indian, if we 
may credit their own story, have been in the practice of manufacture, and in the 
observance of a certain police, which was calculated only to regulate their traffic, 
and to protect them in their application to servile or lucrative arts. (Ferguson 109) 
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In this geographical description, Ferguson’s primary focus is the form of polity and its 
influence on the social and cultural condition of people’s subsistence. His historical 
perspective emphasizes the lack of genuine progress in India and China. The comparative 
study of society highlights “ignorance and barbarity” as a common feature of people’s life 
outside of Europe. The boundary between Europe and non-Europe is more than geographical. 
Ferguson’s use of the word “credit” is crucial to understand this hierarchical division. The 
records of European travelers are referred to as a reliable source of information in the Essay, 
while non-European people’s capability to represent their society and history is potentially 
undermined in the quoted passage. 
     Ferguson’s geographical interest is not limited to politics as a genre of writing. On the 
one hand, his own narrative is neither discursive nor digressive. On the other hand, it is the 
outcome of interweaving different kinds of reference. In the second part of the Essay, “Of the 
History of Rude Nations,” he refers to custom in Siberia. 
 
It was a proverbial imprecation in use among the hunting nations on the confines 
of Siberia, [t]hat their enemy might be obliged to live like a Tartar, and be seized 
with the folly of breeding and attending his cattle. Nature, it seems, in their 
apprehension, by storing the woods and the desert with game, rendered the task of 
the herdsman unnecessary, and left to man only the trouble of selecting and of 
seizing his prey. (94-95) 
 
What he commits to doing is “the whole description of mankind” (Ferguson 94). In other 
words, his Essay offers “general representations of what mankind have done” and “the more 
minute description of the animal himself” (109). The human being as a social creature “has 
occupied different climates, and is diversified in his temper, complexion, and character” 
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(109). “Man in his animal capacity, is qualified to subsist in every climate” and spreads over 
the globe. (106). The social life of human beings is found everywhere, and this premise 
generates a global consciousness. With his focus on the interaction between human beings 
and their natural environment, the geographical scope of Ferguson’s essay-writing covers the 
whole surface of the earth. 
     Compared to his substantial discussion of the diversity among human beings on the 
globe, Ferguson is less involved with examining the homogenizing agency of international 
trade. He does not anticipate the emergence of the interconnected world in an explicit 
manner. But he is still conscious that Europeans are stretching out over the globe.  
 
[…] rude nations in general, though they are patient of hardship and fatigue, 
though they are addicted to war, and are qualified by their stratagem and valour to 
throw terror into the armies of a more regular enemy; yet in the course of a 
continued struggle, always yield to the superior arts, and the discipline of more 
civilized nations. Hence the Romans were able to over-run the provinces of Gaul, 
Germany, and Britain; and hence the Europeans have a growing ascendency over 
the nations of Africa and America. (93-94) 
 
Ferguson’s essay-writing commits to not only the global survey of peoples and societies, but 
also to dividing the globe into two categories, Europe and beyond, almost corresponding to 
the distinction between civil and rude societies. This act of division is crucial for 
understanding his geographical imagination and narrative. In the middle part of the Essay, he 
suggests that “we must here bid farewel[l] to” the non-European world “to pursue the history 
of civil society (118). He generally sees non-European people as “inferior in the powers of 
the mind” (118). Ferguson has never been outside of Europe. But he experiences “restless” 
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life away from home as part of his military service.13 Appointed as chaplain of the Black 
Watch, a regiment of Highlanders, in 1745, he “was serving a continental tour of duty in the 
War of the Austrian Succession” (Fagg xxiii). Ferguson himself has a Gaelic background.14 
This personal experience might underlie his perception of the world. 
The opening section of the Essay, whose methodological account is well-known as a 
critique of conjectural history, can be construed as the articulation of Ferguson’s own theory 
of writing. To begin with, he points out the philosophical and literary interest in the original 
state of human beings, which has captured the imagination of various kinds of people such as 
poets, historians and moralists (7). Opposing their intellectual passion to speculate on the 
“nature” of human beings distinguished from art, Ferguson claims that these attempts just 
produced “fruitless inquiries” and “many wild suppositions” which possibly caused further 
confusion (8). In contrast, he intends to conceptualize a new model of writing which is 
performed in the Essay: 
 
Among the various qualities which mankind possess, we select one or a few 
particulars on which to establish a theory, and in framing our account of what man 
was in some imaginary state of nature, we overlook what he has always appeared 
within the reach of our own observation, and in the records of history. 
   In every other instance, however, the natural historian thinks himself obliged 
to collect facts, not to offer conjectures. [. . .] He admits, that his knowledge of the 
material system of the world consists in a collection of facts, or at most, in general 
tenets derived from particular observations and experiments. (Part I Section I; 8) 
 
                                                   
13 See Jane B Fagg’s biographical introduction to The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson Vol. 1 xxii-
xxxi. 
 
14 See Michael Fry, “Ferguson the Highlander” in Adam Ferguson: Philosophy, Politics and Society. 
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His appreciation of the natural historian’s argumentation proceeds to reshape the relation 
between abstract principles and concrete examples in the writing of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Argument usually starts with offering general presumptions. Hume’s essays 
can be seen as an instance of this kind of discussion due to his speculative narrative in which 
the abstract is assigned priority over the concrete. In contrast to these writing practices, 
Ferguson emphasizes the value of focusing on concrete examples. Unlike preceding writers 
of philosophical history, his writing aims to present particular facts concerning human beings 
rather than a hypothetical view. In short, Ferguson inverts the relation between abstract 
principles and concrete examples by dismissing the way of writing conjectural history. 
     This inversion in writing also reshapes the way of reading. As the initial task of natural 
historians is to present a collection of facts, Ferguson needs to show that his source of 
information is not the product of literary imagination but a much more trustworthy account. 
As a reader, Ferguson considers whether his source texts are facts or mere fiction. This 
distinction might affect the issue of literary genres, and create the possible distance between 
his own writing and imaginative literature. In addition, this leads him to use footnotes as 
clarification of reference. Compared to Hume, who uncritically uses information about 
distant societies in his discussion about national characters, Ferguson has a keen awareness 
that the writer is obliged to explain where his references come from. 
     To start writing the history of civil society, therefore, Ferguson needs to determine what 
kind of text is proper to mention as a reliable example in his own inquiry. To explicate the 
rude state of human society, the Essay refers to the social condition of North American 
Indians as observed by European travelers. His frequent reference to the travel writing of 
Charlevoix, a French missionary, implies that Ferguson quits collecting information about 
European ancestors, and focuses instead on detail relating to distant societies and peoples in 
the contemporary world. This is one instance where a question of historiography shaped 
Ferguson’s Enlightenment narrative of geography. 
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The turning from historical speculation about European ancestors to geographical 
description about primitive society in the contemporary world is based on a particular 
assumption about the relation between time and space: 
 
The Romans might have found an image of their own ancestors, in the 
representations they have given of ours: and if ever an Arab clan shall become a 
civilized nation, or any American tribe escape the poison which is administered by 
our traders of Europe, it may be from the relations of the present times, and the 
descriptions which are now given by travellers, that such a people, in after ages, 
may best collect the accounts of their origin. It is in their present condition, that 
we are to behold, as in a mirrour, the features of our own progenitors [. . .]. (Part II 
Section I; 80) 
 
Ferguson projects the European past on the present condition of the Arabs or North American 
Indians, which is considered to be far from the civilized state. As he presumes that the 
progress of the European society is the same as that of non-European societies, this projection 
is an attempt to locate every society and people in a single timeline which flows “from 
rudeness to civilization.” This mapping practice might be regarded as a prelude to what 
Dipesh Chakrabarty criticizes as “historicism” in Provincializing Europe. It is “what made 
modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global 
over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it” (7). In short, its 
essential core is a “‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ structure” (7). In Ferguson’s narrative of 
the contemporary world, distant societies and people are presented as those who have “not” 
reached a civilized state “yet,” which the European societies have “already” achieved. 
Although Chakrabarty associates historicism with nineteenth-century writing such as John 
Stuart Mill’s essays, Ferguson’s representation of the global is potentially involved with this 
84 
 
 
narrative structure in the second half of the eighteenth century by presuming that the progress 
of non-European societies will follow the trajectory of that of European societies. 
     I call the Essay a prelude to historicism rather than the embodiment of historicism, 
because Ferguson’s confidence in the high degree of European civilization is paired with a 
haunting anxiety about its inevitable decline. He accepts the general principle that the 
polished “races of men . . . have in some cases retuned to rudeness again” (107). This means 
that the current supremacy of Europe over other parts of the globe can be seen as a merely 
transitory event. The Essay imagines that “[t]he chieftain of an Arab tribe, like the founder of 
Rome, may have already fixed the roots of a plant that is to flourish in some future period, or 
laid the foundations of a fabric, that will attain to its grandeur in some distant age” (108). 
Ferguson does not think that only European people are capable of achieving a high degree of 
civilization. This haunting view of the possible downfall of civil society seems to distinguish 
Ferguson from other Scottish thinkers. The future of an expanding commercial society can 
become a nightmare of corruption, as “[t]he pavement and the ruins of Rome are buried in 
dust, shaken from the feet of barbarians” (108). This vivid image of primitive people 
triumphing over the vestiges of a preceding civilization illustrates Ferguson’s own idea about 
progress. The Essay shapes a new literary imagination which articulates a gloomy future for 
Europe, or for the ideal of civil society itself. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the study of human nature, Hume makes the whole surface of the earth the object of his 
observation. Geographical information is one source for his speculation. Each society 
develops its distinctive form of subsistence as well as its form of government, normative 
codes, and social customs. Diverse groups of people live on the earth. Hume intends to reveal 
the process by which diversity emerges despite the uniformity of human nature. He 
undertakes this task based on geographical description and analysis across several subjects 
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such as moral philosophy, politics, and criticism. The essay becomes an effective form to 
describe diversity on the globe and analyze those geographical discourses. For Hume, essays 
are the embodiment and medium of conversation. Therefore, he deploys the essay form as the 
interface between different kinds of knowledge. His essays represent one form of writing, but 
are not necessarily confined to one genre. Instead, he writes on diverse subjects in the essay 
form such as moral philosophy, politics, and criticism. In his writing, geography and the 
essay form are linked based on their discursive nature. 
     In his essays, Hume imagines the globe as the space of a collision between 
heterogeneity and homogeneity. On the one hand, as I have already pointed out, Hume is 
interested in the particular details of diverse societies and peoples on the earth. The globe is 
heterogeneous in the sense that human beings develop diverse forms of subsistence there. On 
the other hand, the interaction between different groups of people homogenizes their 
character. Hume is aware that European people stretch out into the non-western world. As the 
scope of international trade is expanding in his contemporary world, he develops the vision of 
the interconnected world under which what we might refer to as “globalization” is understood 
as an emergent and ongoing process. The globe gradually becomes homogenized as a 
consequence of imperial conquest and international commerce. 
     As an essayist, who takes his source material from daily life, Hume is surely committed 
to “writing the global.” In his essay-writing, the geographical scope of his observation is 
maximally expanded, and the globe is imagined as not only heterogeneous but also 
interconnected in a certain extent. This idea and practice of writing the global in the essay 
form originate with Addison’s periodical essays, particularly Spectator No. 69. Mr. 
Spectator’s aesthetic experience in the Royal Exchange shows that global interconnection 
constitutes the daily scene of polite society. He imagines London as a cosmopolis of 
international trade which embodies global flows of things and people. As an essayist, Hume 
follows Addison by discerning the connection between daily life and this commercial 
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dynamism. But he interrogates Addisonian euphoria about global commerce. As the 
embodiment of collision, his essays show that the ongoing process of globalization could 
cause people’s suspicion and concern. As his use of the phrase “the jealousy of trade” 
suggests, he is aware that globalization could perplex people. And his essay-writing aims to 
relieve them by clarifying some misunderstanding of the nature of global interconnection. 
     Ferguson subverts the Addisonian model of writing the global by depicting the 
corruption and decline of civil society in his Essay. He shares the global scope of the study of 
human nature with Hume, but he is less interested in developing a vision of the 
interconnected world. His initial interest is confined to diversity on the earth. The Essay 
articulates his ambiguous feeling about the progress of society from a rude condition to a 
polite one. He certainly supports the superiority of Europe over the rest of the globe. But his 
sense of superiority is provisional. The Essay envisages that European societies will 
necessarily decline as a result of their progress.
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Chapter 3 
 
Imagining the Spectator of the Interconnected Globe: 
Adam Smith’s Writing as System-Building 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Adam Smith grew up in a small Fife seaside town, Kirkcaldy, that was both 
profoundly isolated from the metropolitan existence of Versailles and Westminster, 
and connected, especially by the licit and illicit commerce in goods and people of 
which both Smith and his father were the invigilators, to the wider worlds of the 
Baltic and the North Atlantic. He started the Wealth of Nations in 1764 in 
Toulouse---“I have begun to write a book in order to pass away the time,” he wrote 
to David Hume, of a provincial existence in respect of which his life “at Glasgow 
was a pleasurable, dissipated life in comparison”--- and he returned to his 
mother’s home in Kirkcaldy to complete it. (Emma Rothschild, “Global 
Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces” 
5-6) 
 
 
As part of the rise of global intellectual history in the 2000s, some historians of political and 
economic thought come to see Adam Smith as a global thinker, who analyzes the emergence 
of an interconnected world and its consequences. Emma Rothschild’s “Global Commerce and 
the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces” (2004) is a foundational 
work in this respect. She argues that some economic thinkers in the 1760s and 1770s, 
including Smith and Turgot, tackled “the question of global commerce” which was about 
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“[t]he relationship between the local and the global, or between the ‘local situation’ of 
individuals and the great interconnected worlds of the statesmen” (4, 5). Her interpretation of 
the Wealth of Nations emphasizes that Smith’s provincial background underlies his vision and 
analysis of global interconnection. This contention helps us to grasp his distance from the 
Addisonian view of international trade. Rather than cosmopolitan London, it is the provincial 
circumstances of Kirkcaldy which shape his geographical imagination. 
     The experience of Glasgow also underlies Smith’s view of the contemporary world. He 
was a student at Glasgow University between 1737 and 1740, and taught there as a professor 
between 1751 and 1763. Eighteenth-Century Glasgow was the center of the international 
tobacco trade in which merchants actively participated in sociable exchange. Andrew Hook 
and Richard B. Sher distinguish the Glasgow Enlightenment from the Edinburgh 
Enlightenment in part because of the loose connection between professors at Glasgow 
University and men in the mercantile circles (“Introduction” 5). The Glasgow Enlightenment 
(1995) edited by them contributes to pluralizing the Scottish Enlightenment. Robert 
Crawford’s On Glasgow and Edinburgh (2013) continues to develop the contrast between 
these two cities. As Hume was not substantially involved with Glasgow’s conversational 
culture, the analytical framework of the Glasgow Enlightenment helps to highlight the 
difference between Smith and Hume. It also contributes to revealing Smith’s link with 
Boswell and Smollett, both of whom are usually not seen as members of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in eighteenth century studies. As Gordon Turnbull points out in “Boswell in 
Glasgow,” Boswell was “a privileged witness of […] Adam Smith’s course of lectures in 
moral philosophy” in his short student life at Glasgow between 1759 and 1760 (163). 
Smollett went to Glasgow University in 1735 and was exposed to the mercantile spirit of the 
city.1 In Tobias Smollett in the Enlightenment (2011), Richard J. Jones points out Smollett’s 
                                                   
1 See Kenneth Simpson’s Oxford DNB entry on Smollett. 
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interest in Smith’s moral philosophy (63). In such a manner, the Glasgow Enlightenment 
helps us to think about the interaction between Scottish philosophy and literary culture in the 
eighteenth century. 
     Following Rothschild, Sankar Muthu and Jennifer Pitts develop her view of Smith as a 
global thinker. In “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies” (2008), 
Muthu suggests that Smith’s understanding of the interconnected world is not entirely 
sanguine and its account is more complicated than commonly understood. His interpretation 
of the Wealth of Nations shows that Smith grasps “the rise of global commerce and 
communication” as the cause of “gross injustices” as well as of “great possibilities” (206). In 
other words, Muthu points out Smith’s concern about the emergence of destructive “passions 
and interests” as a consequence of the rise of global interconnection (206). His attempt to 
locate the Wealth of Nations in a global context reveals the link between Smith’s theory of 
political economy and moral philosophy. Exchange is a matter for moral sentiments as well 
as commerce. For Muthu, Smith is attentive to the way in which the emergence of the 
interconnected world affects the condition of the passions.2 
     In “Irony in Adam Smith’s Critical Global History” (2017), Pitts discusses The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations together to trace “the development of Smith’s 
concerns about moral judgment in a globalizing world” (143). In A Turn to Empire (2005), 
she also argues that his moral philosophy “attempts a delicate balance between a very general 
set of universal values and an understanding of moral judgment as grounded in concrete 
situation” (43). She reads The Theory of Moral Sentiments as the philosophical foundation of 
“cross-cultural judgments” (43). Her approach suggests that moral philosophy also 
constitutes Smith’s vision and narrative of the interconnected world. In addition, it also 
describes him as a skillful writer who makes use of irony in the critique of imperial expansion 
                                                   
2 Albert O. Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests (1977) is a pioneering work to pose the 
question of this link between passions and commerce. 
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(“Irony in Adam Smith’s Critical Global History” 151).  
     Smith did not write his major works in essay form. Both The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations are philosophical treatises, the form which Hume 
abandoned in the early stage of his literary career.3 Unlike him, Smith principally lived as a 
professor. He lectured on diverse subjects such as moral philosophy, jurisprudence, and 
rhetoric.4 In this chapter, I argue that the construction and critique of “system” is at the heart 
of Smith’s writing about moral philosophy and political economy, and therefore, his narrative 
of global interconnection. His intellectual passion for system is an aspiration to imagine a 
perspective from which he as an “impartial spectator” can grasp the interconnected world as a 
whole. It is an attempt to invent an Olympian view of the world. Even though Smith 
distinguishes his writing from works of fiction, it has an imaginative aspect. His appeal to the 
imagination connects him to novelists in the eighteenth century, particularly Tobias Smollett. 
     This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I examine Smith’s idea and practice 
of system-building, which I distinguish from Addisonian and Humean essay-writing. His 
construction of systems aspires to establish a comprehensive view of the world across 
disciplines. At the same time, he is critical of any excessive passion for system-building. He 
acknowledges that the idea of a “system” is a product of imagination and sometimes conflicts 
with the particular details of reality. Both the aspiration to system-building and reflexive 
commentary on this endeavor are characteristic of his writing. Secondly, I aim to discuss the 
global setting in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The diversity of human beings on the globe 
                                                   
3 The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the full title of the first edition (1759). In the fourth edition 
(1774), Smith adds some phrases to the title: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, or an Essay towards an 
Analysis of the Principles by which Men Naturally Judge concerning the Conduct and Character, 
First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. Even though this new title suggests that The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments is an essay, I do not take it at face value. There is no significant structural 
difference between the forth and former editions. The form of his writing continues to be very 
different from the Addisonian and Humean essays. 
 
4 James Chandler sees Smith as a critic because of his substantial engagement with aesthetics, and 
argues that his theory and practice of art criticism are “an integral part of his larger system of thought” 
(“Adam Smith as Critic” 141). 
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provides case studies to test his model of moral philosophy. He also introduces a global scope 
into his writing as part of examining the influence of distance on the mechanics of sympathy. 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is an attempt to imagine an impartial spectator of the globe 
overcoming distance and difference. Thirdly, I discuss the imaginative aspect of his writing in 
the Wealth of Nations. Imagination plays a central role in his writing on the interconnected 
world. His narrative of global interconnection is characterized by conflicts between abstract 
principles and concrete examples, hypothetical assumptions and historical propositions, and 
prescription and description. 
 
2. System-Building and Comprehensive Views 
Nicholas Phillipson describes Smith’s idea and practice of system-building as an attempt “to 
develop a genuine Science of Man based on the observation of human nature and human 
history” (Adam Smith 2). Phillipson sees The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) as “the first 
part of the superstructure of his science of man” (2). In its concluding passages, Smith clearly 
announces that The Theory of Moral Sentiments is part of his larger project. 
 
I shall in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles 
of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the 
different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what 
concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. I shall 
not, therefore, at present enter into any further detail concerning the history of 
jurisprudence. (VII.iv.37: 342) 
 
In the final section of the book, Smith divides the “rules of morality” into two kinds: (a) “the 
rules of justice […] which are precise and accurate” and (b) “those of all the other virtues” 
which are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” (VII.iv.1: 327). “Jurisprudence” treats the former 
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subject, while “Ethics” covers the latter (VII.iv.34: 340). In the finale of the construction of 
his own moral theory, Smith articulates the further necessity to move from ethics to 
jurisprudence. The concluding passage also announces his plan to introduce historical 
perspective into hypothetical speculation in the subsequent work. The balance between 
historical description and hypothetical prescription will be a matter in the next book. On the 
one hand, he plans to observe the form of government and law in each society from the past 
to the present. This will be the descriptive account of specific laws. On the other hand, he 
also intends to conceptualize “the natural rules of justice independent of all positive 
institution” (VII.iv.37: 341). Such “a theory of the general principles […] ought to run 
through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations” (VII.iv.37: 341). His attempt is to 
present theoretical prescription detached from positive laws and beyond national divides. 
     An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) partially 
realizes the plan for another discourse. It is a study of political economy, dealing with social 
organization, revenue, and arms. 
 
Political œconomy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or 
legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or 
subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a 
revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or 
commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services. It proposes to 
enrich both the people and the sovereign. (IV. Introduction. 1: 428) 
 
Smith defines the field of political economy from two perspectives, those of “the people and 
the sovereign.” This distinction entails the use of two different scales in his writing. On the 
one hand, he deploys a micro-perspective to depict how each individual subsists in society. 
On the other hand, he also presents a macro-perspective to analyze how the state manages 
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people’s subsistence as a whole. The definition of political economy in the passage shows 
Smith’s art of classification and signposting. Like the concluding passage in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, he intends to clarify how his subject is fitted into a wider picture. His 
systematic classification aims to offer a comprehensive view of the subject. 
In the advertisement to the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), 
Smith refers to the present condition of his endeavor to produce another discourse announced 
at the end of the first edition. 
 
In the […] Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as 
concerns, police, revenue, and arms. What remains, the theory of jurisprudence, 
which I have long projected, I have hitherto been hindered from executing, by the 
same occupations which had till now prevented me from revising the present 
work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little 
expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; 
yet, as I have not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still continue 
under the obligation of doing what I can, I have allowed the [last] paragraph [of 
the first Edition] to remain as it was published more than thirty years ago, when I 
entertained no doubt of being able to execute every thing which it announced. 
(Advertisement 2: 3) 
 
The passage expresses Smith’s aspiration to present his works from the past to the present as 
a single project. This aspiration is characterized by his keen sensitivity towards the relation 
between parts and the whole. He wants to present his writing in a comprehensive manner. For 
more than thirty years, he tries to realize the grand design of the project, which Nicholas 
Phillipson calls the science of man. This continuous effort makes a notable contrast with 
Hume’s turn to essay-writing after the unsuccessful publication of the Treatise. In the process 
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of becoming an essayist and man of letters, Hume abandoned his aspiration for system-
building. His essays show the interconnection between different kinds of knowledge in a 
discursive manner, not in a comprehensive way. As he does not explicate the relation between 
essays, his writing remains fragmentary. Phillipson points out that “a sceptic’s distrust of 
systems of knowledge” underlies Hume’s manner of writing (Smith 70). His skepticism 
undermines the idea of wholeness itself. 
     Prior to the publication of the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
mentioned his plan for subsequent works in his letter to Rochefoucauld (1 November 1785). 
 
I have not forgot what I promised to your Grace in an edition of the “Theory of 
Moral Sentiments,” which I hope to execute before the end of the ensuring winter. 
I have likewise two other great works upon the anvil; the one is a sort of 
Philosophical History of all the different branches of Literature, of Philosophy, 
Poetry and Eloquence; the other is a sort of theory and History of Law and 
Government. The materials of both are in a great measure collected, and some Part 
of both is put into tollerable good order. But the indolence of old age, tho’ I 
struggle violently against it, I feel coming fast upon me, and whether I shall ever 
be able to finish either is extremely uncertain. (The Correspondence of Adam 
Smith 286-87)5 
 
The letter articulates his sense of uncertainty about the completion of the two books as well 
as his aspiration to undertake further intellectual pursuits. This prospect is almost similar to 
what he expresses in the advertisement to the sixth edition. He probably plans to transform 
his lectures on jurisprudence and rhetoric at Glasgow into two books. In sum, he seems to 
                                                   
5 See Phillipson’s Adam Smith 3. 
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imagine that four kinds of systematized knowledge---moral philosophy, political economy, 
jurisprudence, and rhetoric---constitute his single project. 
     In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith’s system-building has three steps. Firstly, he 
establishes his own system of moral philosophy based on the model of human beings as 
sympathetic subjects. The book begins with a speculative statement: “How selfish soever 
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in 
the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing 
from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (I.i.1.1: 9). Smith thinks that the sympathetic 
disposition of human beings is “a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove 
it” (I.i.1.1: 9). For this reason, the opening discussion has few references to actual examples. 
His theoretical model is tested in the later part of the book. 
     Secondly, Smith discusses the relation between his and preceding systems in the last 
part of the book, entitled “Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.” His review of some preceding 
theories of “the nature and origin of our moral sentiments” shows the process in which his 
own system is embedded in the history of moral philosophy. It signals the location of his 
book in a wider scale of arguments among philosophers. In System (2016), Clifford Siskin 
points out that Smith aspires to shape The Theory of Moral Sentiments as the “Master 
System” by “includ[ing] specific sections for comprehending the competition within a larger 
whole” (117, 118). Each system aspires to explain the foundational principles of morality. 
And the master system intends to present the comprehensive view of the relation between 
these systems. 
     Thirdly, Smith’s system building embeds The Theory of Moral Sentiments in his wider 
project in the concluding passage, as I have shown before. In system building, Smith’s 
intellectual labor as a writer is the reversal of the process of “the division of labor,” which he 
conceptualizes as the founding principle of political economy in the Wealth of Nations. As an 
example of the division of labor, he presents “the trade of the pin-maker” whose work “is 
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divided into a number of branches” (I.i.3: 14). 
 
One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a 
fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or 
three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is 
another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper […]. (I.i.3: 15) 
 
As each worker can concentrate on his specified task, the efficiency of pin-making is notably 
increased. At the same time, those workers only know their own part of the whole process of 
pin-making. The division of labor causes problems as well as generating productive 
efficiency. The view of each individual in this process becomes partial. No worker can 
imagine what is going on as a whole in their factory. In English Literature in History (1983), 
John Barrell points out that writers in the mid eighteenth century negotiate with a larger 
social uncertainty: the perception that their society could become too complex to 
“comprehend” (29). He argues that novels and poems in this period aspire to a 
comprehensive view in which the individual can grasp society and social knowledge “as a 
whole” (40). Along with novelists and poets, Smith participates in this intellectual endeavor. 
Instead of writing a work of fiction, he thinks that the collection of systems, “theory” as a 
genre of writing, recovers the comprehensive view. This point explains why Smith did not 
become an essayist. Unlike Hume, the focus of his writing is comprehending rather than 
connecting. Smith’s works are texts of eighteenth-century literature as well as a context for it. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, theorizing becomes practice, the practice of representing 
the diverse and expanding world as a whole. 
Siskin points out that The Theory of Moral Sentiments criticizes the excessive passion 
for system-building even though Smith extensively uses the idea of system in the 
construction of his own moral theory (System 85). Smith thinks that the potential danger of 
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system-building comes from our human nature to “take pleasure in beholding the perfection 
of so beautiful and grand a system” (IV.1.11: 185). The purpose of system-building is to grasp 
objects in a comprehensive manner and to improve the condition of our social lives. But the 
“love of system” could transform system-building from a means into an end (IV.1.11: 185). 
Those who are possessed by this “spirit of system” solely aim to “remove any obstruction” 
that possibly undermines the harmonious unity of the constructed system (IV.1.11: 185). 
     In the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith develops this critique of 
system-building further. In his revision, he emphasizes that system is a product of the 
imagination. The danger of system building occurs when individual subjects forget this 
fictionality of the system. They become “intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of this ideal 
system” (VI.ii.2.15: 232). This blindness causes havoc particularly in the construction and 
maintenance of political institutions. “The man of system […] is often so enamoured with the 
supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest 
deviation from any part of it” (VI.ii.2.17: 233-34). The conflict between the whole and its 
parts, the system and the minute details of the everyday world is unavoidable. Smith finds 
that this clash opens the space for criticism. 
     In system-building, Smith differentiates his writing from works of fiction. He chooses 
non-fictional prose to construct his system of knowledge. In Virtuous Discourse (1987), John 
Dwyer suggests that Smith opposes “practical moralists” in Scotland, “active promoters of 
the novel as a vehicle for the cultivation of the moral sentiments” (141, 169). Henry 
Mackenzie is a representative figure who connects the novel and moral improvement in such 
a way (141). According to Dwyer, Smith sees their project as “unnatural and unrealistic” 
(169). Instead of the novel, he deploys theory for moral improvement. At the same time, his 
awareness that systems are the product of imagination also shows a connection between his 
writing and the novel, both of which are the product of an imaginary perspective on the 
world. For this reason, his relationship with eighteenth-century literature is much more 
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complicated. On the one hand, he shares with novelists and poets the task of writing, the 
recovery of the comprehensive view. On the other hand, he intends to differentiate the nature 
of his writing from that of the novel. This ambiguity shows the conflict between reality and 
imagination, fact and fiction in his writing.  
 
3-1. Moral Philosophy in Global Settings (1): Difference 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith begins his argument with the construction of his 
model of sympathy, which is highly abstract. As the subsequent step of argumentation, 
however, he brings this abstract model into contact with specific case studies. This is the 
process through which he tests the workability of his system in diverse conditions. The scope 
of his writing moves from an abstract to a concrete level. His case studies are composed of 
diverse examples from history and geography. This is therefore a point where his moral 
philosophy has to engage with the diverse conditions of the peoples of the world. 
     Smith is aware that the world is populated by diverse peoples and that it is becoming 
increasingly interconnected. His revision of The Theory of Moral Sentiments shows the 
development of his global vision in tandem with the elaboration of his moral philosophy. In 
the first edition (1759), the global scope of his writing is substantially expressed in Part V 
“Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and 
Disapprobation.” In the second edition (1761), he adds a thought experiment about a Chinese 
earthquake and a European observer to Part III “Of the Foundation of Our Judgments 
concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty.” In the sixth edition 
(1790), he adds an entire new part titled “Of the Character of Virtue” between the fifth and 
last parts of the book. In this addition, he contrasts the condition of sentiments in “pastoral” 
and “commercial countries” (VI.ii.1.12, 13: 222, 223). He also discusses the idea of 
“universal benevolence,” which further expands the geographical scope of his moral 
philosophy. He emphasizes that “our good-will is circumscribed by no boundary, but may 
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embrace the immensity of the universe” (VI.ii.3.1:235). These points develop his former 
examination of distance and sympathy in the thought experiment of the Chinese earthquake. 
     The opening passage of The Theory of Moral Sentiments expresses Smith’s theoretical 
hypothesis about human nature. Where this opening statement is concerned, there is no 
difference between the first and later editions. 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of 
others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. 
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too 
obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other 
original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and 
humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The 
greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether 
without it. (I.i.1.1: 9) 
 
Smith does not talk about the disposition of a particular person but that of human beings as 
such. It is an establishment of a hypothetical framework in which he brackets the socio-
cultural background of individual subjects. He begins to describe the mechanics of sympathy 
in a highly abstract manner. At this moment, he just suggests that every individual subject is 
inclined to pay attention to other people. To develop the model of the human being as the 
sympathetic observer of others, Smith also needs to focus on the relationship between the 
observer and the sufferer in addition to the natural disposition of the observer. This is the 
point at which difference and distance start to matter in his moral philosophy. 
100 
 
 
Smith emphasizes that “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” 
therefore “it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of . . . sensations” of 
other individuals (I.i.1.2: 9). In this formulation, he conceptualizes sympathy as the process 
by which the individual subject imagines himself/herself in the “situation” of the sufferer 
(I.i.1.2: 9). We can sympathize with anyone, or even anything as long as we can imagine 
his/her/its situation. The limits of sympathy correspond to that of the scope of imagination. 
This imaginative nature of sympathy means that the individual subject does not 
necessarily have to encounter the physical presence of a sufferer when the observer 
sympathizes with him/her. As long as there is something which mediates the passion of the 
victim, the observer does not have to witness suffering first-hand. Smith points out the 
experience of reading as an example in this respect: 
 
We can sympathize with the distress which excessive hunger occasions when we 
read the description of it in the journal of a siege, or of a sea voyage. We imagine 
ourselves in the situation of the sufferers, and thence readily conceive the grief, the 
fear and consternation, which must necessarily distract them. We feel, ourselves, 
some degree of those passions, and therefore sympathize with them: but as we do 
not grow hungry by reading the description, we cannot properly, even in this case, 
be said to sympathize with their hunger. (I.ii.1.1: 28) 
 
Literature in a broader sense is an effective medium which opens the imaginary space of 
encounter between the individual subject and the distant victim. The scope of our sensory 
perception of the world is very limited but the literary contact zone drastically expands the 
scope of our sympathy. In An Archaeology of Sympathy, James Chandler conceptualizes the 
subject of sympathy in Smith’s moral philosophy as “the literary spectator” because his/her 
101 
 
 
“sensorium” is “virtually embedded in a medium” (145, 166).6 Smith’s focus on the faculty 
of imagination links the experience of sympathy with that of reading, and their similarity is 
more than analogy. Both experiences are virtual to a large extent. The literary space mediates 
the subject and object of sympathy. The experience of reading reduces the peculiar conditions 
of the individual subject which block his/her imaginary identification with the distant victim. 
Literature as a medium adjusts both distance and difference. As for the problem of distance, 
its power of representation expands the scope of “sensorium” of the individual subject 
beyond his/her physical perception. As distance is a mental condition as well as a physical 
reality, literature as virtual space is able to negotiate with distance. According to Chandler, 
Smith’s model of sympathy helps us to understand eighteenth-century literature because it 
conceptualizes the “views” of spectators; “the world of fiction” is defined “by various lines of 
sight, some of them crossing, some of them matching, some of them reciprocated, some of 
them not” (An Archaeology of Sympathy 175). Each individual has his/her own perspective of 
the world, and writing/reading a fiction is an experience to gain a different perspective. The 
virtual space of literature also makes possible the coexistence of different (and sometimes 
conflicting) perspectives of the world. 
In the fifth part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith discusses the non-western 
world as a substantial subject for his moral philosophy rather than using it as an imaginary 
point of reference to embody his abstract ideas. Where the fifth part is concerned, there is no 
major difference between the first edition and the subsequent editions. Non-European peoples 
appear as Smith’s contemporaries instead of his thought experiment’s hypothetical subjects. 
The focus of his discussion moves from the hypothetical model of human beings into specific 
groups of people on the earth. This is the process by which Smith intends to clarify and fill 
the gap between his theoretical model and the actual conditions of human beings. 
                                                   
6 See Jonathan Lamb, The Evolution of Sympathy in the Long Eighteenth Century 77-88. 
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Smith acknowledges that there are “many irregular and discordant opinions which 
prevail in different ages and nations concerning what is blameable or praise-worthy” (V.1.1: 
194). European observers of the non-European world have been surprised or even disgusted 
by unfamiliar and strange social practices which indigenous people regard as common and 
just. Smith’s argument has two steps. Firstly, he aims to clarify the way in which social 
custom has influence upon the judgments of members of society. He shows that we tend to 
justify our own opinions under the name of “reason and nature,” but that this is actually an 
outcome of our “habit or prejudice” (V.1.4: 195). Secondly, despite acknowledging the 
influence of custom, he contends that our moral judgments “are founded on the strongest and 
most vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be 
entirely perverted” (V.2.1: 200). In A Turn to Empire, Jennifer Pitts contends that Smith’s 
moral philosophy “encourages open-mindedness toward unfamiliar values and practices,” and 
therefore “accepts the possibility of cross-cultural judgments” (43). My interpretation of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments aims to develop this line of argument. In the construction of his 
moral theory, Smith’s response to the diversity of people on the globe is two-fold. Firstly, he 
just suggests that such diversity is a superficial matter in moral philosophy because he denies 
the substantial influence of custom on moral judgment. Secondly, he is still interested in the 
diversity of custom and attempts to argue that individual subjects can properly understand 
people in a different socio-cultural context by overcoming their own “prejudice.” 
     Smith grasps social practices performed in each society, which seem to be enigmatic 
and strange from the outsider’s view, as reasonable attempts to respond to the particular 
condition in which that society is located. This is a point where the dichotomy between 
civilization and savagery underlies his moral theory. He contrasts the condition of “civilized 
nations” whose “virtues . . . are founded upon humanity” with that of “rude and barbarous 
nations” which are based on “the virtues of self-denial” (V.2.8: 204-05). The relative absence 
of humane sentiments among these primitive people is not interpreted as a result of their 
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natural deficiency or ignorance in this argument. Instead, he suggests that such a moral 
attitude is a consequence of the “circumstances” in which members of a society are 
continuously exposed to various dangers such as hunger (V.2.9: 205). On the one hand, this 
depiction emphasizes the superiority of civilization over savagery based on the assumption 
that people have more comfort and convenience in a civilized society while rude and 
barbarous societies are always haunted by the fear of death. On the other hand, he encourages 
readers to find a hidden logic and necessity behind the unfamiliar social practice. This 
becomes the basis for proper cross-cultural judgments; European observers should not apply 
their own standards to judge the non-western world, but instead examine the degree of 
appropriateness of their social practice by speculating how far they successfully respond to 
problems which their particular circumstances impose. The rationality of each society is 
confirmed by the fact of its subsistence. (V.2.16: 211). 
     In the theoretical foundation of cross-cultural judgments, Smith is aware that the 
European observer of the non-western world does not always remain a spectator but becomes 
an active agent. The focus of his argument, therefore, moves from examining the proper way 
of judging unfamiliar social practices to the nature and consequence of the encounter between 
Europe and the rest of the globe: 
 
Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she 
subjected those nations of heroes [Africans] to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to 
wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, 
nor of those which they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly 
expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. (V.2.9: 206-07) 
 
His critique of slavery presents the view that the superiority of civilization over savagery 
does not justify intervention in other societies. Instead of relating how the miserable 
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condition of people in savagery can be improved, he is concerned with the unfortunate 
consequence of the encounter between societies which are in different stages of progress. As 
Jennifer Pitts points out, his narrative of history is characterized by a sense of “contingency” 
(A Turn to Empire 32, 34). The civilized status of Europe is just a consequence of contingent 
events, therefore does not imply any essential superiority over the rest of the globe. He 
criticizes such complacency as the cause of corruption and injustice in the history of 
European empires. This is one of the moments in which his theoretical reflection in the area 
of moral philosophy encompasses an inquiry into the nature and consequence of the history 
of encounter. He returns to this subject in the Wealth of Nations.  
     In the first edition, Smith is conscious that individual subjects are interested in people 
outside of their own society. While social and cultural difference divides the inhabitants of 
the globe, the imaginative disposition of human beings sometimes overcomes this boundary. 
They might be curious to know how people in another society live and behave. The encounter 
between people from different societies does not straightforwardly develop into the exchange 
of sentiments in Smith’s picture. For instance, 
 
The savages in North America, we are told, assume upon all occasions the greatest 
indifference […]. Their magnanimity and self-command, in this respect, are 
almost beyond the conception of Europeans. (V.2.9: 205) 
 
In his description of the encounter beyond social and cultural boundaries, Smith highlights 
the blockage of sympathy. The passage above suggests the situation in which the European 
observer cannot sympathize with the non-European individual. In this setting, the difficulty in 
sympathy becomes the problem of understanding. Europeans are perplexed, or even 
disgusted, by the behavior of non-Europeans. Smith’s philosophy aspires to understand the 
nature of this difference as well as overcoming the difference. Understanding different groups 
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of people expands the scope of sympathy. 
 
3-2. Moral Philosophy in Global Settings (2): Distance 
Smith’s model of sympathy itself is just a description of the mechanics of our mental faculty. 
After his formulation of sympathy as an imaginary exchange of positions between the subject 
and the object, Smith needs to explain (1) how it can be the basis of our critical judgment on 
our own or other people’s conduct, and (2) why such a judgment can be the foundation of 
morality. Sympathy becomes an issue of moral philosophy because sympathizing entails 
approval. He argues that we approve the conduct of another individual when we find the 
“perfect concord” between our and his/her emotions (I.i.3.1: 16). 
The perfect concord between “I” and “he/she” is not always a fair criterion of 
appropriate conduct because any shared background or interest may distort its nature. To 
conceptualize sympathy as a moral principle, Smith discusses the invention of an imaginary 
perspective in the form of an “impartial spectator.” When we observe the conduct of another 
individual, what matters is not the concord between the agent and us (actual observers), but 
the concord between the agent and a person who has nothing to do with the event. Smith also 
refers to the impartial spectator as the “indifferent by-stander” and “the indifferent spectator” 
(II.i.2.2: 69, II.ii.2.4: 85). In the second edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he 
explicates the concept of the impartial spectator by referring to the process through which we 
compare “a very small interest of our own” with “the greatest concern of another with whom 
we have no particular connexion” (III.3.3: 135). He presents a way of reconciling the clash 
between egoism and altruism. 
 
Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must 
change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from 
his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the 
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eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who 
judges with impartiality between us. (III.3.3: 135) 
 
The critical judgment comes from imagining the view of the third person. This is the pivotal 
point in which sympathy as a psychological process transforms into the foundation of moral 
judgment. In the first stage of Smith’s inquiry, there are only two different actors in his 
theory, the agent and the observer, or the self and the other. In the second stage, a third actor 
is introduced into this model, the disinterested spectator who is distant from both of them. 
The emergence of this triangular relation is the basis for Smith’s moral theory of sympathy. 
The impartial spectator is an abstracted individual, characterized by distance. Imagining the 
view of the impartial spectator is a means of putting aside our own subjective views based on 
our specific settings. Smith uses distance as a solution to the problematic partiality of the 
individual view. 
     In the second edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith substantially examines 
the influence of distance upon moral judgment by adding a thought experiment about the 
Chinese earthquake. In Performing China, Chi-Ming Yang points out that this hypothetical 
case study shows the way in which Smith’s theoretical reflection is involved with 
geographical representation (161-67). It is the moment in which the abstract individual 
subjects in his model are put into a particular setting again. 
 
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, 
was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of 
humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, 
would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, 
I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that 
unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the 
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precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could 
thus be annihilated in a moment. . . . And when all this fine philosophy was over, 
when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would 
pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same 
ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. . . . If he was to lose his 
little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw 
them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred 
millions of his brethren . . . . (TMS III.3.4:136) 
 
This hypothetical example of the Chinese earthquake presents both the possibilities and limits 
of sympathy as the basis of our moral judgment. Smith assumes that the European subject is 
capable of imagining the tragic condition of people in a distant region who have a different 
socio-cultural background. The problem of distance, however, appears in the transient nature 
of sympathy. The “tranquillity” of the European “man of humanity” after the expression of 
“humane sentiments” represents the egocentric nature of human beings. Smith’s thought 
experiment, therefore, shows two different aspects of distance. On the one hand, it is essential 
to sympathizing with other individuals because it keeps the distinction between the subject 
and object of sympathy. Without this kind of distance, the European observer cannot establish 
his position as a detached spectator of the disaster. On the other hand, it weakens our 
continuous attention to the circumstance of other human beings. Smith’s moral philosophy 
needs to negotiate with this paradox of distance. 
     The goal of this thought experiment is not to reveal our tendency to give precedence to 
our own concern over the suffering of distant and unfamiliar people. Instead, Smith supposes 
that no one is actually “willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren” in 
order to avoid injury to their own finger (TMS III.3.4: 137). His narrative of the hypothetical 
Chinese earthquake, therefore, proceeds to discuss the way in which an individual subject 
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struggles to overcome, or at least adjust, such an egocentric perspective by inventing the view 
of an impartial spectator which embodies one’s “conscience.” It is “the inhabitant of the 
breast . . . the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (TMS III.3.4: 137). It compares from a 
detached position the seriousness of losing one’s little finger with that of a calamity 
experienced by distant people, and so compels a revision of judgment. 
     In the beginning of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith mainly examines how 
proximity distorts the appropriateness and objectivity of moral judgments. Sharing with 
objects of sympathy a similar socio-cultural background or any commercial/political interest 
might undermine the foundation of morality. In response, he conceptualizes the impartial 
spectator as the abstracted individual detached from that context. The hypothetical case study 
of the Chinese earthquake, then, clarifies the presence of another kind of issue in moral 
philosophy: how far should we accept/oppose our indifference to distant people? In the 
hypothetical setting, the European man of humanity is not responsible for the hazardous 
consequence of the earthquake at all; at least, he is neither an agent nor a perpetrator in this 
case. It is also notable that Smith does not proceed to discuss laws of nations in this thought 
experiment. His focus is the affective relation between European people and Chinese victims, 
not the relation between European countries and the Chinese empire. The subject of this 
inquiry is an individual rather than a nation. The hypothetical case study of the Chinese 
earthquake does not cover all issues of the condition of morality in an international setting 
but focuses on one particular aspect of it. 
In The Hypothetical Mandarin, Eric Hayot suggests that the Chinese setting in this 
thought experiment enables Smith to embody the abstract problem of his moral philosophy in 
a concrete example (3-30). Modern Europe perceives China as a “contemporaneous 
civilizational other” (Hayot 9). Through choosing China, Smith can envisage a cross-cultural 
judgment beyond the European border without assuming an unequal relation. The 
hypothetical setting of this thought experiment can help to clarify Smith’s idea of the globe. 
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He presents “a man of humanity in Europe” as an individual who has “no sort of connexion 
with that part of the world [China].” Interestingly, Smith assumes that this figure might 
develop a particular reflection as well as expressing “humane sentiments” before going back 
to a state of tranquillity: 
 
He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings 
concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of 
Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. (TMS III.3.4:136) 
 
According to the note of the editors of the Glasgow Edition, “[i]t is significant that for Smith, 
writing this passage in 1760, ‘a man of speculation’ would be liable to reflect on the 
economic consequences, not the theological implications, of the disaster” (136 n.5). Although 
European sympathy toward Chinese victims of the earthquake is transient, the destruction of 
the Chinese empire will have continuing repercussions for Europe. The phrase, “the trade and 
business of the world,” implies the presence of large-scale commerce beyond Europe. China 
is distant but not in a different world. The assumption that even a distant region of the earth 
has connections with Europe through commerce can be seen as an articulation of the idea of 
the global.7 This is the moment in which Smith’s narrative slips from a fictional setting, and 
starts to grasp the reality of his contemporary world. 
     This connection between Europe and China is the product of imagination as well as the 
material condition of the flow of things and people. The man of speculation is not in China 
but in Europe, and knows the circumstances of the Chinese earthquake. He probably 
                                                   
7 The establishment of connection means that peoples in two distant regions share the same 
temporality. Due to this synchronicity, the global is an idea concerning time as well as space. In Time 
and the Other, Johannes Fabian conceptualizes “denial of coevalness” to “examine how Time is used 
to create distance” by modern anthropologists (28, 31). He argues that there is “a persistent and 
systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the 
producer of anthropological discourse” (31). 
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encounters this news by reading a newspaper or having a conversation with someone who has 
a connection with this region such as an international trader or a sailor. In this respect, his 
confrontation with the victims in the distant country is virtual in some degree because it is 
mediated by literary representation. Smith’s slip from the fictional setting into the reality of 
the contemporary world, then, shows how conceptions of the global are constituted by a 
combination of firsthand and secondhand encounters 
     Smith’s assumption of the presence of large-scale commerce in this hypothetical 
question leaves a further question about the condition of moral sentiments in a global setting. 
In his model of moral judgments, the detached position of the spectator ensures the 
impartiality and objectivity of his/her judgment. In the case of the Chinese earthquake, the 
European man of humanity or speculation appears as an impartial spectator of this event 
because Smith emphasizes that he has no personal connection with China. It is ambiguous, 
however, whether this presentation of the man of speculation can be ultimately compatible 
with the assumption that commerce between Europe and China underlies the daily lives of his 
own society. The question is whether there is any position detached from this global 
interaction and circulation of things, peoples and information. Due to its nature, there seems 
to be no outside of the global system. How can the individual subject imagine a particular 
perspective on the global which ensures the impartial understanding of events and conducts 
in such a setting? In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, there is no further reflection on this 
question; instead, the Wealth of Nations provides a possible answer by examining the colonial 
history of the New World. 
 
3-3. Writing the History of the Progress of Sentiments 
As a result of Smith’s substantial revision, the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments has a new part titled “Of the Character of Virtue.” This addition expresses his 
further reflection on the condition of sympathy in a concrete setting with geographical 
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reference. I understand its second section, “Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can 
affect the Happiness of other People,” as an attempt to write about the history of the progress 
of sentiments, both in the individual subject and mankind. This attempt shows the way in 
which Smith interweaves hypothetical theory and actual history into his narrative. The 
beginning of his inquiry is hypothetical. Smith constructs a model of the progress of 
sentiments by analyzing the affective relation among family members. This is because, for 
each individual, “the members of his own family, those who usually live in the same house 
with him . . . are naturally the objects of his warmest affections” (VI.ii.1.2: 219). As they are 
the beings in closest proximity, the individual subject finds it easy to exchange his/her own 
situation with theirs based on the faculty of imagination. The primitive mode of sympathy 
emerges in the family relation. In this theoretical framing, Smith describes the extension of 
sympathy from close to distant objects, from familiar people to strangers. 
As the second step of constructing his model, Smith examines the individual subject’s 
affective relation to relatives. Unlike his preceding description of familial affections, he 
denies the presence of “the force of blood” and contends that such an idea is merely a product 
of “some tragedies and romances” (VI.ii.1.11: 222). Instead, he explains the condition of the 
extended tie between relatives based on its function. At this point, his narrative of the 
progress of sentiments switches its focus from the idea of “nature” to that of “utility.” To 
argue that the affective tie with relatives cannot be attributed to human nature, Smith 
compares its different conditions in two kinds of society. “In pastoral countries,” the people 
who belong to the same tribe “are all, from the highest to the lowest, of more or less 
importance to one another” (VI.ii.1.12: 222). The scope of affection extends beyond family 
members as long as its object belongs to the same tribe. Smith emphasizes that this affective 
tie emerges because “the authority of law [in pastoral countries] is not alone sufficient to give 
perfect security to every member of the state” (VI.ii.1.12: 222). The tie exists not because it is 
natural but because it benefits each member of this social group. 
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“In commercial countries,” on the contrary, “the authority of law is always perfectly 
sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state”; “the descendants of the same family” do 
not find any necessity to live together, and therefore gradually come to “lose all care about 
one another” (VI.ii.1.13: 223). The contrast between pastoral and commercial countries is the 
moment at which Smith introduces concrete examples from history and geography into his 
theoretical framing: 
 
It is not many years ago that, in the Highlands of Scotland, the Chieftain used to 
consider the poorest man of his clan, as his cousin and relation. The same 
extensive regard to kindred is said to take place among the Tartars, the Arabs, the 
Turkomans, and I believe, among all other nations who are nearly in the same state 
of society in which the Scots Highlanders were about the beginning of the present 
century. (VI.ii.1.12: 223) 
 
Smith refers to the primitive life of clans in the Highlands as something now lost. Although 
he thinks that there are still surviving examples of pastoral society in his contemporary world, 
such a mode of affection is mostly found in non-European regions. Ian Duncan points out that 
“the temporal structure of a dislocation of origins,” the break between “then and now,” 
expresses the continuity between the Scottish Enlightenment and Romanticism represented 
by the Ossian controversy (“Edinburgh and Lowland Scotland”169). At the same time, I want 
to note that Smith’s narrative of this extinguished past does not display a nostalgic tone. His 
pragmatic understanding of affective ties is far from idealizing the past. His use of the phrase, 
“the same state of society,” reminds readers of his stadial theory, which suggests that each 
society on the globe is considered to follow the same trajectory of the progress of civilization. 
His reference to several societies including the Highlands assumes the correspondence 
between the condition of the affective tie with relatives, or affections themselves, and the 
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degree of civility. Aaron Garrett points out that anthropological inquiries in the Scottish 
Enlightenment emerged from the study of passions, the attempt to write “the history of 
sentiment” (“Anthropology” 83). 
As the final step of his argument, Smith discusses affective relations beyond national 
boundaries. Under the authority of the same legal system and custom, people in the same 
society find it easy to share sentiments. As members of society share their circumstances, this 
shared social condition ensures the possibility of an imaginary exchange of positions between 
them within society. The problem is that shared national sentiments also become a barrier to 
the communication between different countries. Smith’s inquiry, therefore, focuses on the 
conflict (and the possible compatibility) between “[t]he love of our own country” and “the 
love of mankind” (VI.ii.2.4: 229). He firstly discusses the affective relation to neighboring 
countries, and then proceeds to examining the relation between national sentiments and 
distant countries as a subsequent subject. 
     As for neighbors, the love of our own country tends to generate “national prejudice” 
under which individual subjects “view, with the most malignant jealousy and envy, the 
prosperity and aggrandizement of any other neighbouring nation” (VI.ii.2.3: 228). In this 
formulation, Smith is particularly conscious about the long rivalry between England and 
France, both of which “have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military 
power of the other” (VI.ii.2.3: 229). He still acknowledges the value of the competition 
among nations fostered by the love of one’s own nation because of its fruitful outcome: 
“improvements of the world we live in” (VI.ii.2.3: 229). Instead of proposing to abandon 
national sentiments, he seeks to control or channel them. Individual subjects should constrain 
their jealousy towards the prosperity of other nations. Smith suggests that British people do 
not have to worry about the opulence of France. The prosperity of their neighbor enhances 
the happiness of mankind beyond national boundaries. 
In this critical response to the nature and consequences of national sentiments, Smith 
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introduces a prescriptive dimension into his narrative instead of concentrating on the 
description of the mechanics of human psychology. He criticizes its natural disposition of 
blocking the extension of sympathy beyond national boundaries. His attempt is to balance the 
loves of our own country and those of mankind. His writing intends to reshape the natural 
disposition of preferring the familiar over the unfamiliar, different, or distant object. At the 
same time, he also acknowledges the positive value of the love of familiar objects. In the 
examination of “universal benevolence,” he contends that “the care of the universal happiness 
of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man” (VI.ii.3.6: 237). 
For distant countries, Smith does not have any serious concern about national prejudice 
because a greater distance weakens the intensity of jealousy: 
 
National prejudices and hatred seldom extend beyond neighbouring nations. We 
very weakly and foolishly, perhaps, call the French our natural enemies; and they 
perhaps, as weakly and foolishly, consider us in the same manner. Neither they nor 
we bear any sort of envy to the prosperity of China and Japan. It very rarely 
happens, however, that our good-will towards such distant countries can be 
exerted with much effect. (VI.ii.2.5: 229-30) 
 
The British/European indifference about the prosperity of Asian countries has a notable 
relation to the hypothetical case study of the Chinese earthquake in the second edition. He 
actually refers to Asia in the Wealth of Nations as well. 
The initial task of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is not an analysis of global 
interconnection or geographical description of the globe. But Smith refers to the diverse 
condition of peoples and societies as case studies in his system-building. His theory brings 
together abstract principles and concrete examples, actual history and hypothetical 
assumptions. In the second edition, his thought experiment about the Chinese earthquake 
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locates the condition of sentiments in a global setting. And the European observer of the non-
western world emerges as a crucial subject in his moral philosophy. Distance as well as 
difference matters. In the sixth edition, his former attention to diversity and global 
interconnection is reshaped into an attempt to write the history of the progress of sentiments. 
Smith becomes more concerned about national sentiments as the cause of the conflict among 
neighboring countries. He discusses the problem of proximity as the cause of jealousy in 
addition to the problem of distance as the cause of indifference. 
 
4. Comprehending Global Interconnection 
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith presents exchange as an essential element of human 
activity, and examines how it determines the web of human relations. In the seventh chapter 
of book IV, he applies this conceptual framework to discussing the contemporary problem of 
colonial administration. Through combining theoretical reflection on human nature with 
practical diagnosis of the present issue of political economy, the Wealth of Nations shapes the 
language of encounter. In the micro level, it depicts individual subjects within the process of 
commercial interaction. In the macro level, it investigates European interaction with the rest 
of the globe, the New World in particular. To represent this imperial encounter, Smith strives 
to offer readers an Olympian view of such an immense process. Through writing the book, he 
imagines that the emerging vast structure of political economy comes to cover the whole 
surface of the earth. His writing is a literary experiment to open a new perspective on the 
contemporary world by which one can imagine it as interconnected. This also expresses his 
idea of the relation between space and time, because he assumes that the origin of global 
interconnection can be traced back to 1492. The Wealth of Nations is an ambitious project to 
frame a perspective which covers the enormous scope of both geography and history. 
Smith started to consider writing a book which condensed “some of [his] thinking 
about jurisprudence, police and political economy” when he was in France in 1764 
116 
 
 
(Phillipson, Adam Smith 188). After his travels around the European continent, he wrote the 
Wealth of Nations in Kirkcaldy between 1767 and 1773 (Phillipson 201). This was the exact 
period during which Britain experienced the new order and problems of the post-Seven Years 
War’s regime. After the Treaty of Paris (1763), Britain gained new territories outside of 
Europe as a result of its victory over France. In Britons, Linda Colley highlights the 
transformation of the British empire in this period from a comparatively “homogeneous” to a 
heterogeneous entity. The British empire became too vast to imagine as an empire of “a 
liberty-loving and commercial people” distant from bloody conquests (102). The security and 
management of these colonies needed considerable expense, which lead the government to 
plan to levy new taxes upon some of its colonial subjects. The dispute over the Stamp Act 
between 1765 and 1766 was one of the examples of this turbulence. When Smith decided to 
write the Wealth of Nations, this socio-political turbulence appeared as both a theoretical and 
highly topical subject. In terms of the theoretical dimension, Smith aspired to establish a 
framework to imagine the new order emerging in the contemporary world. In terms of the 
practical dimension, he aimed to suggest a possible solution to the tense relation between 
metropole and colony by examining the system of taxation and the abuse of monopoly in 
imperial economy. His initial task is to recover a systematic view of the world and to re-
imagine it as harmonious. Due to this response to the heterogenous condition of Britain’s 
empire, “system” becomes one of the important words which link the content and form of his 
discussion. 
The seventh chapter of Book IV is devoted to examining the process and consequences 
of the European encounter with the New World. This does not mean that its focus is limited to 
a particular region of the globe. Smith’s approach to colonial problems is rather comparative. 
It intends to clarify the distinctive character of European colonies in the New World by 
investigating their difference from ancient colonies. His inquiry proceeds to compare British 
colonies with other European territories in the New World. Finally, the corrupt condition of 
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American colonies is contrasted with the dynamic example of Asia. In Reading the Global, 
Sanjay Krishnan argues that through turning his perspective away from America to Asia, 
Smith “reimagines British imperialism as an ethical institution whose purpose is to enable its 
colonized subjects to freely partake in their material improvement through free production 
and exchange worldwide” (26-27). This shift also determines the flow of his narrative: 
 
What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every part of the East Indies, 
Batavia is between the principal countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most 
frequented road from Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way 
upon that road. Almost all the ships too that sail between Europe and China touch 
at Batavia; and it is, over and above all this, the center and principal mart of what 
is called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is 
carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians; and 
vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, 
Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in its port. Such 
advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies [the Cape of Good Hope 
and Batavia] to surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an 
exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. (IV.vii.c.100: 
635) 
 
Batavia, as a hub of international commerce, functions as a point of encounter between 
Europe and Asia due to its unique geographical location. As a major port for non-European 
merchants, it also connects South Asia with East Asia. Batavia is a center of interaction 
among local inhabitants as well as travelers from other Asian countries and European 
empires. As the narrative changes the scale of its focus, it moves from a macro- to a micro-
perspective. Smith assumes that the colonies he mentions have evaded the evils of monopoly 
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which characterize European empires elsewhere. Although the quoted passage is a descriptive 
account of actual places, his narration actually slips from analyzing the current condition of 
the Asian market into imagining an ideal picture of the European encounter with the rest of 
the globe. Krishnan points out that Smith “creates a hierarchy by placing China and India on 
a different scale of civilization than Mexico and Peru” (29). Asian peoples are represented as 
those who are more civilized and therefore more capable of managing foreign commerce. By 
implying that there is a difference between peoples in the New World and Asia, Smith can 
argue that Europeans may be able to establish a reciprocal relation with local inhabitants in 
Asia. This is the recovery of the ideal which they failed to achieve in colonies in America. 
For the Wealth of Nations, Asia is presented as potentially closing the gap between the ideal 
of the British empire and its reality, which is exemplified by the American crisis. 
The concept of a reciprocal relation between Europe and other parts of the globe 
introduces a dichotomy between necessity and accident as well as ideal and reality, individual 
and system, and macro- and micro-perspectives: 
 
The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of 
Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history 
of mankind. . . . By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, 
by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s 
enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would 
seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, 
all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been 
sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These 
misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen from accident than from any thing in 
the nature of those events themselves. (IV.vii.c.80: 626) 
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The first half of the passage above consists of a theoretical narrative of colonialism. 
Europeans expected to establish mutual benefits in their encounter with the other parts of the 
globe. This remained their ideal but was not realized in the actual process. The second half of 
the passage attempts to reconcile the ideal of encounter with what actually happened in the 
New World. Smith admits that indigenous people suffered from this encounter. At the same 
time, he intends to rescue the idea of reciprocal intercourse by arguing that the current 
situation is an exceptional case caused by accidental circumstances. This idea of historical 
contingency might secure the possibility of a harmonious relation, but also creates a rupture 
in his narrative between “what the European encounter ought to be” (prescriptive and 
theoretical) and “what the European encounter actually was” (descriptive and historical). 
Even at the end of the passage, it is still unclear whether this “is-ought” division can be 
negotiated. His use of the adversative conjunction twice (“however . . . however . . .”) in just 
two sentences symbolizes the unnatural flow of his argument itself. The use of “seem” also 
weakens the clarity of his assertion. Behind his confident statement about the possibility of a 
harmonious interconnected world, the (dis-)order of his language implies a sense of 
confusion and anxiety. Ironically, his narrative of harmony is not harmonious. 
     As the object of Smith’s inquiry is the idea of union among “the most distant parts of 
the world,” what this passage talks about is more than the interaction between two remote 
regions; he imagines the contemporary world as a whole. Every part of the earth is 
interconnected with other parts. As Krishnan points out, the sentence, “By uniting . . . their 
general tendency would seem to be beneficial,” articulates the idea of the “global” (27, 180 
n.4). In the Wealth of Nations, this describes the present condition of the world shaped by the 
flow of commodities, information and human beings. Global interconnection is also an 
imaginary or virtual concept in the sense that no one can physically see what is going on in 
the contemporary world as a whole due to its enormous extent. Instead, people can 
comprehend it from an imagined perspective, an Olympian view of the whole world. Global 
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interconnection is thus the product of imagination as well as the material condition of the 
world. 
     Krishnan argues that Smith presents the global as “a representational style and form in 
which the disparate parts of the world and its diverse and heterogeneous peoples and actions 
are comprehended as a single, bounded, unified, and interconnected entity developing in 
common time” (28). This statement has two implications for situating the Wealth of Nations 
within a broader history of eighteenth-century literature. Firstly, Smith’s conceptualization of 
global interconnection shapes the frame within which his contemporary readers perceive the 
world. Krishnan recognizes the Wealth of Nations as “a revolutionary text” because “it does 
not merely provide another interpretation of the situation it describes: it seeks to change the 
very terrain on which description and evaluation take place” (28). Secondly, it leads 
contemporary readers of the Wealth of Nations to introduce historical perspective into the 
geographical imagination. For Smith, the perception of immense space is entangled with an 
encounter with an equally vast sense of time. 
Prior to the attempt to reconcile the ideal and the reality of global interconnection, 
Smith identifies its historical origin: 
 
The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of 
Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history 
of mankind. Their consequences have already been very great: but, in the short 
period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these 
discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences 
can have been seen. What benefits, or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter 
result from those great events no human wisdom can foresee. (IV.vii.c.80: 626) 
 
For Smith, 1492, the moment in which Columbus “discovered” the New World, is the starting 
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point of global encounter. Due to its ongoing effect, 1492 is not in the distant past. This 
historical moment is still continuous with Smith’s contemporary world. Columbus’s 
discovery is not only a past event but also a present affair. To describe the emergence of the 
global world, Smith finds it necessary to consider a period covering three hundred years. He 
also argues that even this extended period is not enough to grasp the full consequences of 
1492. He is aware of the potential limits of the Olympian view as a product of imagination. 
     Smith’s historical perspective on the rise of global interconnection also develops into a 
vision of the future. In addition to presenting the current condition of the interconnected word 
as a consequence of historical accidents, Smith imagines the shape of things to come: 
 
At the particular time when these discoveries [of America and a passage to the 
East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope] were made, the superiority of force 
happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to 
commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, 
perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may 
grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may 
arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can 
alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for 
the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality 
of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of 
improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries 
naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it. (IV.vii.c.80: 626-27) 
 
Since 1492, Europeans have continuously perpetrated injustice on the rest of the world. Due 
to the establishment of interaction between remote countries, particular regions of the globe 
have been exploited for the prosperity of European commerce. The present world “is” 
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suffering from this negative effect of global interconnection. In the future, however, a more 
equal relation between Europe and other parts of the globe “ought” to be established. Smith 
imagines that such an altered balance of power will prevent further injustice and promote 
reciprocal communication. For him, global interconnection is both the source of problems 
and the solutions to them. The switch of his narrative from “is” (descriptive) to “ought” 
(normative) shows how he intends to connect two different visions of the world. The 
encounter, or the potential conflict, between these two is embodied in his use of the auxiliary 
verb “may” and the adverb “perhaps.” The decline of Europe and the rise of non-European 
powers are presented as possible events, not as a necessary consequence or imperative of the 
progress of civilization, with the frequent use of “may.” The path from what the present 
world “is” to what the future world “ought” to be is not necessarily uni-directional. Instead, 
Smith assumes that there are different ways of regarding the progress of history even though 
both starting and ending points are fixed in this narrative. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As a writer, Smith strives to comprehend his contemporary world as a whole. Both his moral 
philosophy and political economy are committed to invent a spectator possessed of an 
Olympian viewpoint. As part of his system-building, he applies his model of the impartial 
spectator to specific geographical settings. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the impartial 
spectator becomes the European observer of the non-western world in his reference to diverse 
social customs. This transformation highlights his awareness that individual subjects pay 
attention to people outside of their own society. As part of conceptualizing the imaginary 
exchange of sentiments, Smith shapes a narrative of encounter between groups of people 
from different regions. In the Wealth of Nations, the global scope of his writing, an aspiration 
to cover the whole surface of the earth, also develops into a critical examination of global 
interconnection. 
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     Smith endorses the value of theory, a collection of systems, as a form enabling a 
comprehensive view. He expresses a passion for systematic understanding of his subjects as 
well as connecting different fields of knowledge. This intellectual attachment to systems 
makes his literary practice different from that of Hume’s essay-writing. He is seriously 
concerned about the fragmented perception of a world whose web of interconnection 
becomes too complicated to grasp. In his system-building writing, Smith is conscious that 
systems are the product of the imagination and, therefore, constantly exposed to the conflict 
between actual reality and hypothetical assumptions, particular examples and abstract 
principles. This conflict produces the distinctive tone of his writing. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Moralizing Commerce and Literary Culture in the Scottish Enlightenment: 
Tobias Smollett’s Humphry Clinker 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1771, Tobias Smollett published The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, an epistolary novel 
depicting a fictional tour across Britain. In the opening of this story, Matthew Bramble, the 
protagonist of the novel, complains of “how hard I am to move” in his letter to Dr. Lewis (7). 
He suffers from gout, and now leaves Brambleton-hall in Wales to visit several cities in 
England and Scotland, hoping that his travels will help him to recover his health. In his 
journey from Bristol to London via Bath, however, his letters articulate disappointment and 
irritation. He laments that Bath has “become the very center of racket and dissipation” due to 
“the general tide of luxury” (34, 36). The hectic scene of this spa town negatively affects his 
temper. In his view, Bath is a “monster” composed of “intoxicated” people such as “[c]lerks 
and factors from the East Indies” and “planters, negro-drivers, and hucksters, from […] 
American plantations” (36, 37). Bramble also describes London as “an overgrown monster; 
which, like a dropsical head, will in time leave the body,” and suggests that “[t]he tide of 
luxury” has changed the landscape of the metropolis (86, 87). 
     In this story, Bramble not only records his own physical ailments but also observes the 
condition of the body of Britain as a whole, constituted by networks of commerce. There is a 
notable analogy between his physical body and the imaginary body of Britain. On the one 
hand, he suffers from gout and hopes that activity will provide an antidote to this disease, the 
result of problems of blood circulation. On the other hand, Bramble observes that the body of 
Britain itself experiences an overflow of wealth from its colonies. The proper regulation of 
circulation is understood as a key to solving the problem in this picture. Both a blockage and 
125 
 
 
an excess of circulation are problematic here. By deploying this medical analogy between the 
individual and the national body, Humphry Clinker diagnoses the present condition of the 
networks of commerce in eighteenth-century Britain. 
     Smollett’s epistolary novel aspires to imagine Britain as a whole, and to analyze its 
networks of commerce. The scope of this vision covers not only the field of political 
economy but also that of moral philosophy, because the novel presents the moral corruption 
of Britons as a consequence of the overflow of wealth. The structural problem of political 
economy is linked to the decline of moral consciousness among individual subjects. As a 
novelist, Smollett probes the conflicted relation between commerce and virtue through the 
form of fiction. Indeed, Humphry Clinker shows the way in which the literary culture of 
eighteenth-century Britain is involved with the intellectual and social project of moralizing 
commerce across different genres of writing. Reconciling virtue and commerce is a central 
task for Scottish intellectuals in the eighteenth century such as David Hume and Adam Smith, 
who are contemporary with Smollett. In their introduction to Wealth and Virtue, Istvan Hont 
and Michael Ignatieff argue that Smith’s “Wealth of Nations was centrally concerned with the 
issue of justice, with finding a market mechanism capable of reconciling inequality of 
property with adequate provision for the excluded” (2). In the larger intellectual context, 
moralizing commerce can be understood as an element of the Scottish Enlightenment. John 
Robertson contends that “moral philosophy, history, and political economy” are “the 
intellectual core of the Scottish Enlightenment” (“The Scottish Contribution to the 
Enlightenment” 46). 
     Alexander Broadie presents the Scottish Enlightenment as “a creative surge” taking 
place in Scotland “[d]uring a period of a few decades on either side of 1760” (The Scottish 
Enlightenment 1). This activity occurs across different fields such as “chemistry, geology, 
engineering, economics, sociology, philosophy, poetry, [and] painting” (1). Interestingly, in 
Humphry Clinker, Smollett depicts a scene in which Bramble encounters the Scottish 
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Enlightenment in his journey to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Bramble observes that “Edinburgh 
is a hot-bed of genius” (227). And he is glad to “be made acquainted with many authors of 
the first distinction; such as the two Humes, Robertson, Smith, Wallace, Blair, Ferguson, 
Wilkie, & c.” (227). 
     This chapter aims to argue that Humphry Clinker is a work of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, and to examine the way in which Smollett’s epistolary novel explores the 
relationship between virtue and commerce. Particularly, Smollett’s use of the medical trope 
of circulation suggests an overlap between his novelistic representation and Smith’s 
theoretical narrative of commerce. My approach will add two insights to the existing 
scholarship. Firstly, I argue that literary work, the novel in particular, is an important 
component of the Scottish Enlightenment. Even though Alexander Broadie emphasizes that 
artists and their communities are important for understanding the Scottish Enlightenment, 
eighteenth-century literature is often excluded from studies of the Scottish Enlightenment 
(The Scottish Enlightenment 4). In the introduction to The Scottish Enlightenment and 
Literary Culture, this general tendency is summarized as follows: 
 
When viewed in relation to the remarkable output in polite letters during the 
Scottish Enlightenment and groundbreaking achievements in moral and natural 
philosophy, medicine and natural history, and the critical arts, the imaginative 
literature of the period is often seen as relatively barren. David Craig once 
remarked that all Scotland’s Golden Age could account for in terms of literary 
output was a “striking dearth.” John R. R. Christie likewise called out the Scottish 
Enlightenment for its “lack of a substantial literary dimension,” particularly when 
compared to Enlightenment France, but also in relation to the “native” output of 
Allan Ramsay, Robert Fergusson, and Robert Burns […]. Although Christie’s aim 
was to display the relative fertility of science during the Scottish Enlightenment, 
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this context confirms how easily the imaginative literature of the period has been 
dismissed by commentators. (1) 
 
Smollett as a novelist is crucial to interrogate such an assumption about the relative absence 
of literature in the Scottish Enlightenment. He is a Scottish writer living in London and 
responding to Hume. I will present him as an extended member of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. My argument is not only that the Scottish Enlightenment is an important 
context for reading Smollett’s novels but also that Smollett’s novel itself can be seen as an 
element of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
     Secondly, my reading of Humphry Clinker will show the active interaction between the 
novel and non-fictional prose in the eighteenth century. Smollett’s use of the medical trope of 
circulation suggests that the novel shapes its form of representation by incorporating 
narratives from non-fictional prose such as philosophical writing. Indeed, David Trotter 
points out that the metaphor of circulation is deployed to “grasp the ramifying sequences of 
exchange which distribute wealth as a system” in the “analysis of wealth” from Thomas 
Hobbes to Smith (Circulation 61, 63). When we read Humphry Clinker as a work of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, we can see a shared background between the rise of the novel and 
the flourishing of philosophical writing on commerce and virtue. Ian Watt contends that “the 
novel is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation 
to satisfy its readers with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, 
the particulars of the times and places of their actions” (The Rise of the Novel 32). Bramble’s 
letters in Humphry Clinker show that the perception of the flow of wealth constitutes his 
experience of daily life. The conflict between commerce and virtue underlies Smollett’s 
construction of the daily world and its experience in the novel form. 
 
2. Smollett’s Life, Works and Scholarship 
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Smollett was born in Dunbartonshire, Scotland in 1721, just two years before the birth of 
Adam Smith in Kirkcaldy.1 As a Scot, Smollett was contemporary with representatives of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. He was sent to Glasgow University by his family for medical 
training in 1735 when he was fourteen. At that time, the merchants of Glasgow flourished in 
the international tobacco trade. The flow of commodities also catalyzed the wider circulation 
of ideas and print culture. Richard B. Sher and Andrew Hook point out that this “commercial 
prosperity . . . provided opportunities for the development of notions of enlightened progress 
and improvement” (Introduction 4). In other words, Smollett’s encounter with the “Glasgow 
Enlightenment” was framed by the progressive and practical atmosphere of international 
traders. The social landscape of Glasgow showed the way in which one regional city was 
connected to the wider web of commercial interactions and such a connection helped to 
transform urban space. Smith also embarked on his philosophical studies as a student of 
Glasgow University under the influence of Francis Hutcheson in 1737. In Tobias Smollett in 
the Enlightenment, Richard J. Jones points out that Smollett probably encountered 
Hutcheson’s teaching as well in the late 1730s (53). Between 1737 and 1739, both Smollett 
and Smith were in Glasgow, exposed to the culture of its regional Enlightenment. This shared 
experience is an important context for their deployment of similar tropes/narratives in their 
later works. 
     Smollett went to London to fulfill his literary ambition in 1739. In the same year, 
Hume published the first two volumes of A Treatise of Human Nature. Due to the successful 
publication of The Adventures of Roderick Random in 1748, Smollett established his literary 
fame as an eminent novelist. After moving from Glasgow to London, he kept his tie with 
Scots by participating in sociable conversation in “the Scottish coffeehouses of London” 
(Jones 5). He particularly enjoyed his company with “Scottish medical men and writers” in 
                                                   
1 My description of Smollett’s life is based on his Oxford DNB entry. For Smith’s life, see Nicholas 
Phillipson’s Adam Smith. 
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London such as William Hunter.2 As an eminent writer of the age, he deployed various 
genres of writing in his literary output. He composed a verse satire Advice (1746), translated 
Lesage’s Gil Blas (1748), wrote A Complete History of England (1757-1758) and The Present 
State of All Nations (1768). In addition to working as a novelist, poet, translator and historian, 
he also edited The Critical Review from 1756 to 1763. As a review article on Adam Smith’s 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments appeared in the May 1759 issue of The Critical Review, 
scholars estimate that Smollett was familiar with Smith’s moral philosophy around that time.3 
After these various engagements with different genres of writing, Smollett published The 
Expedition of Humphry Clinker in 1771 and died in the same year. It is the culmination of his 
literary experimentation and incorporation of narratives from various genres including non-
fictional prose. 
Unlike the major representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smollett experiences a 
firsthand encounter with the non-European world. He served as a naval surgeon in the 
imperial expedition to the West Indies (1740-41) in which Britain intended to undermine the 
Spanish dominance of Cartagena. After this imperial war, he married Anne Lassells in 
Jamaica, where her family managed plantations. This experience of the horrors of the 
imperial periphery and the cost of imperial ambition are rehearsed in his fictional writing. 
The Adventures of Roderick Random (1748) depicts the miserable condition of British sailors 
in this battle. 
 
The sick and wounded were squeezed into certain vessels, which thence obtained 
the name of hospital ships, though methinks they scarce deserved such a creditable 
title, seeing none of them could boast of either surgeon, nurse or cook; and the 
                                                   
2 See the “Medicine and Literary Apprenticeship, 1744-1748” section of Simpson’s Oxford DNB 
entry on Smollett. 
 
3 See Jones 63, and Robert Crawford’s Devolving English Literature 65-66. 
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space between decks was so confined, that the miserable patients had not room to 
sit upright in their beds. Their wounds and stumps being neglected, contracted filth 
and putrefaction, and millions of maggots were hatched amid the corruption of 
their sores. (Chapter XXXIII.187) 
 
Roderick Random, the protagonist of this story, is forced to join this imperial expedition as a 
surgeon. In the enclosed space of the ship, everyone is exposed to the risk of disease, injury, 
and death because there is no safe space. Even though Random is an observer of conflict 
rather than a participant, this does not assure his detached position. He recognizes how the 
lives of British soldiers are consumed to establish imperial dominance in a far away space. 
The word “corruption” connects the physical condition of wounded soldiers with a moral 
critique of this imperial ambition. Smollett’s medical description presents the vivid reality of 
imperial conflicts outside of Europe. It shapes his narrative of grotesque realism, which 
depicts the horrors experienced by servants of Britain’s empire. The physical body is 
associated with the moral condition of the expanding network. Empire is a monster which 
consumes human lives as it expands and seeks to consolidate its gains. This perspective 
continues to be developed in his later novel, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker. 
Studies of eighteenth century literature have seen Humphry Clinker as an embodiment 
of a pivotal stage of the interplay between the socio-cultural condition of Britain after the 
Anglo-Scottish Union in 1707 and the rise of the novel as a new form of writing. The 
emergence of the novel form in the eighteenth century is construed as an attempt to represent 
the new socio-cultural reality of Britain shaped by the connective force of rising commerce. 
Britons felt that their world of daily experience was rapidly expanding and becoming more 
closely connected with distant places. The novel engages with the transformation of everyday 
life with a sense of both astonishment and anxiety. John Richettti suggests that the novel as 
“narrative institution” emerged as “a mode of regulation or realignment of [the divide 
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between fact and fiction]” (Introduction 2). It was a response to the transformation of 
everyday life, which could shape perceptions of reality and therefore pose the question of the 
authenticity of daily experience. In this respect, the function of the novel is critical as well as 
representational, normative as well as descriptive. The act of writing a novel entails a process 
of judgment in which the narrator sorts out different kinds of experience and perspective, and 
authorizes the authenticity of some ahead of others. 
     Humphry Clinker is recognized as a significant work in the history of the novel due to 
its generic character as an epistolary novel. Robert Folkenflik contends: 
 
The Expedition of Humphry Clinker was a new departure not only for Tobias 
Smollett, but for the eighteenth-century novel as well. Unlike the nearly 
monolithic Pamela, this epistolary novel never lets any view dominate to the 
exclusion of other perspectives. The letters, separate but read in a series, are the 
perfect medium for Smollett’s central theme. The Expedition of Humphry Clinker 
is a novel about the necessity of human relationships presented through the 
medium of individual voices, and therefore any one perspective is partial, 
inherently at the mercy of the ironies of a larger view. (“Self and Society: Comic 
Union in Humphry Clinker” 195) 
 
The epistolary form as a subcategory of the novel emphasizes that the subjectivity of each 
individual character constitutes the sense and representation of reality. Smollett’s use of this 
literary form deals with the possibility of reconciling different perspectives. Each individual 
has a partial view of the world, and therefore, individual experience could remain merely a 
fragment of the authentic reality which requires synthesis. The relation between a whole and 
its parts is a matter of geography as well as epistemology. In the aftermath of the Anglo-
Scottish Union, the novel is potentially in a position to imagine “Britain” as a whole, a 
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harmonious synthesis of diverse regions. Humphry Clinker offers a travel narrative in 
epistolary form. Michael Rosenblum points out that Humphry Clinker problematizes the way 
in which “culture prescribes the rules for movement: who moves and who does not, and along 
what paths?” Bramble observes “the chaotic movement in and around Bath and London” 
from a distance as well as in the course of his own travels (“Smollett’s Humphry Clinker” 
184, 185). 
Postcolonial readings tend to construe Humphry Clinker as an anti-imperial novel due 
to the presence of Lismahago, a Scottish lieutenant who was seriously wounded in America. 
For instance, Tara Ghoshal Wallace contends that “Humphry Clinker participates in a 
polemical dialogue about the American colonies as refuge and opportunity”: Lismahago’s 
captive experience and his mutilated body are used to show that they “have damaged the 
home country much more than they have benefited it” (232, 250). The grotesque figure of 
this injured Scot is discussed as an epitome of “the human cost of empire” (Wallace 233). In 
Durham, a city near the Anglo-Scottish border, Bramble and his company encounter 
Lismahago. Jerry Melford’s letter summarizes it: 
 
“Leddies, (said he) perhaps ye may be scandaleezed at the appearance my heed 
made, when it was uncovered by accident; but I can assure you, the condition you 
saw it in, is neither the effects of disease, nor of drunkenness; but an honest scar 
received in the service of my country.” He then gave us to understand, that having 
been wounded at Ticonderoga, in America, a party of Indians rifled him, scalped 
him, broke his scull with the blow of a tomahawk, and left him for dead on the 
field of battle [. . .]. (183) 
 
James E. Evans points out that “through the adventures and speeches of Lismahago, Smollett 
connects the domestic plot of the novel more directly to British overseas expansion, though 
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he also invites skepticism about the ideology that legitimates it” (484). 
     The course of Lismahago’s life in the imperial space is determined by the logic of 
commerce. He became an imperial agent of the British army because he “purchased an 
ensigncy thirty years ago; and […] rose to be a lieutenant” (185). A chain of commercial 
exchanges led him to be in the North American colonies. On the one hand, he appears in front 
of Bramble and his company as a man back from the imperial periphery of the non-European 
world. On the other hand, however, his economic status is very different from that of 
corrupted clerks in Bath. He remains poor because he “had no money to carry to market” and 
could not advance his “preferment” (185). His presence conceptualizes circulation as the 
pivot of the reconciliation between virtue and commerce, as his grotesque figure represents 
the failure of the fair distribution of wealth in imperial commerce. Some groups of people 
gain too much, while others have almost nothing. This blockage of circulation causes the 
uneven expansion of society. Bramble’s letters adapt the trope of the “monster” to represent 
the disease of the expanding world mediated by commerce. In the micro-level, the failure of 
circulation is embodied in Lismahago’s monstrous body mutilated in imperial space. In the 
macro-level, it also corresponds to the monstrous figure of London and Bath as unregulated 
urban spaces. 
     Lismahago’s captive experience articulates the horror of unregulated space in the wider 
scale. Colonial space is far from secure, as an imperial agent from Britain is easily swallowed 
by the indigenous community. The victim in this narrative is not non-European but in fact the 
British imperial agent. The vulnerability of Lismahago’s body to torture implies the 
instability of power-relations between British imperial agents and indigenous people. The 
British Empire does not necessarily secure its superior position in colonial space. Charlotte 
Sussman construes Lismahago’s captivity as a process of “transculturation” in which he loses 
his cultural background as a consequence of physical torture and is incorporated into another 
culture as a result of this encounter between two different communities (“Lismahago’s 
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Captivity: Transculturation in Humphry Clinker” 597-605). He “was elected sachem, 
acknowledged first warrior of the Badger tribe, and dignified with the name or epithet of 
Occacanastaogarora, which signifies nimble as a weasel” (Smollett 189). 
His life as the sachem suddenly comes to an end “in consequence of being exchanged 
for the orator of the community, who had been taken prisoner by the Indians that were in 
alliance with the English” (Smollett 189). His transient status in this tribe is construed as a 
result of the blockage of circulation. Its recovery enables him to return to Britain. His captive 
experience potentially articulates another horror as well as the process through which 
commerce solves the problem of circulation. The exchange of Lismahago for the “orator” 
means that he becomes an object of a commercial transaction instead of its subject. As 
Sussman points out, “Lismahago is as much a commodity as one of his own furs” 
(“Transculturation in Humphry Clinker” 604). Lismahago emphasizes that his wound is “an 
honest scar received in the service of [his] country” and that he is “a gentleman” (Smollett 
183, 185). This obsession with dignity seems to be a response to the horror of commerce in 
the imperial space where the distinction between things and individual subjects is blurred. 
It should be noted that Lismahago himself does not express anti-imperial sentiments 
even though his captive narrative can provide a resource for postcolonial reading. Moreover, 
the significance of his colonial experience is marginalized by a subsequent sequence of 
events. His presence and narrative are incorporated into the main body of letters. Melford 
dismisses his narrative as comprising “unimportant occurrences,” and presents Lismahago’s 
figure in his letters for “entertainment” (Smollett 186, 196). He is “Don Quixote” (182). In 
Melford’s letters, the power of comedy regulates the arrangement of events, and it 
undermines the seriousness of the captive experience. A similar process of undercutting is 
evident in Bramble’s letters. Although his letter summarizes Lismahago’s view of commerce 
and virtue, Bramble emphasizes that “[t]he spirit of contradiction is naturally so strong in 
Lismahago” (197). The conversation between them is represented as a comical interaction 
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between two eccentric characters, as the seriousness of Bramble’s subjectivity is also 
undermined by Melford’s observation.  
 
3. Smollett’s Novel and Smith’s Philosophical Prose 
Bramble is concerned about the spread of luxury across the country. The focus of his 
narrative moves from a dismissive perception of newly rich people as individual subjects to 
imagining the imperial network behind them as a diseased body. His scope switches from the 
micro-perspective in which the behavior of individuals matters to the macro-perspective in 
which the whole structure of the circulation of people, things and wealth is interrogated. 
Smith’s philosophical writing shows a similar trajectory. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
he explores the influence of wealth on the behavior of the individual subject. He develops his 
concern about the conflicted relation between commerce and virtue into a critique of the 
British empire as an overgrown monster in the Wealth of Nations. The medical trope of 
circulation is crucial to the imagining and the analysis of the present network of commerce as 
a diseased body in both Smollett’s novel and Smith’s philosophical writing. 
In Bath, Bramble continuously complains about his unpleasant stay in his letters to Dr. 
Lewis, which speculate about the changing social landscape of this spa town as well as 
reporting particular events there. He refers to the condition of some “decent families” with 
“small fortunes,” who once planned to reside in Bath “a dozen years ago” (55). At that time, 
people could afford their lives in Bath without extravagant expense.  
 
[…] the madness of the times has made the place [Bath] too hot for them [decent 
families], and they are now obliged to think of other migrations---Some have 
already fled to the mountains of Wales, and others have retired to Exeter. Thither, 
no doubt, they will be followed by the flood of luxury and extravagance, which 
will drive them from place to place to the very Land’s End; and there, I suppose, 
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they will be obliged to ship themselves to some other country. Bath is become a 
mere sink of profligacy and extortion. (55-56) 
 
Bramble talks about the spread of luxury over the country, and is apprehensive about 
restlessness as one of its negative consequences. From his point of view, the accumulation of 
wealth is destructive to social unity, because it destroys the organic relation between people 
and their land by impelling them to move. This letter points to a paradox of wealth: it 
originally has an agency to connect different individuals, distant regions, and even nations, 
but also disconnects established organic relations by appealing to people’s desire for luxury. 
In this respect, Bramble’s travels around Britain are not only a medical trial to recover his 
health but also a kind of field trip to observe the way in which wealth changes the social and 
cultural landscape. 
     Bramble expresses that there “is now a mushroom of opulence, who pays a cook 
seventy guineas a week for furnishing him with one meal a day” in Bath (56). This phrase, “a 
mushroom of opulence,” enables us to understand the exact object of his criticism. He does 
not necessarily dismiss the accumulation of wealth itself. Rather, he despises the frivolous 
behavior of those who pile up wealth in a short time. Such a rapid but unnatural accumulation 
of wealth becomes possible in imperial ventures outside of Europe. His disgust is mainly 
towards the newly rich coming from British colonies. This is a point where the moral 
diagnosis of wealth is subsumed into a vision of the interconnected world. For instance, he 
writes: 
 
I have known a negro-driver, from Jamaica, pay over-night to the master of one of 
the rooms, sixty-five guineas for tea and coffee to the company, and leave Bath 
next morning, in such obscurity, that not one of his guests had the slightest idea of 
his person, or even made the least inquiry about his name. Incidents of this kind 
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are frequent […]. (56) 
 
 
He also describes: 
 
Clerks and factors from the East Indies, loaded with the spoil of plundered 
provinces; planters, negro-drivers, and hucksters, from our American plantations, 
enriched they know not how; agents, commissaries, and contractors, who have 
fattened, in two successive wars, on the blood of the nation; usurers, brokers, and 
jobbers of every kind; men of low birth, and no breeding, have found themselves 
suddenly translated into a state of affluence, unknown to former ages; and no 
wonder that their brains should be intoxicated with pride, vanity, and presumption. 
(36) 
 
In Bramble’s view, the expansion of the British empire sets a stage for colonial agents to 
achieve such unprecedented wealth. His list of corrupted professions, however, does not 
include military officers. His critique is directed toward those who are engaged with imperial 
economy rather than colonial conquest itself. Commerce in the imperial space is identified as 
a potential cause of moral corruption. 
People avidly pursue wealth in modern commercial society, but this aspiration 
potentially becomes a form of mania. The expansion of international trade transforms the 
social landscape of eighteenth-century Britain. This moral diagnosis of economic growth is a 
crucial subject for Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) as well as Smollett’s 
Humphry Clinker. Smith presents the aspiration for wealth as an element of human nature 
rather than a feature of a particular group of people. In the fourth part of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he refers to the way in which “people ruin themselves by laying out money on 
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trinkets of frivolous utility” (IV.1.6: 180). People stuff their pockets with a number of “little 
conveniencies” even when their “whole utility is certainly not worth the fatigue of bearing the 
burden” (IV.1.6: 180). As an example, Smith presents a story of “[t]he poor man’s son”: 
 
The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he 
begins to look around him, admires the condition of the rich. He finds the cottage 
of his father too small for his accommodation, and fancies he should be lodged 
more at his ease in a palace. He is displeased with being obliged to walk a-foot, or 
to endure the fatigue of riding on horseback. He sees his superiors carried about in 
machines, and imagines that in one of these he could travel with less 
inconveniency. […] He is enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity [enjoying 
himself in the thought of the happiness and tranquility of his situation]. It appears 
in his fancy like the life of some superior rank of beings, and in order to arrive at 
it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness. To obtain the 
conveniencies which these afford, he submits in the first year, nay in the first 
month of his application, to more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of mind 
than he could have suffered through the whole of his life from the want of them. 
(IV.1.8: 181) 
 
This man initially pursues wealth just as a means to realize happiness and tranquility, but it 
gradually turns into the end of his life itself. He becomes blind to the situation in which the 
pursuit of wealth actually causes greater suffering than he experienced before this attempt. 
The more he struggles to pursue wealth, the further away he becomes from happiness and 
tranquility. This is the psychological process in which the individual subject confuses 
happiness with wealth. Wealth might promise happiness to him, but wealth is not happiness 
itself. In the continuing part of the story, Smith depicts the miserable condition of this man’s 
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later life. 
 
Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant 
repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquillity that 
is at all times in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old age he should at 
last attain it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to that humble security and 
contentment which he had abandoned for it. It is then, in the last dregs of life, his 
body wasted with toil and disease, […] that he begins at last to find that wealth 
and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility […]. (IV.1.8: 181) 
 
The man becomes conscious that wealth is not happiness itself. Ironically, the misery of his 
body and mind enables him to reflect on his past ambition. Even though The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments is not itself a work of fiction, this kind of story is sometimes deployed as a 
hypothetical example to illustrate Smith’s philosophy. This may suggest the way in which the 
philosophical inquiry into wealth incorporates an element of fiction into its own narrative. I 
also want to emphasize that Smith’s narrative here is descriptive, not prescriptive. His aim is 
to grasp the psychological process of confusing happiness with wealth. He does not offer 
advice as to how to avoid making this mistake. 
     Smith summarizes that people pursue wealth because of their “deception” (IV.1.10: 
183). Nature deceives them to imagine wealth as “something grand and beautiful and noble, 
of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety” (IV.1.9: 183). He emphasizes a 
productive consequence of this deception. Although it prompts people to suffer from 
excessive work, this labor will contribute to improve their social and natural environment. 
The pursuit of wealth even transforms “the whole face of the globe” and establishes “the 
great high road of communication to the different nations of the earth” (IV.1.10: 183, 184). 
Smith’s narrative moves from a micro-perspective focusing on the individual subject to a 
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macro-perspective focusing on the globe. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he does not 
examine the interaction between the metropole and colonies. But his subsequent work, the 
Wealth of Nations, shows a keen awareness that these colonies become a crucial space for the 
pursuit and subsequent transmission of wealth.  
     In the Wealth of Nations, Smith examines the negative influence of “[t]he monopoly of 
the colony trade” for “[t]he industry of Great Britain” (IV.vii.c.43: 604). This analysis shows 
the way in which a huge amount of wealth flows from the colonies into the metropole. This is 
what Bramble perceives in Bath. Smith’s narrative of international trade deploys a trope 
which is also found in Humphry Clinker, Britain as an overgrown monster. 
 
In her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome 
bodies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that 
account, are liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to those in which 
all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-
vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and 
through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the 
country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous 
disorders upon the whole body politick. (IV.vii.c.43: 604-05) 
 
As in Bramble’s letters, circulation appears as a metaphor to connect the health of the 
individual body with that of the British empire itself. Smith’s concern is monopoly, which 
causes the unnatural development of the industrial structure of Britain. Humphry Clinker and 
The Wealth of Nations share this perception of an imbalance in the economic structure, which 
leads them to deploy a similar kind of trope. At the same time, Smith initially focuses on the 
channels of circulation rather than the amount of wealth. In other words, the problem he 
addresses is how, rather than how much, wealth flows from the colonies into the metropole.  
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The use of the metaphor of circulation also suggests that both Smollett’s epistolary 
novel and Smith’s philosophical works are attempts to grasp the whole structure of the 
network of international trade. The form of the epistolary novel enables the representation of 
individuals encountering this web of the interconnected world from their own perspective. 
Smith’s philosophical narrative aims to establish an impartial view of the whole structure of 
this interconnected world. Smollett’s epistolary novel shows the way in which this structure 
shapes each individual’s daily experience and view of the world as well as depicting the way 
in which individuals imagine the interconnected world as a whole from their partial 
experience. 
     In “From Map to Network in Humphry Clinker,” Andrew Franta argues that Humphry 
Clinker surveys “a picture of society constructed in the service of an attempt to depict the 
networks of social relations that comprise it” (772). Some features of Smollett’s writing as a 
novelist, such as “flat characters, episodic plots, and a preference for satire and romance at 
the expense of realism,” are actually “key features of an approach to novelistic representation 
that emphasizes the systems and schemes that organize social relations” (773). Franta 
construes letters in Humphry Clinker not only as individual voices of each character but also 
as “formal markers of social connections” (773). Franta deploys the idea of the network to 
examine the construction of a vision of society in Humphry Clinker, but this approach is also 
useful for thinking about its vision of the wider world which is composed of the relation 
between the metropole and its colonies. My own question arising from Franta’s framing 
focuses on the way in which Bramble observes and responds to the network of the 
interconnected world.  
     In Bath, Bramble calls the new rich from the colonies a “mob,” or “a monster” (37). 
His letter expresses that he “never could abide, either in its head, tail, midriff, or members” 
(37). He aspires to be a distant observer of this chaotic assemblage, not a participant in it. His 
act of observation is observed by a travel companion, Jery Melford. He finds that “delicacy of 
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feeling . . . makes [Bramble] timorous and fearful” (29). From this perspective, he can be 
seen as a man who needs boundaries between him and others to regulate his excessive 
feeling. He continues to be reluctant to participate in sociable exchange after moving from 
Bath to London. His impression of London is almost the same as that of Bath. He is disgusted 
by “[t]he tide of luxury” transforming the capital into “an immense wilderness, in which there 
is neither watch nor ward of any signification” (87). The recovery of order becomes a theme 
of his journey in two respects. Firstly, Bramble himself needs to regulate his feelings in order 
to recover his health. Secondly, he thinks that the body of Britain, comprised by networks of 
trade, becomes ill due to the lack of any regulating force. His concern is that the intensive 
flow of wealth mixes different groups of people together and makes their interaction frenzied. 
At sites of public entertainment in London, he states, “there is no distinction or subordination 
left” (87). “The different departments of life are jumbled together” there (87). “All is tumult 
and hurry” (88). 
 
4. The Unity and Heterogeneity of the Epistolary Novel 
By deploying the medical trope of circulation, Smith suggests that the problem of the 
conflicted relation between virtue and commerce is not a product of the interconnected world 
itself but rather its structure. In this vision, the imbalanced distribution of wealth is identified 
as a cause of moral corruption. Returning to my attempt to read Humphry Clinker as a work 
of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smith’s alternative vision of this interconnected world poses 
the question of whether Bramble reaches a similar solution at the end of his journey. On the 
one hand, he becomes less and less dismissive of the flourishing of international trade on his 
way to the northern part of Britain by observing the way in which the power of commerce 
transforms a previously barren land into an energetic hub connecting distant places. He is 
particularly amazed by the prosperity of Glasgow as a city of merchants who “have a noble 
spirit of enterprise” (239). The transformation of his view reaches a Smithian solution. On the 
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other hand, Bramble’s last letter expresses his joy at returning to Brambleton-hall where he 
will enjoy Christmas dinner (336). He says, “It must be something very extraordinary that 
will induce me to revisit either Bath or London” (335-36). He clearly aspires at this point to 
separate himself from the interconnected world. Charles R. Sullivan presents the conflict 
between these interpretations as “the two Smolletts problem” (“Enacting the Scottish 
Enlightenment” 416-19). In the former, Bramble finally becomes an ally of Smith, assuming 
the possibility of a reconciliation between virtue and commerce. In the latter, Bramble 
remains a civic humanist denying the possibility of that reconciliation. It should be noted that 
Bramble is just one of the characters who express their views in the letter form in this novel. 
This means that his voice is not necessarily dominant in Humphry Clinker, and therefore, his 
view cannot be equivalent to the view of the novel itself or Smollett’s own opinion on 
commerce and virtue even if there might be continuity. The two Smolletts problem is actually 
the two Brambles problem. 
     Bramble dislikes people involved with commerce, accusing them of causing the chaotic 
disorder of the social and moral landscape of the capital. He becomes nostalgic about a past 
time, around thirty years ago, when “very few, even of the most opulent citizens of London, 
kept any equipage, or even any servants in livery” (87). In the present time, on the contrary, 
he sees that “every trader in any degree of credit […] maintains a couple of footmen, a 
coachman, and postilion” (87). Like former letters written in Bath, he is horrified by the 
emergence of a corrupt “mass” comprising people who pursue “luxury” (87). As an observer, 
Bramble thinks that he “[has] done with the science of men” (104). This phrase, “the science 
of men,” seems to allude to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), in which he 
presents his philosophical inquiry into human nature as “the science of man” based on 
“experience and observation” (4: Introduction 7 SB xvi). 
Despite Bramble’s desire to detach himself from the world of commerce, however, it 
remains questionable whether he really succeeds in doing so. Following Dr. Lewis’s advice, 
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he “took some of the tincture of ginseng,” a medical plant, and “found it exceedingly grateful 
to the stomach” (151). This incorporation of an exotic commodity shows the way in which he 
actually participates in acts of consumption made possible by the network of the 
interconnected world. The condition of his body is partially improved thanks to a product 
imported from the wider world. Prior to this, when he is in Bath, he “[sends] to London […] 
for half a pound of Gengzeng,” (37). At this moment, he states: 
 
I doubt much, whether that which comes from America is equally efficacious with 
what is brought from the East Indies. Some years ago, a friend of mine paid 
sixteen guineas for two ounces of it; and in six months after, it was sold in the 
same shop for five shillings the pound. In short, we live in a vile world of fraud 
and sophistication [. . .]. (37) 
 
His disgust is not directed towards the incorporation of an exotic commodity into his body, 
but towards “fraud” taking place in the process of its marketing in London. Bramble’s 
negative view of commerce and consumption seems to come from his background as a man 
from the Welsh countryside who has his own estate. In another letter written in London, he 
“state[s] the difference between [his] town grievance , and [his] country comforts” (117). At 
Brambleton-hall, he “live[s] in the midst of honest men, and trusty dependants, who […] 
have a disinterested attachment to [his] person” (118). 
As Sullivan points out in “Enacting the Scottish Enlightenment,” Bramble’s journey to 
Scotland shows the transformation of his opinion (426-27). Instead of dismissing all kinds of 
commercial activities as a cause of moral corruption, he comes to realize their potentially 
productive agency. He sees the process of improvement by which Scots struggle to negotiate 
with their barren environment by moving from agriculture to commerce. His letter on 
Glasgow is particularly notable as a pivot of this transition. He praises Glasgow as “one of 
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the prettiest towns in Europe; and […] one of the most flourishing in Great Britain” (238). 
Indeed, “it is a perfect bee-hive in point of industry” (238). He writes to Dr. Lewis that 
“marks of opulence and independency appear in every quarter of this commercial city” (238). 
Unlike his negative account of merchants in Bath, Bramble is favorable to merchants in 
Glasgow, saying that “[t]he people of Glasgow have a noble spirit of enterprise” (239). 
Bramble’s view covers the wider network of commerce, of which Glasgow is part, as 
well as the city itself. Merchants connect Glasgow with other places. For instance, he 
observes: “Alloa is a neat thriving town, that depends in a great measure on the commerce of 
Glasgow, the merchants of which send hither tobacco and other articles, to be deposited in 
warehouses for exportation from the Firth of Forth” (237). Commodities circulate across the 
country based on sea traffic. And this connective agency of commerce is presented as a cause 
of the growth of this town. The wider network is well ordered, and he does not find any 
evidence of its deformation. Bramble enjoys a conversation with John Glassford, one of the 
Glasgow tobacco merchants (239, 422 n.15). Bramble describes Glassford as “one of the 
greatest merchants in Europe” (239). 
The two Brambles problem actually arises from his ambiguous position as a distant 
observer. The problem is a consequence of the clash between his aspiration to separate 
himself from the interconnected world and the impossibility of that aspiration. Even though 
he surely realizes the possible reconciliation between virtue and commerce based on his 
astonishing experience of Glasgow, this stance assumes that Bramble himself is outside of the 
process of circulation, emphasizing that his position is not that of an actor but an observer. As 
his incorporation of exotic medicine shows, however, he is also a consumer. After the 
recovery of his health, he looks forward to returning to Brambleton-hall, which he imagines 
as a place separated from the interconnected world. This finale subversively questions 
whether it is possible to get beyond the interconnected world. The whole plot of his journey 
thematizes an attempt to view the interconnected world from a distant position, and draws 
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attention to the nature of the epistolary novel itself, which presents individual perceptions of 
the daily world. The two Brambles problem is not solved even at the end of the story, but the 
presence of that problem suggests the impossible task of Humphry Clinker, imagining an 
outside of the interconnected world and representing its totality from such a detached 
position. 
It should also be noted that Bramble’s view does not necessarily become the dominant 
voice in the novel due to the presence of other characters and their letters. Among his 
company, for instance, Jery Melford counters the negative account of Bath by emphasizing its 
“variety” (47). It is a place where “a man has daily opportunities of seeing the most 
remarkable characters of the community” (47). Melford recognizes the restlessness of this spa 
town, but explicates the productive effects of the mingling of people from different social 
classes, professions, and regions. He writes to Watkin Phillips, his friend in Oxford: 
 
Here we have ministers of state, judges, generals, bishops, projectors, 
philosophers, wits, poets, players, chemists, fiddlers, and buffoons. If he makes 
any considerable stay in the place, he is sure of meeting with some particular 
friend, whom he did not expect to see […]. Another entertainment, peculiar to 
Bath, arises from the general mixture of all degrees assembled in our public 
rooms, without distinction of rank or fortune. This is what my uncle reprobates, as 
a monstrous jumble of heterogeneous principles […]. But this chaos is to me a 
source of infinite amusement. (47) 
 
Melford suggests that what Bramble calls the monstrosity of Bath is just a negative account 
of the social mixture taking place there. In Bramble’s gloomy view, the pursuit of luxury 
destroys the established organic unity of the community. In Melford’s sanguine view, 
however, this havoc generates the encounter of different groups of people originally divided 
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in the established social structure. This positive account presents restlessness as a productive 
force to dissolve social and cultural boundaries. As Humphry Clinker is not a philosophical 
dialogue but an epistolary novel, Bramble and Melford just express their views and there is 
no clear judgment of which is more plausible in the novel as a whole. 
     In addition to presenting a different view of particular scnes, Melford is also an 
attentive observer of Bramble whose “singularities afford a rich mine of entertainment” (29). 
He sees his uncle as a man with “a natural excess of mental sensibility” (18). Melford thinks 
that Bramble continuously struggles to regulate his excessive sensibility. This would explain 
why he is so anxious about the chaotic order of Bath while Melford rather enjoys its fluid 
social dynamics. He might want to protect his delicate mind from being affected in such a 
place, as the chaos of the social order would cause the disorder of his mind. Melford observes 
that Bramble’s “delicacy of feeling [. . .] makes him timorous and fearful” (29).  
 
5. Conclusion 
The novel is a literary form which seeks to grasp and represent the reality of daily life. The 
geographical scope of Humphry Clinker shows that the novelistic perception of the 
contemporary world in the mid eighteenth century reorganizes the interaction between 
domestic space and the wider world. In other words, distant colonial space, North America 
and India, impinges on daily reality in novelistic representation. In their travels around 
Britain, characters in Humphry Clinker are exposed to the socio-political dynamics by which 
they are connected to far away spaces. 
     Humphry Clinker can be seen as a work of the Scottish Enlightenment in the sense that 
Smollett deploys the medical trope of circulation to grasp the present network of commerce 
as a diseased body. The moral corruption of individual subjects is identified as a consequence 
of the unprecedented flow of wealth from colonial spaces into the metropole. This link 
between moral philosophy and political economy, the switch from a micro-perspective to a 
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macro-perspective, shows the shared background between Smollett’s fictional writing and 
Smith’s philosophical prose. Moralizing commerce is an intellectual venture across different 
genres of writing. Literary culture plays an active role in the reconciliation of virtue and 
commerce by presenting a vision of the alternative structure of the distribution of wealth in 
which individual subjects are not drawn into addicted consumption. 
At the same time, the epistolary form explores the possibility/impossibility of 
imagining a detached position from which the individual subject might be able to view the 
interconnected world as a distant observer. Within the network of international commerce, 
people experience different kinds of reality, as with Bramble’s and Melford’s differing 
perceptions of Bath. The trope of the spectator connects Smollett as a novelist with Smith as 
a philosopher. The epistolary novel makes a distinctive contribution to moralizing commerce 
in its emphasis on the co-existence of different experiences, views, and realities within a 
world connected by the vast network of commerce.
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Chapter 5 
 
Circumnavigating the Globe: 
James Boswell as Diarist in the Scottish Enlightenment 
 
1. Introduction 
On the 7th of July 1776, James Boswell (1740-95) visited David Hume in Edinburgh to talk 
to him about religion. Hume was just back from receiving medical treatment in London and 
Bath, and faced the terminal stage of his disease. He realized that there was no hope for 
recovery. Boswell was wondering whether this confrontation with death might make Hume 
reject his atheism. During this visit, he carefully observed Hume and recorded details of their 
encounter in his journal. He later expanded this record into “An Account of My Last 
Interview with David Hume, Esq.”  
 
I found him alone, in a reclining posture in his drawing-room. He was lean, 
ghastly, and quite of an earthy appearance. He was dressed in a suit of grey cloth 
with white metal buttons, and a kind of scratch wig. He was quite different from 
the plump figure which he used to present. He had before him Dr. Campbell’s 
Philosophy of Rhetoric. He seemed to be placid and even cheerful. He said he was 
just approaching to his end. I think these were his words. (11) 
 
Boswell depicts a vivid portrait of Hume approaching death. The passage above emphasizes 
his decline in health with describing his “ghastly” appearance. His “plump figure” no longer 
exists. If Hume’s physical condition has deteriorated, however, Boswell finds him in good 
spirits. He continues to be “cheerful” and calm in the face of imminent death. His mind 
remains active even if his body does not. Boswell did not write a biography of Hume to 
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match The Life of Samuel Johnson, but he shows a keen interest in both Hume’s ideas and his 
life. His journals are valuable sources for Hume studies. In The Life of David Hume, Mossner 
incorporates Boswell’s interview into Chapter 39, which he titles “Death Comes for the 
Philosopher.” 
As a diarist, Boswell is also an attentive observer of eighteenth-century Scotland and 
its intellectual life. In 1773, Boswell accompanied Samuel Johnson to the Hebrides, and kept 
a record of the journey. Boswell’s Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides presents their encounter 
with Scotland, both the Lowlands and Highlands. As a Scot, Boswell acts as a guide for 
Johnson and corrects the latter’s prejudice against Scotland resulting from his background as 
an Englishman. In the beginning of his journal, Boswell expresses that he sometimes treats 
Englishmen including Johnson as “children” because of their “outrageous contempt of 
Scotland” (10). His journal writing intends to depict the process by which Johnson sheds his 
prejudice thanks to the new impressions of Scotland he received and to the mediation of his 
companion. For instance, he mentions an event during their visit to Glasgow: 
 
The professor of the university being informed of our arrival, Dr. Stevenson, Dr. 
Reid, and Mr. Anderson breakfasted with us. Mr. Anderson accompanied us while 
Dr. Johnson viewed this beautiful city. He had told me that one day in London, 
when Dr. Adam Smith was boasting of it, he turned to him and said, “Pray, sir, 
have you ever seen Brentford?” This was surely a strong instance of his 
impatience and spirit of contradiction. I put him in mind of it today, while he 
expressed his admiration of the elegant buildings, and whispered him, “Don’t you 
feel some remorse?” (29 October 1773: 364) 
 
Boswell’s description is anecdotal. His journal is a collection of conversations between 
Johnson and Scots including Johnson and him. For readers, the journal is a medium between 
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them and Johnson’s perception of Scotland. Boswell himself works as a medium between 
Johnson and Scotland. He does not hesitate to point out Johnson’s misunderstanding and 
misperception regarding Scotland. As an observer, Boswell is interested in the personal 
character of Johnson and the Scots whom he met during his tour, in addition to the social and 
cultural landscape of Scottish cities. As he does not think of himself as a philosopher, he does 
not aspire to derive abstract principles from his travel experience.  
     Among modern readers, Boswell is known as the author of his London Journal. But he 
is neither a permanent resident of London nor an Englishman. He is a Scot who admires 
Addisonian London. He was born in Edinburgh in 1740 as the eldest son of Alexander 
Boswell, Lord Auchinleck.1 He attended Edinburgh University between 1753 and 1759 
where he enjoyed the conversational culture. In 1759, he was relocated to Glasgow 
University by Lord Auchinleck. His time at Glasgow was brief owing to his move to London 
in 1760. But he attended Adam Smith’s lectures on rhetoric during this period and 
remembered him as an impressive teacher. His London Journal was written between 1762 
and 1763. After this convivial stay in London, Lord Auchinleck sent him to Utrecht for his 
legal education. He used this as a chance to travel around the European continent and to meet 
Voltaire and Rousseau. He went back to Britain in 1766 and started working at the bar of the 
general assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1769. But he aspired to go back to London. He 
returned to London between March and May 1772 during the court’s spring recess. 
Boswell moved back and forth between Edinburgh and London. As a legal student and 
traveler, he also experienced European cities such as Berlin, Geneva, Turin, Rome, and Paris. 
In his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides, he is proud of himself as “a citizen of the world,” 
and states that he “sincerely love[s] ‘every kindred and tongue and people and nation’” (10). 
He lived as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. He established his literary fame as a diarist and 
                                                   
1 See Gordon Turnbull’s Oxford DNB entry on James Boswell.  
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biographer while developing his legal career. The publication of An Account of Corsica 
(1768) marked his substantial beginning as a writer. Unlike major Scottish thinkers, he was 
not a professor. He was a sociable man favoring theatrical performance, but also suffered 
from hypochondria. The course of his life demonstrates his similarity to Hume, even though 
Boswell is not a philosopher. 
     Boswell visited Hume in Edinburgh before his famous interview of 1776. On the 17th 
of December 1775, he drank “a fresh bottle of port” with Hume, who “had on a white 
nightcap and a hat above it” (The Ominous Years 200). Boswell states that he “had really a 
good chat with him this afternoon” and “thought also of writing his life” (201). He did not 
write Hume’s biography, but these passages show the active interaction between them. By 
emphasizing the link between Boswell and Hume, I do not intend to undervalue the 
friendship between Boswell and Johnson. In some conversations between Boswell and Hume, 
they refer to Johnson and his writing. 
 
Drank tea with David Hume, having half a year’s rent of his house to pay him. He 
spoke of Mr. Johnson’s Journey in terms so slighting that it could have no effect 
but to show his resentment. He however agreed with him perfectly as to Ossian. (6 
March 1775: 73) 
 
As this passage exemplifies, Hume’s comment on Johnson is harsh. In his last interview, 
Boswell notes his unhappiness about Hume’s attack on Johnson. 
 
I somehow or other brought Dr. Johnson’s name into our conversation. I had often 
heard him speak of that great man in a very illiberal manner. He said upon this 
occasion, “Johnson should be pleased with my History.” Nettled by Hume’s 
frequent attacks upon my revered friend in former conversations, I told him now 
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that Dr. Johnson did not allow him much credit […]. (“An Account of My Last 
Interview with David Hume” 13) 
 
Even though Boswell does not directly express his irritation to Hume, their casual 
conversation is far from cordial. Behind the interaction between Boswell and Hume, there is 
Johnson’s shadow. Exploring the friendship between Boswell and Hume alongside that of 
Boswell and Johnson also helps us to understand Boswell’s literary practice. Following 
Addison, Johnson writes periodical essays, and like Hume his essays take a distinctive form. I 
will argue in what follows that Boswell’s journal writing responds to their essay writing. 
In this chapter, I aim to present Boswell as part of the Scottish Enlightenment. Along 
with Hume, he has a critical attention to the nature and use of different literary forms. In 
addition to biography, he often adopts the journal form. Through his literary practice as a 
diarist, he fashions a multi-layered self as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. In the metropolis, 
he presents himself as an observer of humankind akin to the Addisonian spectator. This 
model of spectatorship highlights his intellectual link with Smith as well. Like other 
contemporary Scottish thinkers, Boswell experiences a secondhand encounter with diverse 
parts of the globe, and is amazed by the great diversity of human beings and their societies. 
As he is not a philosopher, his writing is not committed to establishing a theory of human 
diversity. But his journals vividly depict forms of secondhand global encounter in the 
metropolis. This global consciousness and geographical interest emphasize that there is some 
shared ground between Boswell and Scottish thinkers. 
     This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine Boswell’s 
practice of keeping a diary in his London Journal. He uses the journal as a medium to 
transform himself from a provincial Scot into a cosmopolitan citizen in the metropolis. The 
journal embodies a theatrical idea of selfhood. In addition, it is a repository of conversation 
taking place at venues in London such as taverns and theaters. For Boswell, listening to and 
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participating in sociable conversation are an effective way to recast himself as a polite writer. 
He started keeping a diary in 1762, at a time when the Seven Years War was approaching its 
end. This was arguably the first global war.2 Boswell’s London Journal shows some of the 
specific ways in which people in London experienced a secondhand encounter with the wider 
world through conversation. 
     In the second section, I discuss Boswell’s fascination with Captain Cook’s 
circumnavigation of the globe during the 1770s. On the 2nd of April 1776, he dined with 
Captain Cook and was impressed by the careful manner in which he described people in 
distant lands (The Ominous Years: 307-09). Boswell also had a conversation with Samuel 
Johnson in which he expressed his enthusiastic “inclination to make the voyage” with 
Captain Cook (3 April 1776: 310). Johnson simply pointed out the vanity of such an 
aspiration. He is a man who is not amazed by the diversity of human beings on the globe but 
just finds people in different places experiencing a universal human condition. For Boswell, 
geographical curiosity saves him from melancholy. In London, Cook’s voyages promoted a 
rising interest in the South Pacific. In addition to the publication of a narrative of Cook’s 
travels, the visit of the Pacific islander Mai served to mediate this distant region for 
Londoners. Boswell shared the enthusiasm for information about the South Pacific with some 
Scottish thinkers, while remaining skeptical about the possibility of deriving philosophical 
principles from the firsthand observations of others. 
 
2-1. The Theatrical Self and Conversation 
The opening of Boswell’s London Journal refers to the famous dictum “Know thyself” (39). 
He started keeping daily records when he left Scotland for London in 1762. There is an 
essential link between his literary practice and his experience of being away from home. By 
                                                   
2 See Linda Colley, Britons 101-03, and Carol Watts, The Cultural Work of Empire 5-9. See also 
Shaun Regan’s Introduction to Reading 1759 1-17. 
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the performative agency of writing, he intended to recast himself into a metropolitan man of 
polite manners. 
 
A man cannot know himself better than by attending to the feelings of his heart 
and to his external actions, from which he may with tolerable certainty judge 
“what manner of person he is.” I have therefore determined to keep a daily journal 
in which I shall set down my various sentiments and my various conduct, which 
will be not only useful but very agreeable. It will give me a habit of application 
and improve me in expression; and knowing that I am to record my transactions 
will make me more careful to do well. (39) 
 
The focus of Boswell’s journal writing is his selfhood combining his inner sentiments and 
external actions. His idea of the self is fluid. He thinks that the continuous practice of writing 
a daily record affects his manner of behavior, and this improvement in action also polishes his 
sentiments. He sees the self as an accumulation of habits, and therefore it is changeable. His 
journal writing presumes that there is a model of the mutual interaction between the self and 
the process of writing. The individual subject observes London and writes down his 
experience, while this act of writing in turn shapes subjectivity. As a diarist, Boswell is both a 
spectator and actor in London. 
There are notable interactions between Boswell’s sentiments and the social dynamic of 
the metropolitan landscape. He started writing his journal in 1762, towards the end of the 
Seven Years War (1756-63). The socio-political climate of the early 1760s, characterized by 
uneasiness about the consequences of this first global war and the rapid growth of Britain’s 
territorial empire, sometimes prevents Boswell from being only a spectator of an event, and 
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forces him to reflect on his position.3 For instance, he faced the rising tide of Scotophobia 
when he went to see an opera on 8 December 1762.  
 
At night I went to Covent Garden and saw Love in a Village, a new comic opera, 
for the first night. I liked it much. I saw it from the gallery, but I was first in the 
pit. Just before the overture began to be played, two Highland officers came in. 
The mob in the upper gallery roared out, “No Scots! No Scots! Out with them!,” 
hissed and pelted them with apples. My heart warmed to my countrymen, my 
Scotch blood boiled with indignation. I jumped up on the benches, roared out, 
“Damn you, you rascals!,” hissed and was in the greatest rage. I am very sure at 
that time I should have been the most distinguished of heroes. I hated the English; 
I wished from my soul that the Union was broke and that we might give them 
another battle of Bannockburn. (Boswell’s London Journal 8 December 1762: 71-
72) 
 
Boswell presents himself as “the most distinguished of heroes” due to his expression of anger 
at the jeering of his countrymen. This exemplifies the theatricality of the self in his writing. 
He transforms himself from being a passive spectator of the opera to an active participant in 
the theatre. The metropolis itself becomes a theatre where individual subjects respond to the 
scenes which they witness. In addition, Boswell is more than a spectator in the sense that he 
actively involves himself in conversation with others. As an avid reader of Addison’s 
periodical essays, he aspires to follow the figure of Mr. Spectator. But the combination of 
detached observation and active participation distinguishes his writing from The Spectator. 
On the 9th of December 1762, Boswell described the day as “the great day of debate in 
                                                   
3 See Linda Colley, Britons 101-05. 
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the Houses of Parliament on the Peace” (London Journal 72). Citizens also exchanged their 
own opinions about this matter. At Child’s, in his record, a physician says: 
 
Have not you had all that you wanted? Did you not begin the war to settle your 
boundaries in North America? And have not you got that done, as Mr. Pitt the 
great champion of the Opposition acknowledged in the House, better than could 
have been expected? (11 December 1762: 74-75) 
 
Boswell responds: 
 
Now, Sir, I grant you that we began the war with intention only to settle our 
boundaries in America and would have been satisfied with that and nothing more. 
But, Sir, we have had uncommon success. We have not only got what we intended, 
but we have also picked up some other little things, such as the Havana, 
Guadeloupe &c. (75) 
 
This dialogue exemplifies the way in which conversation enables people in London to 
imagine their connection with the distant lands. Boswell’s journal is the record of diverse 
kinds of conversation. The idea and practice of conversation are central to his journal writing. 
 
I shall here put down my thoughts on different subjects at different times, the 
whims that may seize me and the sallies of my luxuriant imagination. I shall mark 
the anecdotes and the stories that I hear, the instructive or amusing conversations 
that I am present at, and the various adventures that I may have. (39) 
 
Boswell’s attention to “whims” and “sallies” suggests that there is no straightforward 
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direction to his narrative. As a diarist, he rambles. Due to the discursive form of his journal, 
he can move from one topic to another with ease. He can also insert information and 
anecdotes into the record, even if they are not related to his main point. His London Journal 
is a notable record of “conversation” taking place in the metropolis. Its anecdotes show the 
way in which individual subjects were exposed to the wider web of circulating information in 
the mid-eighteenth century. Even during his journey from Scotland to London, at the very 
beginning of the London Journal, he records a conversation about India. His travel 
companion, Mr. Stewart, “had made four voyages to the East Indies” (15 November 1762: 
41):  
 
We chatted a good deal. Stewart told me that some blacks in India were attacking 
their boat in order to plunder it, and that he shot two with his own hand. In the 
afternoon between Stamford and Stilton there was a young unruly horse in the 
chaise which run away with the driver, and jumping to one side of the road, we 
were overturned. (43: 18 November 1762) 
 
This passage shows the way in which conversation mediates the imagination of the world 
beyond Europe. In addition to print culture, personal connections work as a crucial factor. I 
also want to note that Boswell’s own comment and response to the anecdote are not in the 
journal. After describing Mr. Stewart’s tale, his writing moves to another story. He is not 
interested in using anecdotes as case studies for establishing and testing the principles of 
human nature. This highlights a distinctive contrast between his journal-writing and Hume’s 
essay-writing, even as the idea and practice of conversation underlie both. They embody 
conversation in different ways. As an essayist, Hume presents himself as “a Kind of Resident 
or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation” (“Of Essay-
Writing” 535). He collects information and events from the everyday world to develop his 
159 
 
 
study of human nature. His essay writing analyzes and abstracts these examples into 
knowledge and universal principles. And he envisages that the outcome of this intellectual 
labor will be the “most agreeable Topics of Conversation” (“Of Essay-Writing” 535). The 
essay form is a medium for sociable conversation and a container of knowledge. 
     As a diarist, Boswell similarly characterizes his journal as a repository of conversation. 
The journal is a container of information, opinions, and knowledge. But they are not 
necessarily and distinctively his own. He is interested in keeping a record of circulated 
information and cheerful conversation, in Hume’s terms the raw materials of philosophical 
abstraction. Boswell detaches himself from theorizing. 
Boswell has one specific reader in mind when he starts the London Journal. This is 
crucial for understanding the nature of his writing and how he uses the journal form to 
embody conversation. 
 
I shall regularly record the business or rather the pleasure of every day. I shall not 
study much correctness, lest the labour of it should make me lay it aside 
altogether. I hope it will be of use to my worthy friend Johnston, and that while he 
laments my personal absence, this journal may in some measure supply that defect 
and make him happy. (40) 
 
According to Pottle’s note, the “entire journal was written with Johnston in mind, and was 
sent to him through the post in weekly parcels, each accompanied by a letter” (40 n.4). 
Johnston is a Scot living in Edinburgh and Boswell’s former classmate in “Robert Hunter’s 
Greek class in 1755” (Pottle’s Introduction 31) The journal is included with Boswell’s letters 
from London to Scotland. 
 
2-2. Global Interconnection and the Condition of Sentiments 
160 
 
 
The first entry of the London journal, “Monday 15 November,” begins with an expression of 
Boswell’s excitement: “[e]lated with the thoughts of my journey to London, I got up” (40). 
There is no sense of sorrow at being away from home here. When he “came upon Highgate 
hill and had a view of London,” he “was all life and joy” (19 November 1762: 43). As he 
presents himself as a man born “with a melancholy temperament,” this continuous 
enthusiasm is remarkable (“Sketch” 1). London initially appears to be a place which enables 
him to cure his melancholia, though this recovery might be ephemeral. The interplay between 
the condition of his sentiments, his experience of the metropolis, and the agency of journal-
writing, therefore, is pivotal to my interpretation. 
     Boswell encounters London through an Addisonian lens. He describes himself as “full 
of rich imagination of London, ideas suggested by the Spectator” (8 January 1763: 130). This 
ideal man of polite manners filters his experience and view of being in London. He walks 
around the metropolis all the while attempting to identify as Mr. Spectator. 
 
The Spectator mentions his being seen at Child’s, which makes me have an 
affection for it. I think myself like him, and am serenely happy there. There is 
something to me very agreeable in having my time laid out in some method, such 
as every Saturday going to Child’s. (11 December 1762: 76) 
 
Boswell acts like a performer in a theatre, and he aims to transform himself into a polite man 
with a good sense of taste. Being in London is analogous to being at the theatre. This might 
also signal a notable difference between Mr. Spectator and Boswell. The former is an 
observer of the metropolis, whose own position is detached from its social dynamics, while 
the latter is directly engaged as an actor in urban life. The crucial question here is to what 
extent Boswell remains a spectator of London. 
     The theatre is not only a crucial metaphor for grasping the nature of Boswell’s sense of 
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self but also an important place in his metropolitan routine. He is an enthusiast for dramatic 
performances, and his London Journal records of his frequent visit to theatres. Even on his 
first day in London after the long journey from Edinburgh, he “went to Covent Garden” to 
see Every Man in His Houmour and expressed his feeling of satisfaction; “[i]t was fine after 
the fatigues of my journey to find myself snug in a theatre, my body warm and my mind 
elegantly amused” (19 November 1762: 45). His enjoyment of the theatre as a metropolitan 
pastime is also significant in a Scottish context due to the Douglas controversy in the late 
1750s.4 On the one hand, the socio-cultural fascination with playwriting and performance 
was not acceptable to the religious ethos of the Presbyterian tradition. On the other hand, the 
absence of any Scottish playwriter who could be comparable with Shakespeare was 
understood as a mark of the cultural inferiority of Scotland to England by Moderates such as 
William Robertson. The theatre was a symbol of civilized society and the aesthetic 
experience of enjoying plays was seen as an important step on the way to becoming a man 
with polite manners. Therefore, it is a crucial place for Boswell’s attempt to transform 
himself from a parochial Scot into a metropolitan Briton. 
     The theatre is not only a place for dramatic spectacle but also for sociable conversation. 
On 27 November 1762, for instance, Boswell was introduced into “the Beefsteak Club” by 
Mr. Beard, the manager of Covent Garden Theatre; the members met in “a handsome room 
above the theatre” (London Journal 51). Among this company, Boswell refers to the presence 
of John Wilkes, “the author of The North Briton,” which suggests that the theatre and its 
conversable space is tied to the contemporary socio-political climate of the early 1760s (52).5 
                                                   
4 Adam Ferguson wrote The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered (1753) to defend the stage 
production of John Home’s play. See Fania Oz-Salzberger’s introduction to Ferguson’s An Essay on 
the History of Civil Society. See xi. 
 
5 Felicity A. Nussbaum argues that the theatre is a place of secondhand encounter between people in 
the metropolis and the wider world in the long eighteenth century. See “The Theatre of Empire: Racial 
Counterfeit, Racial Realism” in Kathleen Wilson’s A New Imperial History (2004) 71-90. After 
witnessing the English hostility towards two Highlanders in the Theatre, Boswell had a conversation 
with these officers and learned that they “were just come from the Havana” (London Journal 72). This 
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Boswell’s experience of London theatres does not always follow the Mr. Spectator model. 
His London journal sometimes presents the moment in which he realizes the existence of this 
gap. For instance, he “went to Drury Lane gallery and saw Macbeth” on 13 April 1763: “We 
[Boswell and Temple] endeavoured to work our minds into the frame of the Spectator’s, but 
we could not. We were both too dissipated.” (240) 
On 19 January 1763, Boswell planned to “walk from the one end of London to the 
other” with his Scottish friends, Dempster and Erskine, to satisfy “a whim” (152). The 
beginning of this day is not favorable due to the shadow of his melancholia. In the morning, 
he “felt stronger symptoms of the sad distemper” though he “was unwilling to imagine such a 
thing” (152-53). He started this planned urban excursion without confiding this anxiety to his 
two friends. 
 
We walked up to Hyde Park Corner, from whence we set out at ten. Our spirits 
were high with the notion of the adventure, and the variety that we met with as we 
went along is amazing. As the Spectator observes, one end of London is like a 
different country from the other in look and in manners. (153) 
 
He presents their walking around London as an aesthetic experience of encountering 
diversity. Boswell imagines the metropolis as a microcosm of the wider world, saying that 
“one end of London is like a different country from the other.” His enjoyment of this variety 
somewhat cures his depression. The social energy of the urban space affects the condition of 
his sentiments. As he refers to Mr. Spectator in his narrative of his urban excursion, 
Addison’s ideal again frames his aesthetic experience of being in London  
     Boswell’s enthusiasm and depression should also be examined with reference to 
                                                   
kind of conversation in the theatre mediates the geographical imagination. 
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another interlocutor, Samuel Johnson, as a writer of periodical essays and a man of letters 
who is skeptical of the value of travel. Boswell employs his persona as a polite metropolitan 
in London as a kind of theatrical performance. In this engagement with urban dynamics, he 
does not have a particular profession. He is an ambitious Scot living in London, but his 
aspiration is detached from economic success. It is therefore illuminating to read Boswell 
alongside Johnson, who, in the opening remark of The Idler No. 1. (15 April 1758), points out 
“the difficulty of finding a proper title” for a collection of periodical essays, and suggests that 
“man may be more properly distinguished as an idle animal” (3, 4). Such a character is 
“always inquisitive and seldom retentive” (5). Johnson states that “[t]he idler, who habituates 
himself to be satisfied with what he can most easily obtain, not only escapes labours which 
are often fruitless, but sometimes succeeds better than those who despise all that is within 
their reach, and think every thing more valuable as it is harder to be acquired” (3). This is a 
kind of paradox of the Idler. He is reluctant to participate in productive labor, but this laziness 
enables him to be a critical inquirer and present fruitful opinions. Compared to Addison’s 
Spectator, Johnson’s favorable account of his own social detachment appears highly self-
conscious about the Smithian division of labor happening in his own society. 
     Boswell is also a kind of Idler in the sense that he is not involved with productive labor 
in the urban landscape. Notably, his enthusiasm about being in London does not extend to 
consumption rooted in leisure. On 5 December 1762, Boswell responded to a question about 
“whether London or Edinburgh was the most agreeable place to a Scotch gentleman of small 
fortune” (London Journal 68). 
 
In reality, a person of small fortune who has only the common views of life and 
would just be as well as anybody else, cannot like London. But a person of 
imagination and feeling, such as the Spectator finely describes, can have the most 
lively enjoyment from the sight of external objects without regard to property at 
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all. London is undoubtedly a place where men and manners may be seen to the 
greatest advantage. . . . Here a young man of curiosity and observation may have a 
sufficient fund of present entertainment, and may lay up ideas to employ his mind 
in age. (68-69) 
 
Boswell emphasizes that the value of being in London cannot be simply reduced to the 
enjoyment of urban pastimes. This also signals his difference from the figure of the Idler, 
which can be related to his Scottish background. Boswell is not satisfied with “what he can 
most easily obtain.” He constantly articulates the necessity for self-improvement, seeking to 
transform himself into a metropolitan Briton. 
     Boswell’s view of London as a microcosm of the wider world is characterized by his 
excitement at being exposed to a great diversity of human beings, their customs and manners. 
This fresh sense of wonder could derive from his original background as a parochial Scot; he 
is amused by London because he is a newcomer to this metropolis. This aspect of his fresh 
sentiments helps to distinguish Boswell from Johnson, who from a moralistic perspective 
emphasizes that similar virtues and vices repeat themselves everywhere. In The Rambler No. 
6. (7 April 1750), Johnson satirizes those who aim to escape from their melancholy by 
“change of place”: they are “always hoping for more satisfactory delight from every new 
scene, and always returning home with disappointment and complaints” (32). This is a moral 
critique of our common desire to find novelty and refresh ourselves from boredom. It is, 
therefore, a challenge to the conventional distinction between here and there. 
Johnson concludes this periodical essay as follows: “he, who has so little knowledge of 
human nature, as to seek happiness by changing any thing, but his own dispositions, will 
waste his life in fruitless efforts, and multiply the griefs which he purposes to remove” 
(Rambler No.6. 35). Johnson’s use of the phrase “human nature” coincidentally enables us to 
discuss the value of geographical knowledge along with discourses of the Scottish 
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Enlightenment. In Johnson’s presentation of the wider world, the idea of the uniformity of 
“human nature” leads him to grasp the whole of the earth as the site of comparable scenes. 
This is the main reason why he is very dismissive of the value of travel. He rehearses this 
view in different genres, as well as in his periodical essays. 
 
Let observation with extensive view, 
Survey mankind, from China to Peru; 
Remark each anxious toil, each eager strife, 
And watch the busy scenes of crouded life;  
(The Vanity of Human Wishes 91-92 Line 1-4) 
 
This “extensive view” does not present a nihilistic attitude towards human lives. Instead, it 
introduces certain moral propositions about our own everyday life; we can find everything 
within our own world here. Johnson suggests that his readers abandon an assumption that 
they can find something new and different in a distant place; there is no valuable discovery to 
be made by traveling. 
Boswell as a diarist performs his metropolitan self by exposing himself to the socio-
cultural dynamics of London. He describes an aesthetic experience of encountering a great 
diversity of human beings and their manners of life. This sense of wonder cures his 
melancholia. He grasps London as a macrocosm of the wider world because metropolitan 
spaces, notably theatres, mediate his secondhand encounter with the world beyond Europe. 
He presents his curiosity about geographical information and discoveries as a potential 
catalyst for his recovery from mental illness. His journal-writing can be seen as a literary 
project which indirectly considers the global influence on the condition of his sentiments. The 
London Journal’s narration of these secondhand encounters with the rest of the globe adopts 
an Addisonian model of spectatorship. The socio-political climate of the Post-Seven Years 
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War, however, does not allow Boswell to remain detached from these global dynamics. Due 
to his Scottish background, he becomes a participant. 
Boswell’s journal-writing somewhat embodies the perspective of Johnson’s Idler in the 
sense that he participates in the urban landscape without having any profession. He is outside 
of the Smithian system of the division of labor, while his participation as a metropolitan 
allows him to enter in the social dynamics of London. At the same time, I want to emphasize 
the distinctive difference between Boswell as a diarist and Johnson as a periodical essayist. 
Johnsonian idleness entails a moral message. Geographical curiosity is dismissed as a 
masquerade which blinds us to universal truth. Boswell is more interested in the particular 
details of human life rather than any universal principles behind them. This enthusiasm for 
minute details embodies another kind of conversation, which is different from the Humean 
conversation imagined as sociable commerce. 
 
3. Captain Cook’s Circumnavigation and the South Pacific 
The death of David Hume in 1776 indicates the end of one generation of the Scottish 
intellectual tradition. The publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in the same year 
signals the birth and development of political economy as a new branch of knowledge. 
Whereas the Treaty of Paris (1763) represents one point of socio-cultural and intellectual 
discontinuity in the 1760s, the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 poses both 
theoretical questions and practical issues to these Scottish thinkers. Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
and William Robertson’s History of America exemplify how imperial administration and 
global exploration shape the modes and outcomes of philosophical speculation in the Scottish 
Enlightenment. 
In the context of the global eighteenth century, we need to be conscious that the 
American crisis is one of several pivots to determining the socio-cultural and intellectual 
ethos of the 1770s. Cook undertook his second voyage between 1772 and 1775. In Empire, 
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Barbarism, and Civilisation, Harriet Guest points out that Scottish Enlightenment theories of 
civilization shape Cook and his crews’ experience and observation of the South Pacific. 
Although most major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment had previously shown little 
interest in the region, the visit of Omai, a Pacific Islander, to Britain facilitated by Captain 
Cook in 1774 triggered a growing social interest and cultural fascination. As Kate Fullagar 
argues in The Savage Visit, “Oceania began to replace America as the center of the New 
World in British minds” from the 1760s and “Britons . . . lose their interest [in so-called 
savages] from the 1780s” (2, 3). According to Fullagar, then, the 1770s is a crucial 
transitional period for the British geographical imagination. 
     Charles Ryskamp and Frederick A. Pottle title Boswell’s journal written between 1774 
and 1776 The Ominous Years. Ryskamp describes it as “the account of one who hungered to 
know himself, the whole story of a man of feeling: his passions and pleasures . . .” 
(Introduction ix). Unlike the major Scottish thinkers, Boswell shows a transient but 
enthusiastic interest in “the celebrated circumnavigator” Captain Cook and the South Pacific 
(London, 2 April 1776: 308). He expresses “an inclination to make the voyage” (London, 3 
April 1776:310). This enthusiasm provides an interesting example of how apprehensions of 
the wider world mediated by conversation may affect the condition of people’s sentiments in 
the metropolis. We should revisit Boswell’s sketch of his own character written in 1764: “I 
was born with a melancholy temperament” (“Sketch of the Early Life of James Boswell” 1). 
Boswell’s fleeting aspiration to sail with Captain Cook indicates his belief that exposure to 
the extra-European world can cure his melancholy, even if only ephemerally.  
On the 2nd of April 1776, Boswell dined with Captain Cook “at Sir John Pringle’s” 
(308). Pringle (1707-82) is known as a military physician born in Scotland, and worked as 
president of the Royal Society between 1772 and 1778; he formerly had been joint professor 
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of pneumatics and moral philosophy at Edinburgh University.6 His status as a mediator of 
this conversation between Boswell and Cook suggests the way in which Boswell is exposed 
to the web of the circulation and production of knowledge, and how Scots are involved with 
this network of knowledge distribution in London. 
     Interestingly, Boswell’s record of this conversation is mainly devoted to describing 
Cook’s personal character, though information about the South Pacific and recollections of 
his travels follow it. He describes Cook as “a plain, sensible man with an uncommon 
attention to veracity” (308). This point may seem strange unless we understand that the 
veracity of the traveler’s account of the unknown world was a crucial issue in the 1770s. In 
Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770-1840, Nigel Leask emphasizes “the 
fragile credit afforded to eighteenth-century travellers” by focusing on “the public’s 
disbelief”; if what these travelers had found in the non-European world was “morally 
unacceptable, the public preferred to condemn the reporter as a travel liar” (58). In this 
respect, it is very reasonable for Boswell to start with observing Cook’s character particularly 
from a moral perspective. Unless he is acknowledged as a reliable witness, Boswell cannot 
take his account of the circumnavigation seriously. 
     Boswell enjoyed his conversation with Cook and the relatively long record of the day 
expresses his intellectual enthusiasm, an antidote to gloom and melancholia. 
 
I talked a good deal with him [Captain Cook] today, as he was very obliging and 
communicative. He [Captain Cook] seemed to have no desire to make people 
stare, and being a man of good steady moral principles, as I thought, did not try to 
make theories out of what he had seen to confound virtue and vice. He said 
Hawkesworth made his book a general conclusion from a particular fact, and 
                                                   
6 See his Oxford DNB entry. 
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would take as a fact what they had only heard. (308) 
 
This passage shows the two layers of the issue of credit. Firstly, as Leask has shown, the 
creditability of the circumnavigator is tested with regard to the moral implications of what he 
says. Cook is acknowledged as a reliable observer because his account offers nothing harmful 
to present social norms. Secondly, Boswell also pays attention to the utility of such 
information. If the traveler’s account is credited, does it contribute to any larger form of 
understanding? Boswell praises Cook for his anti-theoretical attitude: the experience and 
observation of the circumnavigation are interesting cases but they should not be used to 
construct any theory. This idea of the relation between the particular and the general has a 
close affinity with Boswell’s use of anecdotes in his journal-writing; information and stories 
about non-European worlds are interesting but should not be used as the basis for abstraction. 
A case is just a case. 
This anti-theoretical attitude shows a vivid contrast with the attitude of most Scottish 
thinkers towards information about these unfamiliar regions. It is worth paying attention to 
the rest of Boswell’s narrative in which he mentions how Lord Monboddo responded to 
Cook’s discovery. 
Cook, as Sir John had told me before, was a plain, sensible man with an 
uncommon attention to veracity. My metaphor was that he had a balance in his 
mind for truth as nice as scales for weighing a guinea. Sir John gave me an 
instance. It was supposed that Cook had said he had seen a nation of men like 
monkeys, and Lord Monboddo had been very happy with this. Sir John happened 
to tell Cook of this. “No,” said he, “I did not say they were like monkeys. I said 
their faces put me in mind of monkeys.” There was a distinction very fine but 
sufficiently perceptible. (2 April 1776: 308) 
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Boswell seems to use Pringle’s anecdote about Cook and Lord Monboddo to satirize a fallacy 
which philosophers sometimes fall into. They should frame a theory based on an analysis of 
each case, but they sometimes strive to find examples which can support their pre-existent 
theory. In short, the anecdote explores the relationship between general theory and individual 
examples. The cases must come first to assure the accuracy and truthfulness of any theory, 
but a desire for abstract principles sometimes sets this aside. 
     Boswell’s anti-theoretical attitude towards Cook’s circumnavigation differentiates him 
from the Scottish thinkers concerning the value of geographical discoveries and explorations. 
Boswell thinks that kind of information is valuable because it gratifies the public’s sense of 
curiosity, and should be treated no more seriously than this except when it is necessary to 
examine the creditability of these travel accounts. This playful approach to novelty has its 
literary analogue in the journal form. Most Scottish thinkers proceed in the opposite 
direction. They are keen to know more about the rest of the world, because they imagine that 
this new information will instantiate the principles of human nature. The circulation of 
geographical information becomes an arena in which the relation between the particular and 
the general may be radically re-examined. Here we can see the way in which geographical 
explorations, the experience of travelers, and the reception of their accounts in print culture 
are all closely involved in determining the epistemological and ontological conditions of 
knowledge. 
The social enthusiasm for the South Pacific was catalyzed by not only the presence of 
Captain Cook as a celebrity in London society but also that of Mai, a visitor from Ra’iatea. 
As Harriet Guest has shown in Empire, Barbarism, and Civilisation, Mai attracted popular 
attention, prompting various journalistic responses and visual representations. Mai’s presence 
also stimulated the literary imagination and philosophical speculation. In her letter to Mr. 
Crisp (1 December 1774), Frances Burney explains her impression of Mai that “he appears to 
be a perfectly rational and intelligent man, with an understanding far superior to the common 
171 
 
 
race of us cultivated gentry” (172).7 She carefully observes Mai’s pronunciation and learning 
of the English language: “he can pronounce the th, as in thank you, and the w, as in well, and 
yet cannot say G, which he uses a d for” (171). In addition, the letter reports that “he called 
for some Drink” and also “for port wine” (171). This indigenous man is represented as a 
person who is capable of participating in British sociable life. 
     Kate Fullagar discusses this cultural phenomenon in the context of “Rousseauism in 
Britain”: she construes Burney’s astonishment as an “impulse to idealize Mai as a noble 
savage in order to criticize contemporary British life” (The Savage Visit 135). On the surface, 
this use of the stranger’s view could be a kind of Orientalism in which the non-European 
society and people are invented as an imaginary reference point from which to criticize 
British or European society. However, we should recognize that Mai is not a distant other but 
an actual visitor to London. He is keen to learn British manners and language and even to 
enjoy European commodities such as port wine. The experience of life in London 
continuously reshapes his character.8 In this respect, there is an interesting similarity between 
a non-European visitor such as Mai and a Scot such as Boswell. Both of them expose 
themselves to the social dynamics of London as a metropolis in order to reshape their 
identity. 
Boswell also mentions Mai in his journal, but the initial difference of his account from 
Burney’s letter is that his journal is not a record of direct personal encounter. He refers to 
what Captain Cook said about Mai, thus helping us to think about how conversation mediated 
information about the unfamiliar regions of the globe. 
 
I should have mentioned that Captain Cook told us that Omai, whom he was to 
                                                   
7 My quotation from Burney’s letter is extracted from Empire and Identity: An Eighteenth-Century 
Sourcebook edited by Stephen H. Gregg. 
 
8 Fullagar points out that Johnson met Mai in 1776 and “Mai had become interesting because he was 
no longer a savage” (143). 
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carry home, begged to have two things for himself: port wine, which he loved the 
best of any liquor, and gunpowder; but the Captain said he would not let him have 
the power of fire-arms . . . . [the Captain] said that for some time after Omai’s 
return home he would be a man of great consequence, as having so many wonders 
to tell. That he would not foresee that when he had told all he had to tell, he would 
sink into his former state, and then, the Captain supposed, he would wish to go to 
England again . . . . (3 April 1776: 310-11) 
 
Boswell does not idealize Mai as a noble savage. He sees him as an indigenous person who 
has learned British manners and taste by staying in London, though we should acknowledge 
that this passage is presented as a record of conversation rather than an expression of his own 
opinion. This narrative combines both essential and anti-essential ideas of difference. On the 
one hand, it assumes that a non-European individual can learn British manners and improve 
himself to become a civilized subject. On the other hand, it is suggested that such a civilizing 
process can only take place in Europe. Boswell, or Captain Cook, imagines that Mai will 
“sink into his former state” after telling others about the “wonders” he experienced. The self-
improvement of the non-European subject is transient. 
     Boswell’s attention to the problem of credit in travel-writing suggests that there is a 
rising consciousness about the distinction between experience and understanding. Cross-
cultural encounter does not necessarily entail mutual understanding. Even someone directly 
exposed to an unfamiliar socio-cultural environment might misunderstand its essential 
feature. This awareness of irreducible otherness is something new. I also want to emphasize 
that this critical distinction does not necessarily lead Boswell towards skepticism. He does 
not deny the possibility of mutual understanding and shares the view of many of his 
contemporaries that the study of foreign language is a key to achieve a proper understanding 
of this otherness. 
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We talked of having some men of inquiry left for three years at each of the islands 
of Otaheite, New Zealand, and Nova Caledonia, so as to learn the language and (I 
am now writing on Wednesday the 22 of May at Edinburgh) bring home a full 
account of all that can be known of people in a state so different from ours. (18 
April 1776: 341) 
 
In outlining this imaginary project, Boswell is not concerned with the problem of Britons 
“going native.” On the one hand, Boswell assumes the possibility that Mai can become like 
Britons. On the other hand, he thinks that Europeans are still Europeans on the other side of 
the world. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Boswell starts keeping a diary during the period that the Seven Years War shapes Britain’s 
consciousness of global interconnection between their metropolis and the rest of the globe. In 
addition to the expansion of international trade, they pay attention to imperial conquest. At 
various places, both public or private, such as coffee houses, taverns, and living rooms, 
people in London have conversations about distant regions. As a diarist, Boswell both 
observes and participates in the circulation of information in the metropolis. Unlike Adam 
Smith, he is not interested in comprehending global interconnection from a detached 
viewpoint. In the metropolis, he aspires to become a cosmopolitan with polite manners. The 
journal embodies his theatrical self and describes how external actions determine his 
sentiments. He performs selfhood in his literary practice, in which he also highlights the 
importance of the theatre as a space for mediating the geographical imagination. 
In the 1770s, Boswell went back and forth between Edinburgh and London. He was 
fascinated by Captain Cook’s voyage. In his journal, his conversation with Captain Cook 
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exemplifies the secondhand encounter with the South Pacific in the metropolis. Geographical 
information stimulates his curiosity. The diversity of the globe affords pleasure to his 
imagination, and temporarily at least saves him from melancholia. His journal expresses the 
interaction between the condition of his sentiments and the geographical imagination, and 
between the individual subject and the circulation of information about the wider world. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Scottish Enlightenment, the British Empire, and the Global Eighteenth Century: 
William Robertson on America and India 
 
1. Introduction 
 
No period in the history of one[’]s own country can be considered as altogether 
uninteresting. […] Even remote and minute events are objects of a curiosity, 
which, being natural to the human mind, the gratification of it is attended with 
pleasure. 
   But, with respect to the history of foreign States, we must set other bounds to 
our desire of information. The universal progress of science during the two last 
centuries, the art of printing, and other obvious causes, have filled Europe with 
such a multiplicity of histories, and with such vast collections of historical 
materials, that the term of human life is too short for the study or even the perusal 
of them. (William Robertson, The Preface to The History of the Reign of the 
Emperor Charles V ix) 
 
William Robertson (1721-93) was an eminent historian and a leader of the moderate party in 
the Church of Scotland. As the principal of Edinburgh University (1762-93), he contributed 
to the intellectual and cultural flourishing of eighteenth-century Scotland. Along with David 
Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, he was one of the representatives of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. As part of their inquiry into human nature, these Scottish thinkers in the age 
of the Enlightenment showed their keen interest in the progress of society in different parts of 
the globe. Robertson began tackling this topic by writing the history of Scotland where he 
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discussed the progress of his own society. The geographical scope of his historical writing 
gradually expanded, from Scotland to Europe, and then from Europe to European Empires 
including their colonies: The History of Scotland, during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of 
King James VI, till His Accession to the Crown of England (1759), The History of the Reign 
of the Emperor Charles V (1769), The History of America (1777), and An Historical 
Disquisition concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India (1791). 
As a writer, Robertson sees history as a genre tied to the nature of the human mind. As 
the opening passage of The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V suggests, he thinks 
that human beings are naturally inclined to know their own past and read historical writings 
with pleasure. As history satisfies their sense of curiosity, it is circulated among people as an 
entertainment. Robertson also points out that history is the place where the distinction 
between home and foreign countries crucially matters, because people become less interested 
in events occurring in distant lands. This is what Adam Smith examines in his hypothetical 
example of the Chinese earthquake and European responses to it. In his attempt to write a 
history transcending national boundaries, Robertson expects readers to be aware that they live 
as Europeans under international connections and that the historical origin of this state of 
affairs can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The reign of the Emperor Charles V is the 
period in which “the several States of Europe [became] intimately connected” (x). By 
highlighting this connection, Robertson tries to generate cosmopolitan sentiments among his 
readers. He makes use of the affective agency of writing and reading. This generic 
understanding and practice of writing history is not necessarily his own but shared with other 
Scottish writers, particularly David Hume. In “Of the Study of History” (1741), Hume states 
that “history is a most improving part of knowledge, as well as an agreeable amusement” 
(566). History presents a “spectacle […] so magnificent, so various, so interesting” (566). 
Compared to other Scottish thinkers traveling around Europe, the geographical scope 
of physical movement in Robertson’s life is more or less limited to Edinburgh and its 
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environs. He was born in 1721 in Borthwick where his father served as a minister of the 
parish.1 In 1733, his family moved to Edinburgh due to his father’s transfer to Lady Yester’s 
Chapel there. He enrolled at Edinburgh University in 1735 and studied divinity as a 
preparation for becoming a parish minister. In 1744, he was ordained to the parish ministry of 
Gladsmuir. In 1751, he helped to establish the moderate party in the Church of Scotland. His 
literary career as a historian extended the scope of his physical movement, because he needed 
to go to London to prepare for the publication of The History of Scotland (1759). 
     In diverse professions, Robertson acts as a center of conversational exchange. In the 
Church of Scotland, he participates in the moderate party, which emerges from the meeting of 
young Scottish ministers at a tavern in Edinburgh in 1751.2 In The Life of William Robertson, 
Jeffrey R. Smitten emphasizes that Robertson was avidly engaged with wider social 
interactions beyond church politics in the 1750s. In 1754, he became a member of the Select 
Society where prominent intellectuals in Edinburgh including Hume and Smith gathered to 
discuss philosophical subjects and improve their skill in debating (103). Secondly, Smitten 
highlights Robertson’s participation in the publication of the Edinburgh Review (1755-56) to 
which he wrote eight reviews (105). From 1762 onward, Robertson was also a point of 
connection between two different institutions in Edinburgh, church and university, working as 
Principal of Edinburgh University. He was a pivot of the circulation of information and the 
diffusion of knowledge. 
     The generic range of Robertson’s writing is less diverse than Hume and Ferguson’s. 
His masterpieces are all histories. But Smitten focuses on the publication of his sermon, The 
Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Nativity (1755), as a point of interaction 
between Robertson the historian and Robertson the minister (The Life of William Robertson 
                                                   
1 My description of Robertson’s life is based on his Oxford DNB entry. See also Jeffrey R. Smitten’s 
The Life of William Robertson. 
 
2 See Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment 50. 
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101). I want to point out that Robertson incorporates diverse narratives from other genres into 
his historical writing. He is not a philosopher embarking on the systematic establishment of 
principles, but still refers to some philosophical ideas in framing his own narrative of history. 
For instance, he begins The History of America by describing the movement of human beings 
across the globe. In its opening passage, the history of human beings is presented as “[t]he 
progress of men in discovering and peopling the various parts of the earth” (Book I: 1). He 
seems to think that movement and settlement are integral to human nature. When he comes to 
depict the European encounter with the New World, Robertson’s narrative is colorfully 
descriptive: 
 
Columbus was the first European who set foot in the New World which he had 
discovered. He landed in a rich dress, and with a naked sword in his hand. His 
men followed […] all kissed the ground which they had so long desired to see. 
They next erected a crucifix, and prostrating themselves before it, returned thanks 
to God for conducting their voyage to such an [(sic)] happy issue. (The History of 
America, Book II: 91) 
 
Robertson dramatizes Columbus’s landing on the unknown land by describing the scene of 
his crew’s erection of a crucifix. His story-like narrative may be somewhat embellished. 
Robertson’s narrative of the encounter also pays attention to the ecological change in the 
New World. 
 
A few years after the Spaniards settled there, the herds of tame cattle became so 
numerous, that their proprietors reckoned them by thousands. Less attention being 
paid to them, as they continued to increase, they were suffered to run wild, and 
spreading over a country of boundless extent, under a mild climate, and covered 
179 
 
 
with rich pasture, their number became immense. They range over the vast plains 
which extend from Buenos Ayres, towards the Andes, in herds of thirty or forty 
thousand; and the unlucky traveller who once falls in among them, may proceed 
several days before he can disentangle himself from among the crowd that covers 
the face of the earth, and seems to have no end. (Book VIII: 394) 
 
His description is vivid but might exaggerate the spread of wild cattle. The focus of this 
passage is the way in which European settlers interact with the natural environment of the 
New World and change its ecological system. It also expresses Robertson’s discursive 
geographical interest in historical writing. He talks about animals, climate, the topographical 
landscape. His historical writing is heterogenous, interweaving diverse subjects into his 
narrative of history. 
     In 2017, Jeffrey R. Smitten published The Life of William Robertson: Minister, 
Historian, and Principal as the first “book-length biography of William Robertson since 
Dugald Stewart published his Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson in 1801” 
(Smitten vi). The long absence of a modern biography might indicate Robertson’s relatively 
marginal status in studies of the Scottish Enlightenment. In The Moral Culture of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, 1690-1805 (2015), Thomas Ahnert recognizes Robertson as an influential 
examiner of “the connection between religious beliefs and Enlightenment moral thought” (2). 
Ahnert emphasizes that “there were very few Scots thinkers whose ideas could be regarded as 
irreligious or atheistic” in the eighteenth century (1). The correlation between Robertson’s 
different professions---minister, historian, and principal---helps us to reconsider the picture of 
the Scottish Enlightenment. 
The recent scholarly examination of Robertson’s writing can be traced back to Richard 
B Sher’s Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (1985) and Karen O’Brien’s 
Narratives of Enlightenment (1997). Sher discusses Robertson’s role as the leader of the 
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moderate party in the Church of Scotland, and the focus of Church and University is on the 
process of the institutionalization and exchange of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment 
from political and religious perspectives. O’Brien is more interested in Robertson’s literary 
output as a historian, which she presents as an attempt to write “cosmopolitan history” whose 
narrative “encapsulates an attitude of detachment towards national prejudice” (2). 
 
Robertson’s writing career took him from the locally specific History of Scotland 
(1759) to broader histories of Europe (The History of the Emperor Charles V, 
1769) and its colonies (The History of America, 1777). He was the most insistently 
cosmopolitan of all eighteenth-century historians, in part because he felt that 
persistent tensions between Scottish and English cultural and political identities 
could only be resolved through a reappraisal of their common European frame of 
meaning. Where Hume exposed the parochial and wayward behaviour of past 
generations of English and Scots, Robertson sought to transcend national and 
denominational prejudices in Britain by drawing attention to common patterns and 
affinities between the British and continental European journeys to modernity and 
empire. (Narratives of Enlightenment 3) 
 
Whereas O’Brien examines the way in which Scottish identity is embedded in a European 
framework, I am more interested in the further expansion of the geographical scope of 
Robertson’s historical writing. His later works, The History of America and An Historical 
Disquisition, actually expand their narrative beyond Europe. The History of America is a 
critical study of the European colonization of the New World. In addition to its 
anthropological sketch of the New World, The History of America discusses the nature and 
consequences of encounter between Europe and the New World. Further, An Historical 
Disquisition embeds this study of European Empires and their colonial encounters in a larger 
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global framework. Finally, Robertson’s geographical scope goes beyond attention to 
European colonies, and he explores the crucial role of Asia in the process of the rise of global 
commerce. 
     In locating Robertson in imperial and global contexts, Jane Rendall’s “Scottish 
Orientalism: From Robertson to James Mill” (1982) is a pioneering work. She presents 
Robertson as a Scottish historian who detaches himself from “assumptions of intrinsic 
Western European superiority,” and explores a lineage of Scottish Orientalists between 
Robertson and James Mill, who undervalues “all that constituted Indian culture” (44). Like 
Robertson, Scottish Orientalists “apply a ‘philosophical’ framework to the history” (44). 
Although they accept “a common European assumption of superiority,” they still differ from 
Mill because of their relatively favorable understanding of the value of Indian civilization 
(44). 
     Following Rendall’s article, William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire (1997) 
edited by Stewart J. Brown aims to examine Robertson’s “contributions in shaping the 
European consciousness in the age of Enlightenment and empire” (Introduction 1). 
Subsequently, Brown also publishes an article on Robertson’s view of India, “William 
Robertson, Early Orientalism and the ‘Historical Disquisition’ on India of 1791” (2009). He 
points out that Robertson’s Historical Disquisition has received relatively little attention, and 
aims to discuss it “within the contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment, the early British 
orientalist movement, and the expansion of British dominion in India” (293). His 
interpretation emphasizes Robertson’s favorable account of Indian civilization and anti-
imperial attitude. 
In this chapter, I present Robertson’s work as a case study for thinking about the 
location of intellectual history in recent scholarship on imperial and global histories. The 
History of America helps us to reconsider the relation between the Enlightenment and 
European Empires. In the early 21st century, historians of political thought came to point out 
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anti-imperial sentiments in the European Enlightenment, but their object of inquiry was 
mainly French and German writing. By reading Robertson’s critique of the Spanish conquest 
of the New World, I highlight the way in which the Scottish Enlightenment is also involved 
with the critique of the European domination of the rest of the globe. In the last section of this 
chapter, the focus of my discussion moves from The History of America to An Historical 
Disquisition. It examines the process through which Robertson’s inquiry into European 
Empires is embedded in his vision of global interconnection. 
 
2. The Geographical Scope of The History of America 
In 1777, William Robertson published The History of America in London and Edinburgh. The 
book aims to present the historical process of the European colonization of the New World. 
Robertson’s plan to write a colonial history of America springs out of his former project to 
write about the social and political history of sixteenth-century Europe. He thinks that a full 
understanding of European society and its international politics in this period is impossible 
without a comprehensive account of the imperial ambitions as a result of which Spain, 
Portuguese, and Britain embark on the colonization of the New World. The link between 
tracing the emergence of modern European society and writing a colonial history suggests 
that the idea of Europe itself is determined by what happens beyond its perimeters. By 
writing The History of America, Robertson conceptualizes the dynamism of this interaction. 
Colonial history emerges as a means to consolidate the idea of civilized Europe as such. 
The History of America is actually about much more than the history of America. The 
geographical description of the natural landscape and indigenous people in the New World is 
embedded into Robertson’s philosophical inquiry into human nature. The History of America 
starts with a general claim about the progress of human beings and their society. 
 
The progress of men in discovering and peopling the various parts of the earth, has 
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been extremely slow. Several ages elapsed before they removed far from those 
mild and fertile regions where they were originally placed by their Creator. The 
occasion of their first general dispersion is known; but we are unacquainted with 
the course of their migrations, or the time when they took possession of the 
different countries which they now inhabit. Neither history nor tradition furnish 
such information concerning those remote events, as enables us to trace, with any 
certainty, the operations of the human race in the infancy of society. (1) 
 
The scope of Robertson’s narrative covers the progress of the whole of humankind rather 
than that of any specific group of people. And Robertson presents the history of human 
beings as determined by the process in which they spread over the whole globe. The 
aspiration for movement and settlement characterizes human nature in this framework. This 
opening statement makes a general point without any specific reference. It is philosophical 
conjecture rather than historical description. As the quoted passage shows, Robertson is well 
aware that any inquiry into the early stages of human life comes up against the lack of any 
related historical evidence. This is why his hypothetical claim about the progress of human 
society is paired with his geographical analysis of the New World. For Robertson, the history 
of the European encounter with America provides much information about the primitive 
condition of human beings, as European travelers write substantial records of their 
observation of indigenous people. The pursuit of certainty in the hypothesis on human nature 
causes Robertson to turn to geography in his historical writing. 
     Edmund Burke, Robertson’s contemporary, endorses this geographical perspective. On 
9 June 1777, he wrote to Robertson to express his approval of The History of America.  
 
The part which I read with the greatest pleasure is the discussion on the Manners 
and character of the Inhabitants of that new World. I have always thought with 
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you, that we possess at this time very great advantages towards the knowledge of 
human Nature. We need no longer go to History to trace it in all its stages and 
periods. History from its comparative youth, is but a poor instructor. . . . But now 
the Great Map of Mankind is unrolled at once; there is no state or Gradation of 
barbarism, and no mode of refinement which we have not at the same instant 
under our view. The very different civility of Europe and of China; The barbarism 
of Persia and Abyssinia. The erratick manners of Tartary, and of arabia. The 
Savage State of North America, and of New Zealand. Indeed you have made a 
noble use of the advantages you have had. (The Correspondence of Edmund Burke 
Vol. III 350-51) 
 
What Burke describes as “the Great Map of Mankind” articulates the consciousness, shared 
by him and Robertson, that the whole globe offers an object of inquiry into human nature for 
anyone seeking to understand the history of humankind. In this framework, mapping the 
world presents the opportunity to introduce certainty into philosophical speculation on the 
progress of human society. Burke’s phrase “the Great Map of Mankind” has attracted 
scholars of eighteenth century studies, who have used the phrase to organize their accounts of 
“British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment.”3 Through reading Burke’s 
letter, those scholars explore Robertson’s writing as a representative example of geographical 
awareness in the Enlightenment. 
The phrase “Great Map of Mankind” helps us to grasp the geographical scope of 
Robertson’s historical writing. The titles of his major four works show its gradual expansion: 
The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and James VI (1759), The History 
of the Reign of Charles V (1769), The History of America (1777), and An Historical 
                                                   
3 See Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind (1982). 
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Disquisition concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India (1791). His literary 
career starts with an attempt to write the history of Scotland. This leads him to think about the 
Scottish connection with the European continent. As part of understanding the political 
climate of sixteenth-century Europe, the European colonization of the New World becomes a 
significant theme of his writing. This interest in the dynamic interaction between Europe and 
the rest of the globe also extends into his work on India. His project to write the history of 
European Empires is expanded and transformed into a vision of a global encounter whose 
geographical scope goes beyond European colonies and covers the entire surface of the globe. 
I want to emphasize that the aim of Robertson’s narrative is not limited to classifying the 
degree of social progress in each region but also encompasses the nature and consequences of 
encounter between different regions of the globe. His historical inquiry does not offer a kind 
of area studies approach focusing on a specific region as such. He is rather interested in the 
connection between regions. 
Robertson’s vision of the interconnected globe is interesting to consider in the light of 
Felicity A. Nussbaum’s call for a critical study of “the global eighteenth century” to 
complement the new imperial history: 
 
Though one could make a case that imperial projects thoroughly infused the 
metropole and the periphery even as their impact was veiled or obfuscated, in the 
eighteenth century vast areas and groups of people were relatively untouched by 
empire. In addition, the focus of an historically specific global studies is to afford 
greater attention to non-European areas, to indigenous people and knowledges, to 
diasporic mobility, and to the social, economic, and ideological investments of 
colonialism on a worldwide scale. (Introduction from The Global Eighteenth 
Century 7-8) 
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Robertson’s move from writing the history of the New World to that of the intercourse 
between East and West shows the way in which his literary ambition to write a colonial 
history is transformed into a project to envisage a kind of global history. Some regions may 
have been relatively untouched by empire when he wrote these histories. But his geographical 
imagination may reach these untouched areas.  
 
3. Enlightenment against Empire in the Scottish Context 
Some historians of political thought reconsider the relationship between the Enlightenment 
and European Empires. In Enlightenment against Empire (2003), Sankar Muthu contends: 
 
In the late eighteenth century, a number of prominent European political thinkers 
attacked imperialism, not only defending non-European peoples against the 
injustices of European imperial rule, as some earlier modern thinkers had done, 
but also challenging the idea that Europeans had any right to subjugate, colonize, 
and ‘civilize’ the rest of the world. This book is a study of this historically 
anomalous and understudied episode of political thinking. . . . This study aims 
both to pluralize our understanding of the philosophical era known as “the 
Enlightenment” and to explore a set of arguments and intellectual dispositions that 
reorient contemporary assumptions about the relationship between human unity 
and human diversity. (1) 
 
Muthu intends to show one intellectual strand in the age of the Enlightenment which 
undermines the ideological justification of imperial expansion. He emphasizes the plurality of 
its thought rather than arguing that the Enlightenment as a whole is against the idea and 
practice of European Empires. Some thinkers in the eighteenth century criticize the civilizing 
project of imperial expansion, but this does not mean all Enlightenment thinkers are anti-
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imperialists. Muthu’s argument can be summarized into three points. Firstly, anti-imperial 
thought is one strand of eighteenth-century philosophy. Secondly, this is more than an 
expression of humanitarian sympathy towards suffering indigenous people as the victims of 
European Empires. “Enlightenment anti-imperialism” intends to challenge the idea that 
Europeans are predestined to civilize people in other regions by colonizing them. Thirdly, 
Enlightenment anti-imperialism is involved with reconceptualizing diversity. Even though 
human nature, regarded as the universal foundation of human activities, is one of the main 
themes in eighteenth-century philosophy, this does not mean that Enlightenment thinkers 
dismiss the importance of the ideas of diversity, difference, and change. Enlightenment anti-
imperialism emerges as an attempt to understand the relation between the diversity of human 
beings and the unity of human nature. 
     The scope of Muthu’s study covers both the French and German Enlightenments, with 
a close analysis of the writings of Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottfried 
Herder, but it does not reach the Scottish Enlightenment. Even though his later article, “Adam 
Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies” (2008), shows his extended interest, 
here he examines Smith as an individual thinker in the eighteenth century rather than as a 
representative of the Scottish Enlightenment. In Muthu’s study, therefore, the relation 
between anti-imperial thought and the Scottish Enlightenment is not discussed. Following 
Muthu, Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn to Empire (2005) adds eighteenth-century British philosophy 
to Muthu’s picture of Enlightenment anti-imperialism. The opening statement of A Turn to 
Empire can be seen as a paraphrase and expansion of Muthu’s thesis. 
 
In the closing years of the eighteenth century, a critical challenge to European 
imperial conquest and rule was launched by many of the most innovative thinkers 
of the day, including Adam Smith, Bentham, Burke, Kant, Diderot, and Condorcet. 
They drew on a strikingly wide range of ideas to criticize European conquests and 
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rule over peoples across the globe . . . . While Diderot’s criticism of empire was 
among the most radical and thoroughgoing, skepticism about both particular 
imperial ventures and the general project of unlimited European expansion was, by 
the 1780s, widespread among intellectuals. Just fifty years later, however, we find 
no prominent political thinkers in Europe questioning the justice of European 
empires. (Pitts 1) 
 
Compared to Muthu, Pitts is more interested in the decline of Enlightenment anti-imperialism 
in the nineteenth century, after which there was “the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and 
France” (this is the subtitle of her book). Her study of Adam Smith suggests the possibility of 
locating eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy in the context of anti-imperial thought. But 
Pitts herself, like Muthu, does not substantially examine the Scottish context of Smith’s 
critique of colonial conquest. Instead, she focuses on the flow of Smith’s intellectual legacy 
into Burke’s political thought. 
 
In Burke, we find a thinker and politician in sympathy with some of the key 
strands of Scottish Enlightenment thought, respected by and an admirer of Adam 
Smith, who undertook a critical engagement with imperial politics more 
wholeheartedly than any other figure in eighteenth-century Britain. . . . Burke’s 
belief that sympathy and moral imagination are essential for just international 
policy shared much with Smith’s moral philosophy. (Pitts 59) 
 
Pitts is explicit about the Scottish Enlightenment’s engagement with the critique of imperial 
expansion. She thinks that the theory of moral sentiments in Scottish philosophy contributes 
to the development of anti-imperial thought in Britain. Robertson’s writing helps us to think 
about what is missing in Pitts’s picture, because he is a Scottish historian who writes about 
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empire but not a Scottish philosopher who theorizes about sympathy. Pitts’s study clarifies 
the relation between Enlightenment anti-imperialism and the theory of moral sentiments as 
one crucial component of the Scottish Enlightenment. My reading of Robertson, then, focuses 
on another strand of the Scottish Enlightenment, the rise and development of modern 
historiography which caused the expansion and transformation of geographical perceptions. 
     In existing work on the history of political thought, scholars are more likely to identify 
anti-imperial arguments in the work of French and German rather than Scottish writers. Their 
attention to Adam Smith is only its exception. This might be due to the more complicated 
relation between Enlightenment thinkers in Scotland and imperial activities. Scholars may 
face a certain difficulty in locating the Scottish Enlightenment in an anti-imperial context 
because of the active role of many Scots in the construction of the British Empire. 
The representative thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Hume and Smith, 
developed their ideas in an age of expansion and transformation. Since the Act of Union in 
1707, ambitious Scots had been involved with the construction of the British Empire. The 
imperial peripheries of the East and West Indies were sites in which they could build a 
fortune as a clerk or merchant. And “the idea of empire” enabled Scots to identify themselves 
as Britons, “peers of the English,” in the imperial periphery (Colley 130). Some Scots in the 
eighteenth century moved between the British Isles and the wider world as well as between 
Edinburgh and London. Neither Hume nor Smith went outside of Europe, but it is highly 
likely that they knew many people who did. The Scottish literati thought and wrote within 
larger networks of the circulation of information, people, and things. In The Inner Life of 
Empires (2011), Emma Rothschild shows this connection between Empire and Enlightenment 
by writing the microhistory of the Johnstone family, whose sons and sisters “grew up in 
Scotland in the 1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination or in reality, to the 
extremities of the British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” (1). The family was also 
connected to some representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. Its “dramas of empire 
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unfolded in the world of the philosophes, and the philosophes also lived in or were familiar 
with the Johnstones’ world of empire” (211). 
     This is the broader context in which The History of America is written. It combines a 
chronological account of the Spanish colonization of the New World with ethnographic 
descriptions of indigenous people. Postcolonial criticism might see Robertson’s 
“unsympathetic account of Native Americans” deriving from “his stadial thinking” as 
potentially justifying imperial violence there.4 The stadial understanding of the progress of 
society---from hunting to shepherding, from shepherding to agriculture, from agriculture to 
commerce--- constitutes the social theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. Such a larger social 
discourse underlies Robertson’s emphasis on the primitive condition of indigenous people in 
the New World. 
     At the same time, we should think about whether Robertson exploits this stadial 
understanding to glorify imperial ventures. The History of America does not necessarily aim 
to support the European conquest of the New World nor to consolidate imperial ideology. As 
Karen O’Brien points out, it is rather “about the failure of the Spanish to implement in the 
New World the phase of social improvement inaugurated by the discoveries,” and “also about 
the catastrophic encounter between two races of people at widely differing stages of social 
evolution” (Narratives of Enlightenment 156). The History of America narrates the failure of 
the imperial project rather than its glory. Robertson thinks that the colonization of America 
spoiled the natural course of the social and economic development of Spain. 
 
Wealth which flows in gradually, and with moderate increase, feeds and nourishes 
that activity which is friendly to commerce, and calls it forth into vigorous and 
well conducted exertions; but when opulence pours in suddenly, and with too full a 
                                                   
4 See Jeffrey R. Smitten’s Oxford DNB entry on William Robertson. 
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stream, it overturns all sober plans of industry, and brings along with it a taste for 
what is wild, and extravagant, and daring in business or in action. Such was the 
great and sudden augmentation of power and revenue, that the possession of 
America brought into Spain, and some symptoms of its pernicious influence upon 
the political operations of that monarchy soon began to appear. (Book VIII: 395-
96) 
 
The Spanish conquest of the New World generated a new flow of wealth to the metropole. 
But the intensity and speed of this economic stimulus potentially undermined the moral 
foundation of society. Robertson does not necessarily think that the European dominance of 
the rest of the globe is the natural course of the progress of society. Imperial expansion is 
rather understood as a cause of corruption in both the state and individual subjects. Robertson 
emphasizes that “[t]he Spaniards, like their monarchs, [became] intoxicated with […] wealth” 
(Book VIII: 397).5 His choice of the word “intoxication” presents the rise of a new imperial 
economy as an anomalous state. 
     Robertson embodies the spirit of European exploration in his description of 
Christopher Columbus as a hero who expands the scope of his maritime practice based on his 
study of the technology of navigation. Robertson presents him as a man of “curiosity” whose 
“active mind” finds the Mediterranean Sea “too narrow” (Vol. I Book II: 60). He is also 
depicted as a passionate man of learning and knowledge committed to improving his 
seamanship. The study of “geometry, cosmography, astronomy, and the art of drawing” in his 
youth leads him to embark on life as a sailor (Vol. I Book II: 59-60). In addition, Columbus’s 
marriage with a daughter of Bartholomew Perestrello also contributes to enlarge his naval 
knowledge, because his wife’s father is “one of the captains employed by prince Henry in his 
                                                   
5 See also O’Brien’s quotation from The History of America in Narratives of Enlightenment 155. 
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early navigations” (Vol. I Book II: 61).  
 
Columbus got possession of the journals and charts of this experienced navigator 
[Bartholomew Perestrello], and from them he learned the course which the 
Portuguese had held in making their discoveries, as well as the various 
circumstances which guided or encouraged them in their attempts. The study of 
these gratified and inflamed his favourite passion; and while he contemplated the 
maps, and read the descriptions of the new countries which Perestrello had seen, 
his impatience to visit them became irresistible. (Vol. I Book II: 61) 
 
The course of Columbus’s life works as a microcosm of the entire human history of 
movement and settlement itself. In such a manner, Robertson combines both micro-
perspective and macro-perspective in his narrative. The History of America presents the 
enlightened education of Columbus, but it does not depict him as a man who is motivated by 
the idea of a civilizing mission; he is passionate to improve himself rather than help strangers 
in a distant land. Robertson’s Columbus might represent the figure of a hero, but this type of 
Enlightenment is not directly linked with imperial ambition. Curiosity is the driving force of 
exploration for Columbus in The History of America. 
     Robertson depicts the scene in which Columbus became “the first European who set 
foot in the New World” as a moment of “mutual astonishment” between Europeans and 
indigenous people (Book II: 91,92). The presence of Columbus’s ship caused “terror” among 
these natives because its “dreadful sound resembl[ed] thunder, accompanied with lightening 
and smoke” (II: 92). The scene is presented as the triumph of advanced European technology 
over the primitive people: “they began to respect their new guests as a superior order of 
beings” (II: 92). In this narrative of encounter, Robertson presents Columbus as a European 
explorer rather than as an imperial agent from Spain. Columbus’s landing is represented as a 
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symbolic scene of the encounter between two regions, Europe and the New World as a whole. 
Robertson’s narrative sometimes moves from describing Spaniards into talking about Europe. 
He seems to be less interested in emphasizing difference between the Spanish and British 
Empires than representing Europeans as a leading force of global encounter. 
Robertson concludes the narrative of encounter with a contrast. 
 
Towards evening, Columbus returned to his ships, accompanied by many of the 
islanders in their boats . . . . Thus, in the first interview between the inhabitants of 
the old and new worlds, every thing was conducted amicably, and to their mutual 
satisfaction. The former, enlightened and ambitious, formed already vast ideas 
with respect to the advantages which they might derive from those regions that 
began to open to their view. The latter, simple and undiscerning, had no foresight 
of the calamities and desolation which were now approaching their country. (Book 
II: 93) 
 
Columbus is represented as an “enlightened” figure from Europe, while indigenous people 
are depicted as unable to foresee their future. Robertson’s narrative emphasizes their inferior 
capacity to understand the present situation by employing words such as “simple,” 
“undiscerning,” and “no foresight.” Their contrasting attitudes regarding the consequence of 
this encounter are the pivot of this passage. O’Brien interprets this scene as a dramatized 
representation of the “stadial mismatch” between two “incompatible stages of human 
development” (Narratives of Enlightenment 156). I want to point out that Columbus is not 
depicted as a civilizing subject who aspires to improve the indigenous people. Robertson 
presents Columbus as an enlightened man but not as an agent seeking to enlighten non-
European people. Spaniards in The History of America are interested in the potential benefits 
derived from the New World, not civilizing agents. 
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The History of America is a critical study of the encounter between two distant regions 
of the globe. It is a problematic work in the sense that it articulates the superiority of Europe 
over other regions with emphasis on European advancement in technology. Robertson sees 
Europe as a leading force in the expansion of commercial interaction across the globe. He 
presents the aspiration for movement and settlement as an essential component of human 
nature, and therefore, European exploration beyond the borders of Europe is understood as 
the natural course of the progress of human beings. Robertson’s description of the inferiority 
of indigenous people in the New World, however, does not necessarily serve as the 
justification of imperial conquest. He thinks that Europeans are superior to indigenous 
people, but he does not think that they should improve the people whom they encounter. In 
his historical writing, European explorers are not depicted as enlightening subjects. 
     I contend that The History of America is written as a justification of international 
commerce rather than of imperial conquest. Robertson is aware of the troubling consequences 
of the encounter he describes. The Spanish conquest of the New World exemplifies an 
encounter which causes misery instead of establishing reciprocity. Robertson is critical of 
imperial expansion to some extent because he thinks that colonization establishes the 
“intoxicated” relation between Europe and the rest of the globe. The metropole is poisoned 
by the sudden flow of wealth from its colony, which itself suffered from brutal exploitation. 
The indigenous people were not ready for international trade when Europeans encountered 
the New World. But Spaniards forced them to engage in it by their intervention. Robertson’s 
work aims to distinguish global commerce from imperial conquest. And he keeps a certain 
distance from the discourse that glorifies colonizers as enlightening subjects. 
 
4. India and Global Interconnection 
Two years before his death, Robertson published An Historical Disquisition. It does not 
attempt to write a regional history of India, as its primary focus is the historical process of the 
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“intercourse” between India and Europe. His inquiry is a detailed study of historical 
documents in which Europeans in the past wrote about India. Another important feature of An 
Historical Disquisition is that Robertson writes it without any special knowledge about India. 
His solution to this problem is to see “some Gentlemen who have filled important stations, 
civil and military, in India, and who have visited many different parts of it” (vii). The book is 
thus a product of his conversation with imperial agents. The extensive network of Scots 
enables him to think about India without going there. He mentions that he “had recourse 
frequently to them, and from their conversation learned things which [he] could not have 
found in books” (vii). 
     In the last section of An Historical Disquisition, Robertson proceeds to thinking about 
the influence of the European discovery of the New World upon the commercial interaction 
between Europe and India. This is the moment in which his historical study of the intercourse 
between two regions is developed into his own vision of global exchange. As the outset of 
shaping his narrative, he points out the existence of “a continual drain of gold and silver” 
from Europe into India after the discovery of the new route to India round the Cape of Good 
Hope (Section IV:165). This new route enabled European traders to communicate with India 
“so much more [easily], that the demand for its commodities began to increase far beyond 
what had been formerly known” (IV: 164). To import more commodities from India, 
European traders needed to export more gold and silver. The colonization of the New World, 
then, offered a solution to this problematic drain. 
 
. . . America opened her mines, and poured in treasures upon Europe in the most 
copious stream to which mankind ever had access. . . . and from that time to the 
present, the English and Dutch have purchased the productions of China and 
Indostan, with silver brought from the mines of Mexico and Peru. The immense 
exportation of silver to the East, during the course of two centuries, had not only 
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been replaced by the continual influx from America, but the quantity of it has been 
considerably augmented, and at the same time the proportional rate of its value in 
Europe and in India has varied so little, that it is chiefly with silver that many of 
the capital articles imported from the East are still purchased. (IV: 165) 
 
Robertson presents the historical process in which the intercourse between Europe and India 
was embedded into a larger system of international commerce. This system connects more 
than two regions of the globe. His narrative of the emergence of the wider system of 
international trade shows the synthesis of his interpretation of the European encounter with 
the New World and that of the European intercourse with India. As the end of the quoted 
passage clearly articulates, Robertson assumes that the economic unification of the different 
parts of the earth produced positive effects on each region, mainly the stability of the balance 
of trade. 
     Robertson’s further discussion points out that America also “gave rise to a traffic with 
Africa” as well as “facilitat[ing] and extend[ing] the intercourse of Europe with Asia” (IV: 
165-66). The focus on the interaction between America and Africa, in the form of the slave 
trade, potentially undermines his sanguine view of the balance of trade. 
 
In every part of America, of which the Spaniards took possession, they found that 
the natives, from the feebleness of their frame, from their indolence, or from the 
injudicious manner of treating them, were incapable of the exertions requisite 
either for working mines, or for cultivating the earth. Eager to find hands more 
industrious and efficient, the Spaniards had recourse to their neighbours the 
Portuguese, and purchased from them negroe slaves . . . . In this practice, no less 
repugnant to the feelings of humanity than to the principles of religion, the 
Spaniards have unhappily been imitated by all the nations of Europe, who have 
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acquired territories in the warmer climates of the New World. (IV: 166) 
 
In his description of the historical process of the emergence of the slave trade, Robertson is 
unclear about whether this is a necessary consequence of the expansion of international 
commerce. Gold and silver mined in the New World ensured the stable exchange between 
Europe and India, but this stability was actually based on bloody exploitation in another 
region. Even though Robertson expresses humanitarian sympathy towards the suffering of 
black slaves, he seems to be reluctant to examine the relationship between the development 
of international commerce and the horror of the slave trade. The passage cited just points out 
that Spaniards invented such an inhumane system and other European countries “unhappily” 
followed their way. This claim postpones any critical judgement on the negative effect of 
international commerce and simply emphasizes the role of contingency in the rise of slave 
trade. The whole quoted passage remains ambiguous.  
     Setting aside the further examination of the slave trade issue, his vision of global 
interconnection confirms the central position of Europe in the modern world. 
 
Thus the commercial genius of Europe, which has given it a visible ascendent over 
the three other divisions of the earth, by discerning their respective wants and 
resources, and by rendering them reciprocally subservient to one another, has 
established an union among them, from which it has derived an immense increase 
of opulence, of power, and of enjoyments. (IV: 167) 
 
Robertson imagines that the globe is divided into four regions: Europe, Asia, Africa, and the 
New World (America). His narrative suggests that the present world shows the intense 
interaction among these four divisions. He seems to think that his contemporary world has 
already became fully globalized in the sense that there is nothing outside of the unified 
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system of international commerce. He describes this condition in a positive manner. The 
reciprocal relation between Europe and other regions is presented as a fact of the modern 
world as well as a hypothetical assumption in this narrative. Robertson seems to assume that 
reciprocity is what international commerce has already achieved rather than what it aims for 
in the future. The concluding section of An Historical Disquisition appears to present 
Robertson’s contemporary world as a certain culmination of human activities of movement 
and settlement, which are understood as an essential feature of human nature in his 
philosophical history. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The critique of imperial conquest in The History of America is subsumed into Robertson’s 
vision of global interconnection in An Historical Disquisition. His narrative of international 
commerce aspires to cover the whole surface of the globe, not just European colonies. He 
envisages a process by which the separated parts of the earth are unified into one vast 
network of international trade. This narrative imagines the establishment of the reciprocal 
relation between Europe and the rest of the earth. Robertson’s historical writing understands 
the Spanish conquest of the New World as a failure to achieve this reciprocity. He seems to 
idealize the expansion of international commerce without conquest. 
Robertson sees European agency as helping to bring about this unifying process. As a 
representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, his understanding of geography is underpinned 
by a stadial theory according to which the supremacy of Europe over the non-European world 
is assumed. This confidence comes from his applause for the notable development of learning 
and technology which enables Europeans to spread across the globe. Robertson embodies this 
view in his description of Columbus. This sense of European ascendancy is however, not 
necessarily linked with the justification of European intervention into primitive society. He 
does not think that Europeans are civilizing subjects who are destined to enlighten people in a 
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different stage of social progress. This distinction between European ascendancy and 
European intervention helps us to locate his writing in the anti-imperial strand of 
Enlightenment thought. And his anti-imperial attitude springs from his larger alignment with 
the discourse on international commerce in the Scottish Enlightenment. 
The global approach to intellectual history is useful in grasping the geographical scope 
of Enlightenment thought beyond European colonies. As the phrase “The Great Map of 
Mankind” shows, Enlightenment thinkers are interested in the whole surface of the earth to 
shape their theories of social progress. In Robertson’s case, critical attention to the innate 
restlessness of humankind leads him to discuss the nature and the consequences of 
connection between different parts of the globe. His critical study of this geographical 
connection is elaborated as an inquiry into international commerce. Robertson’s vision of 
global interconnection corresponds to the birth of political economy as one strand in a new 
division of knowledge. In terms of imperial history, Robertson’s writing provides an example 
that helps us to reconsider the relationship between the Enlightenment and European 
Empires, and it suggests a possibility that the Scottish Enlightenment is bound up with the 
anti-imperial strands of Enlightenment thought. In terms of global history, his work marks the 
emergence of a distinctive kind of eighteenth-century global vision. When Enlightenment 
thinkers discuss imperial themes, some of them are aware that the globe is now unified into a 
single network. 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Scottish Thinkers and Eighteenth-Century Literature 
In this thesis, I have discussed the Scottish Enlightenment as a collection of texts helping to 
comprise eighteenth-century literature in a broader sense rather than as a cultural context for 
interpreting eighteenth-century novels and poems. Focusing on the Scottish Enlightenment as 
literary practice has allowed me to examine how Scottish thinkers make use of various forms 
of writing to diffuse their ideas and interact with readers. Hume’s turn from the philosophical 
treatise to essays in the 1740s exemplifies this keen attention to the function of literary forms 
shared among Scottish thinkers. In addition to essays, he also writes works of history, 
philosophical dialogue, and autobiography. The wide scope of his literary practice is 
distinctive, but I emphasize that he is not entirely an exceptional figure in the Scottish 
Enlightenment in this respect. Adam Ferguson writes an “Essay” and several pamphlets. Even 
though Adam Smith continues to endorse the form of philosophical treatise as part of his 
system building, he is also involved with the launch of Scottish periodicals and writes book 
reviews. In addition to natural and moral philosophy, political economy, ethnography, history, 
and biography are examples of the Scottish Enlightenment’s generic diversity. The extensive 
use of essays in the Scottish Enlightenment helps to make this diversity possible because it is 
a form which is engaged with diverse genres. Hume writes essays on moral philosophy and 
political economy, while Ferguson writes an essay on civil society, a kind of ethnography. 
     Three cities in Scotland---Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen---are major hubs of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. But I point out that the space of the Scottish Enlightenment is not 
restricted to Scotland. Scottish thinkers go back and forth between Scotland and England, and 
between Britain and European countries. Their experiences and narratives of being exposed 
to London and Paris are elements of the Scottish Enlightenment. They live as Scots, Britons, 
and cosmopolitan citizens. Hume’s life and self-fashioning as a man of letters exemplify that. 
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In this light, I also see James Boswell as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment. As a diarist 
and biographer, his writing is committed to the use of different literary forms and contributes 
to the generic flourishing of eighteenth-century prose. The emphasis on his friendship with 
Johnson in Boswell studies potentially undervalues his conversational interaction with Hume. 
Due to his professional status, Boswell resides in Edinburgh after returning from his 
continental tour. He experiences London as a Scot and intends to transform himself into a 
Briton and cosmopolitan by the agency of journal-writing. The structure of his journal is 
influenced by Addison’s periodical essays, and therefore, I pair his journal writing with 
Hume’s essay writing. In addition to behaving as an actor who enlightens himself by the 
agency of writing, Boswell is an attentive observer of the Scottish Enlightenment by 
depicting the character of Scottish thinkers and the intellectual culture of the Lowland cities. 
     Like Boswell, Tobias Smollett comes to London after his study at Glasgow University. 
As a Scot, he is exposed to the social and cultural dynamism of the metropolis. London 
continues to be a key hub of his literary activity, while he keeps ties to Scotland by visiting 
Scottish coffee houses in London. Like Hume, he uses diverse literary forms such as the 
novel, poetry, history, and periodical essays. As a novelist, he observes and represents 
London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow in the form of fiction. Trained in medicine, he deploys the 
metaphor of circulation to depict the interconnection between the metropolis and distant 
regions of the globe. I present him as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment in the sense 
that he lives and writes as a Scot away from home, thinks about England, Scotland, and the 
wider world from a comparative perspective, and incorporates the discourse on virtue and 
commerce into novelistic representations. The Expedition of Humphry Clinker suggests that 
novelists and philosophers in the 1770s have a shared ground concerning their attention to the 
nature and consequences of imperial expansion and the enlargement of international 
commerce. 
     My interpretation of Smollett highlights the point that imaginative literature is a 
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component of the Scottish Enlightenment. Recent scholarship in eighteenth century studies 
has paid more acute attention to the interaction between the Scottish Enlightenment and 
literary culture. But scholars tend to locate literary culture outside of the circle of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. This attitude comes from their understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment 
as a context rather than a collection of texts. Looking at Smollett’s work helps us to 
reconsider this emphasis, although I acknowledge that some Scottish thinkers, Hume in 
particular, are reluctant to use the form of fiction in their writing. He is committed to write 
essays on literature as a practice of criticism, but he does not write fiction. This might be 
because he sees himself as a historian and wants to keep the distinction between history and 
fiction. Smith does not write a work of fiction neither. But he is more aware that his system is 
a product of imagination, and actively makes use of fiction in his writing. 
     In the Wealth of Nations, Smith conceptualizes the division of labor. I suggest that the 
idea of the “profession” is important for understanding the feature of the Scottish 
Enlightenment as literary practice. As a consequence of the division of labor, society is 
composed of many specialized professions. In the mid eighteenth century, Britain becomes 
more heterogenous as it expands its interests. Britons come to be aware that their metropolis 
interacts with distant regions of the globe. The increasing awareness of this global 
interconnection poses a question as to who is capable of grasping and representing the whole 
world in a comprehensive manner. This global context undermines the conventional idea in 
the preceding period that men without a profession, chiefly gentlemen, have a comprehensive 
view of the world. Some Scottish writers think that literary activities imaginatively construct 
the comprehensive view. For Smith, writing as system building negotiates with both the 
possibility and impossibility of this imaginative construction. Smith lives as a professor and 
critic. Despite his critical attention to the function of imagination in writing, he does not 
aspire to be a novelist. In this respect, Smollett the novelist develops this Smithian approach 
to the complicated and expanding world. 
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2. Geography, the Heterogenous Globe, and Global Interconnection 
Scottish thinkers engage with geographical information in diverse genres. For most of them, 
geography is a discursive subject, a component of their writing, rather than a distinctive field 
of inquiry. They are interested in geography as a means of reconciling the uniformity and 
diversity of human beings on the globe. Hume’s “Of National Characters” is an example of 
this. In addition, geography provides Scottish thinkers with a setting in which they can test 
whether philosophical principles work properly in particular conditions. Geography is a 
connection between abstract ideas and concrete examples. In the construction of the theory of 
moral sentiments, for instance, Smith presents the European spectator’s response to the 
Chinese earthquake as a case study.  
     By locating the Scottish Enlightenment in a global context, I emphasize that its 
geographical interest is not confined to one particular region such as America or India. In the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith is deeply concerned about the British colonial administration in the 
New World. But he also refers to Asia to conceptualize the reciprocal relation between 
Europe and the rest of the globe. In The History of America, Robertson locates the European 
encounter with the New World in the wider history of human movement across the globe. His 
work is actually more than the history of America due to this wider geographical scope. In 
such a manner, the geographical interest in one region is embedded in the vision of the wider 
web of interaction. I point out the limits of discussing the Scottish Enlightenment in an 
imperial context because the interests of Scottish thinkers extend beyond imperial conquest. 
     The global scope of writing in the Scottish Enlightenment is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, it suggests that the geographical interest of Scottish thinkers covers the whole surface 
of the earth. Reading and writing are a means of making a virtual tour of the globe. Hume and 
Boswell view the heterogeneity of the world with a sense of curiosity. Exposure to the 
diversity of human beings cures Boswell’s gloom. Secondly, the global scope of Scottish 
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Enlightenment writing also means that it is attentive to the question of global interconnection. 
Political economy becomes the primary field in which this interconnection is examined, but 
the awareness of global interconnection is also shared in other genres such as history, novel, 
and travel writing. Some Scottish writers such as Ferguson are concerned about the potential 
conflict between the heterogeneity of cultures and societies across the globe and global 
interconnection as homogenizing force.  
     The global vision of the Scottish Enlightenment largely follows Addison’s view of the 
interconnected world in Spectator No. 69. In diverse forms and genres of writing, Scottish 
thinkers respond to the way in which Mr. Spectator imagines the Royal Exchange as an 
embodiment of global interconnection and expresses his awareness that daily life in London 
is underlain by the continuous interaction between Britain and the rest of the globe. Both 
Smith and Robertson focus on the movement of people, products, and information on a global 
scale. As a cosmopolitan idler in London, Boswell describes his secondhand encounter with 
the South Pacific through conversation with others. Some people in the metropolis even have 
a chance to dine and converse with a visitor from the non-western world. Such encounters, 
whether firsthand or secondhand, are a component of everyday life in the metropolis. 
     In their response to Addison, Scottish thinkers distance themselves from the idea that 
London is the center and embodiment of global interconnection. Even though they emphasize 
that Edinburgh and Glasgow prosper in polite culture, they do not claim that these Lowland 
cities are the center of the interconnected world. As Scots, they are aware of the ambiguous 
position of their home country within the distinction between the metropolis and the 
provinces, between the center and its peripheries. In the Wealth of Nations, Smith envisages 
that Asian cities will become hubs of global interconnection and equivalent to European 
cities, owing to the reciprocal relations of international trade. His conceptualization of 
contingency undermines the sense of European supremacy over the rest of the globe.  
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3. Conversation, Writing, and Diffusion 
The Scottish Enlightenment is conversational. Scottish thinkers exchange their ideas in clubs 
and societies, at university and church, and in coffeehouses, taverns, theatres, and their own 
residences. Their conversations sometimes take place outside of Scotland. Scots live and 
meet each other in London, Paris, Utrecht, and so on. The network of their conversation 
extends beyond regional and national borders. Some Scots such as international traders, 
military officers, sailors, and clerks join the circle of conversation after their return from the 
wider world. Their stories and anecdotes mediate people’s secondhand encounter with the 
rest of the globe in Britain. Some people even have a chance to talk with an indigenous 
visitor from the South Pacific in London. Conversation mediates the process by which people 
in London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow imagine the heterogeneity of the globe and apprehend 
the interconnection of its parts. Print culture is intimately bound up with the idea and practice 
of conversation. Scottish writers communicate with each other by exchanging letters. 
Conversation also appears as a metaphor in various forms of writing. As an essayist, Hume 
presents his writing as a medium of conversation. As a diarist, Boswell conceives of his 
journal as a compendium of conversation. 
As some Scottish writers move back and forth between Edinburgh and London, their 
idea and practice of conversation have influence over English writers as well. By the late 
1790s, most of the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment I discuss here have passed 
away. Smollett died in 1771, Hume died in 1776, Smith died in 1790, Robertson died in 
1793, and Boswell died in 1795. To a certain extent, the deaths of these figures signal the end 
of the intellectual movement starting from Hume’s literary endeavors of the early 1740s. At 
the same time, their idea and practice of conversation diffuse into the work of English writers 
such as William Godwin (1756-1836) and William Hazlitt (1778-1830). As a social thinker 
and novelist, Godwin critically develops Humean ideas about both the possibilities and limits 
of sympathy, and merges the forms of philosophical treatise and novel. Hazlitt writes as an 
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essayist and also thinks about the interaction between philosophical ideas and forms of 
writing. This diffusion of conversational practice outside of Scotland in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries will be the subsequent subject for my inquiry into the Scottish 
Enlightenment in wider literary and geographical contexts. 
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